THE THOMIST

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OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS: THE DOMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JOSEPH

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EDITORIAL

With this issue THE THOMIST is two years old. It is too much for a child of that age to look back over his past and examine his conscience; but it is not too much to expect of a speculative philosophical and theological quarterly. Such a magazine starts with a rich residue of wisdom; it inherits the hard won wisdom of the men of preceding ages and shares in the divine wisdom that God has so prodigally spread before men. In a sense, such a magazine is very old in the first moment of its life, its eyes are already accustomed to long stretches of road and far horizons, its judgments are mellowed by ages it has never known; it can look back.

The obligation to look back arises not from its vicarious age but from its personal youth. For its enthusiasm, youth too often pays the penalty of blindness; this thing, immediately engaging its energies, is so big, so important, worthy of so whole-hearted an effort that it dwarfs every other consideration. It is necessary, precisely because THE THOMIST is so young, to induce a moment of old age as a corrective of that blinding enthusiasm, to look back that details might be seen in the truer perspective of the pattern of the years.

Such a glance at the past of THE THOMIST necessarily focuses

on the statement, in the first number, of goals, hopes, ambitions and means to the fulfillment of these things. That original statement was a declaration of dedication to hard things; it was a prophecy that was not written in exclusively glowing words. By it THE THOMIST asked for judgment; by it, THE THOMIST shall be judged.

It was to have been completely distinctive: a speculative magazine for specialists and non-specialists, solidly scientific yet not stuffily so, with significance for human living in this age in which we live; and its medium of expression was to be English. This much of the prophecy that was a hope has been fulfilled to a fairly satisfactory degree. At least it would be hard to deny the pertinence to modern life of the objectives upon which THE THOMIST has trained its guns. Social unity, peace, social justice, the theology of marriage, and representative government are topics that cannot be ignored by an age in which both political and domestic society are in danger. Where hope for the individual man has been almost abandoned there is need indeed to talk of human and divine friendship. Here there is desperate need to know more about the means and the impediments to full human achievement: about grace, the Church, devotion, obligation, venial sin, faith and humility. In an age that challenges the intellect, the problems of epistemology need not apologize for intruding themselves; where the threat is to brutalize men it is fitting that man's capacities for the delicate beauty of art and poetry be emphasized. The complexity of the world, the domain of physics, the products of psychology are matters of prime importance to an age bowing down under the precious weight of the achievements of science.

Certainly the subject matter of THE THOMIST has been vital. Perhaps the effort to bring a scientific treatment of this material within the grasp of the non-specialist had best be described, moderately, as earnest. Undoubtedly the attempt has, in some instances, failed; in others it has just as certainly succeeded. Complete success might well have raised the question as to the worth of doing a thing so easily accomplished; partial failure is not an invitation to surrender but a challenge to labor. In

this matter, the labor can never be wholly on the side of the author for here the reader is served with solid food; the chewing and digesting cannot be done by proxy with any appreciable effect of nourishment. Yes, the steak could have been more tender! Here and there, but only here and there, an editor saturated with scholasticism has missed a word or phrase that no other man in the world would mistake for English or would suppose did not need translating. But in two years, even such an editor learns to turn his back on the allure of the trim beauty of the Latin terminology.

All of this, however, was as child's play compared to THE THOMIST's fixed determination to walk paths that had yet to be marked, to dig deeper than the deepest well, to look higher than the highest star and to stride towards horizons as yet dimly seen. It was recognized that to strike " sharp, clear blows on the solid rock from which truth is carved " would be dangerous, laborious, halting work, but work relieved by the freshness of the courage thought demands and the mysterious reward that truth reserves to those who value it above all else.

From the beginning the object of THE THOMIST was to attack problems that needed solving, to attempt answers to questions that had been unanswered, to put its shoulder to difficulties that still blocked the path toward deeper truth. The men who would do such work were prophetically described in that first number of THE THOMIST. " They will be fighters who have often been beaten but haven't as yet quit; men who have gone up many a blind alley, pleased to have its blindness uncovered that they might start over again. Many no doubt should have been worn out years ago by the unremitting pace their minds have set, men who have seen nights slip away while their dogged chase went on. They will be driven men, men who cannot stop, men aflame with an inner fire that consumes but does not destroy, men of unquenchable thirst drinking of an unfailing fountain. They will be a courageous lot, pioneers who go a step before their fellows testing the unknown. And they will be a humble lot, for love must ever be humble, and these are the lovers of truth; not anxious about their name, their reputation,

a burst of applause—but terribly, desperately anxious about the truth that waits to be uncovered."

To the glory of our age be it said that such men have been found for THE THOMIST. Inevitably their work has proved dangerous, for the way they walk is unmarked; naturally their results give ground for disagreements, for the problems they attack have not remained unsolved through the years because of sheer neglect. Indeed, it might safely be said, that it is only by such disagreements that the work they have attempted will ever be completed; it is only by testing their swords against worthy steel that sparks will be struck, a smouldering fire started and finally the roaring flames called forth to consume error.

It is only by disagreements which strike sparks that the cause of truth is advanced; only when reason is met by reason, argument by argument, will the fight be worth the breathless interest of the lovers of truth. For only in such a fight will truth have much to win, though it always have nothing to lose; in any other type of battle truth stands to lose its obvious dignity and beauty, while it can win no more than an empty victory. A sword is not a potent weapon against mud; but then neither is mud ever a lethal weapon against the sword.

It is THE THOMIST's hope that the future will bring a constant increase in reasoned disagreements; it is THE THOMIST's misfortune that the present has brought a disagreement that is of another type. Some defense is necssary; and such defense has been given in M. Maritain's comment in this number of THE THOMIST. The immediate pertinence of this matter demands that it be given a few words here.

The disagreement was by Dr. Muller-Thym and was levelled against Mortimer Adler's " Problem of Species." This work of Doctor Adler ran through a good half of the short life-span of THE THOMIST. In the judgment of the editors it attacked a real problem and the position of the author was well argued. That judgment still stands. More than this THE THOMIST does not ask; less than this it will not have. The acceptance of an article by THE THOMIST is not a decree of canonization nor an

infallible approval of doctrine; it is rather a tribute of admiration to the courage and thinking of the contributor. In the judgment of the editors, Mortimer Adler measured up to the prophetic description of its contributors quoted earlier in this editorial; that judgment still stands. It is the hope of the editors that the future will bring many more of Dr. Adler's works to the pages of THE THOMIST.

That one such disagreement found its way into print is a matter of regret. That this disagreement should have come from Dr. Muller-Thym is a matter for very profound regret. But it is not grounds for a campaign of extermination or a process of philosophical excommunication. Dr. Muller-Thym is also listed among the contributors to THE THOMIST during these past very full two years. In the judgment of the editors he attacked a real problem and argued it well; that judgment still stands. In the judgment of the editors, he too has shown himself not adverse to the hard, dangerous work of pursuing the truth. It is the hope of the editors that the future will bring many more of the works of Dr. Muller-Thym to the pages of THE THOMIST.

Because we are so very young we must look back; because we are so very old, with the vicarious age of perennial wisdom, we can look back. Perhaps the most valuable result of the corrected perspective of that backward glance is its solemn warnings and inspiring goads relative to the vitality of Thomism. These past two years were not a time when vital philosophical and theological thinking could enjoy the ease, assurance and approval of a customary thing. The American scene was not marked out distinctively by activity of this sort. In fact, if it were a matter of holding to the comfort of a crowd, philosophy and theology might well have followed one of two roads almost equally disastrous in that they both lead to oblivion.

One such road, crowded with refugees from thinking, is marked by roadside stands which offer to quench the thirst for intellectual death; and offer no other drink to the traveller. Vitality, intellectual or otherwise, is marked by a thirst for life. It cannot be conceived as inspiring the strange ecstasy of the

strangler as he draws the noose tighter and tighter around his own neck. Vitality then has had no part in the activity of the modern positivism which philosophizes on the basis that philosophizing is impossible, which exercises intellect in a denial of intelligence, which investigates man by denying his humanity and explains life by denying it significance. The very intellectual suicide of this type of philosophizing has an effeminate softness about it repellent to the vigor of life. It has shifted its burden to the stalwart shoulders of science; the contemptuous shrug by which science deposits that burden in the trash heap is well deserved. There is no vitality in a philosophy which sinks idly into the soft embrace of distorted dreams and finds its joy only in the company of a life as meaningless, as hopeless, as futile as itself. The vitality of a human thing must find its source in the vitality of the human individual and the vital human life his very nature demands that he live.

The other road to oblivion is less clearly marked. It looks good because it is good as far as it goes; its danger lies in lulling the traveller into the belief that the end of this road is the end of philosophizing. This is the course laid out by the lethargic apostles (strange contradiction of terms!) of truth. This view would place a premium on intellectual flabbiness, give the crown to memory and draw its sustenance from the deposit accumulated by hard working ancestors.

Vitality does not flourish under such conditions; it languishes. Languor has never been attractive to men; still less has it played a part in the hopes, the struggles, the problems, the lives of men. No matter how royal its blood, how perfect the features handed down to it, how rich its potentialities, philosophy cannot spend its time before a mirror admiring its perfection; not and live.

Philosophical suicide and philosophical lethargy are modern answers to philosophical vitality; and both carry their own refutation. Yet both are understandable, for the vitality of vital Thomism is to be had only at a high price. In its nourishment a man must spend his energy to the point of exhaustion, his time to the edge of eternity, his mind to the boundaries of

mystery. It demands that hopes be high enough to crash resoundingly, that ambitions be high enough to fail, that roads be long enough to be endless, and courage great enough to be inexhaustible. This men can understand; this they can and will respect; this they can follow. For all these qualities go into the living of human life; and only on these conditions can human life be lived successfully.

No cost is too high to pay that men might live that human life fully; nor is any cost too high to pay that men might have the truth by which that life may be so lived. To this goal of vital Thomism THE THOMIST renews its dedication of two years ago.

MODERN PSYCHOLOGY AND MAN *

I

THE psychology of Aquinas is essentially a philosophic interpretation of human nature. The psychology of the moderns, on the other hand, is a scientific construction. The former is chiefly concerned with what man is; the latter centers its analysis on what man does. The two disciplines should be complementary in the same sense that the study of substance and the study of accidents are complementary. What I should like to suggest, in this paper, is that the philosophic analysis of man provides a basic set of tools for working over and measuring the value of the data of experimentation and scientific observation.

To accomplish this end, it is necessary to point out, at least in a general way, the different lines of research that have been developed in the schools of modern psychology. By this method I believe it can be shown that the fundamental philosophic outlook has a real bearing on the problems investigated by the experimenter and the clinician. This bearing or relationship is established at two points in the programmes of scientific psychology: first, at the beginning, where the philosophic approach furnishes certain directive principles as to how investigative work shall be prosecuted; second, at the end, where the same outlook supplies further criteria as to how the results of investigation shall be interpreted.

To illustrate: it should be clear to the scientist *pre-investigatively*, that man is an essential composition of soul and body. By this we mean that the relation which obtains between the psychic and somatic parts of human nature, or, more simply, between mind and its material substrate, is substantial in character. Acceptance of this principle will give the true per-

* Editor's Note: This article is to form part of Dr. Brennan's new book entitled "Thomistic Psychology" to be published by Macmillan in the late Spring.

spective not only on the scope and content of scientific analysis, but also on the proper methods of attacking the phenomenal area of human nature. Similarly, it should be obvious to the scientist, *post-investigatively*, that human thinking and human willing are irreducible to purely sensitive acts. Acceptance of this principle will save him from the error of identifying the abstract insights and volitional impulses of man with the sensations and passions of the animal.

II

In his monumental work on the *Origins of Contemporary Psychology*, Désiré Mercier indicated, once and for all, the position which philosophy must occupy in reference to contemporary psychology. This book is indispensable to one who would understand the philosophic milieu in which the science of psychology was born. Mercier was admirably equipped to write such a book. He was thoroughly familiar, through long years of study, with all the fields of the traditional philosophy. He was also equally at home in the experimental laboratory and the intricate techniques of psychological investigation. No one could better discern, therefore, the various philosophic tendencies that manifested themselves in the systems which divided scientific psychology from the beginning.[1]

The pioneer work of Wilhelm Wundt and Gustav Fechner, some three quarters of a century ago, laid down the general lines along which psychological investigation was to advance. These men not only applied the methods proper to physiology, but invented other methods more adequate to the analysis of

[1] Cf. *The Origins of Contemporary Psychology*. Translated by W. H. Mitchell, M.A. London: Washbourne, 1918. Every serious student of psychology should read this book. It is unique as a critical study, from Thomistic principles, of the progressive development of the science of mind. Unfortunately the text has no index. A new edition, supplying the defect, and adding a critique of the research that has been done since 1918, would greatly enhance the value of Mercier's classic work. At this point I should also like to call the reader's attention to Agostino Gemelli's important paper: "Il Punto di Vista della Neoscolastica di Fronte alla Moderna Psicologia," appearing in the *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scholastica*, August, 1934, which I have found particularly helpful in writing the present article.

conscious phenomena. They constructed a new discipline to which the somewhat equivocal name of " psychophysiology " was attached. How significant the title was of clashing philosophic tendencies, Wundt himself perhaps did not realize. But in it, Mercier saw the ancient conflict of two irreconcilable points of view: first, extreme positivism, which sought to make a god of matter; second, extreme idealism, which apotheosized spirit, and was bound to put in its appearance in answer to the claims of pure natural science. With a genius tempered by the common-sense philosophy of Aquinas, Mercier could clearly distinguish between the fruits of objective analysis, and the subjective interpretation which Wundt put on his own experimental findings. Thus, the great Louvain scholar could accept the data of the laboratory and at the same time proclaim a definition of psychology that was strictly in accord with his Thomistic training.

The very philosophic nature of the perennial psychology furnishes a framework of synthesis and an ultimate point of reference for the factual offerings of the scientist. Its balanced dualistic view of man, deriving from the principle of substantial relationship between body and soul, is the only satisfactory norm by which to investigate, set in order, and pass final judgment upon the results of scientific research. How, except on a basis of such intimate union, are we to account for the demonstrable connections between mind and matter? Despite its factual value, the work of Wundt was vitiated by false philosophic prejudices. The strange wedding of incompatible tendencies, manifest in his writings, was possible only to a period that had been heavily impregnated with a long tradition of idealism, but which was pulled just as strongly in a positivistic direction by the enormous development and successes of the experimental sciences. Such was the background against which Wundt projected his vast programmes of research in psychophysiology. If, as Mercier points out, he could have disengaged his mind from the grip of false metaphysical premisses, inherited from his Cartesian forebears; if he could have rid himself of his

Kantian notions of substance, and freely followed the implications which his own researches imposed upon him, he would have been led logically to the hylomorphic position of the Aristotelians. Certainly, he never could have limited the subject matter of psychology to the investigation of the facts of consciousness. Moreover, there is little doubt that he would have accepted, in all its richness and exuberance of meaning, the traditional notion of soul as the first actuality of living matter, the ultimate source of all man's vegetative, sensitive, and rational operations. This is the only empirically-evolved concept which can give shape and substance to the phenomena of human life. But Wundt was never quite able to master the idea. In spite of its unsound metaphysical bias, however, the psychology of the eminent Leipzig investigator represents a definite counter attack on the position that one must commit oneself either to a philosophy of pure matter or to a philosophy of pure mind—as though no other interpretation of human nature were admissible. Indeed, the Wundtian psychology may be said to have inaugurated a movement which, consciously or unconsciously, is decidedly sympathetic towards a revival of Aristotelianism.[2]

III

Perhaps it will not be out of place at this juncture to make an observation on the significance of the important philosophic trends in psychology since the beginning. These are, mainly, three: idealism, positivism, and a critically moderate realism. The first represents the spirit of Plato; the second, that of Democritus; the third, that of Aristotle. In their final analysis, all three positions are epistemological attitudes. According to the idealist, only mind is real. According to the positivist, only matter is real. Only mind, therefore, or only matter, are valid objects of knowledge. In terms of the philosophy of nature, and more particularly, the philosophy of human nature, man is nothing but mind, or man is nothing but matter. In the first case, we have extreme formalism, which is the position of the

[2] Cf. *op. cit.*, pp. 158-59.

idealist. In the second case, we have extreme materialism, which is the position of the positivist. Now, there are two ways in which the elements of idealism and positivism can be combined, so far as the philosophy of human nature is concerned: first, by the Platonic doctrine of accidental union between mind and matter; second, by the Aristotelian doctrine of substantial union between mind and matter. The modern Cartesian, with his insoluble problem of the body-soul relationship, is a sample of our Platonic heritage. His psychology is grounded on the principles of psychophysical parallelism. The modern Thomist, on the other hand, represents the Aristotelian tradition. His psychology is founded on the principles of hylomorphism. Both Fechner and Wundt, it should be noted, were psychophysical parallelists.

IV

Far from being invalidated by the work of the scientist, the basic principles on which Aristotle and Aquinas framed their analysis of man, are emerging with new depth and vigor when confronted with the data of phenomenal investigation. More than ever before, we realize today that the observed facts of consciousness must be correlated with the physiology of human life if they are to be correctly understood. Furthermore, from serious reflection on the content and meaning of these same experimental data, it is obvious that the mechanistic concept of the soul as a property of cortical substance, or the Cartesian notion of it as an immaterial entity whose whole nature is to think, must be ruled out. Ideas of this sort simply will not fit the facts. If there is to be any solid advance made in the field of psychophysical analysis, it must proceed on the principle that the soul of man, like the first actuality of all other cosmic creatures, is a form immersed in matter. This being the case, psychology cannot limit itself to the phenomena of consciousness, but must extend its technical observation to the whole man: his acts, his powers, his habits, and his entire personality. It must be a science of human nature if it is to be a science at all. It must be a science of man as man, if it is to contribute

to the advance of knowledge by its investigation of a special area of reality. Assured against both excess and defect by the correctness of its methodological principles, it need set no boundaries to the daring of its plans for research. With its subject matter accurately fixed upon, it can proceed with assurance to the construction of proper techniques for the attacking of its special problems. More than this, it can so divide the labor of research as to secure, from all sides, a real cooperative analysis, and thus a balanced development, of all its particular problems.[3]

V

Even before Wundt's long and industrious career was closed, a movement was noted among certain of his followers which foreshadowed a new way of envisaging the field of psychology. The secret ambition of the Leipzig experimentalist was to construct a science of mind which would have as exact a pattern of measurement and classification as any other natural science. He left no stone unturned, no avenue unexplored, to accomplish his end; and, in collaboration with his pupils, was able, finally, to arrange the results of his enormous researches into something like a systematic whole. The goal of the Wundtians was twofold: first, to determine the laws of all the complex phenomena that either condition or accompany mental life; second, to investigate the structural contents of consciousness itself. The first part of the programme was really nothing more than applied physiology. Here, as might be expected, the effects of scientific inquiry were extremely gratifying. The second part of the programme, on the other hand, proved unusually barren and inadequate. Here the data seemed peculiarly rebellious to methodic treatment. Wundt concluded that it was not possible to know, directly and by positive technique, the higher processes of conscious life. Thus, the meaning of intellect and will and their non-quantitative acts, remained for him a closed book. It was the classical work of Hermann Ebbinghaus on memorial functions, that paved the way for new researches,

[3] Cf. Mercier, *op. cit.*, pp 349-50.

showing how the immediate introspective analysis of the operations of consciousness provides us with a wider range of data, and more complete information about man's rational nature, than the indirect study of physiological correlates. From this strategic point of departure, the road was short to a scientifically controlled method of self-analysis. Hence, when Oswald Külpe and his Würzburg school developed a systematic way of recording the facts of introspection, and demonstrated its empirical use within the area of conceptual and volitional processes, psychology had made a distinct advance in its claims for scientific recognition. One thing Külpe made abundantly clear: that the investigation of the subject matter of psychology could not continue along the same lines on which sciences like physics and chemistry had been built. It must occupy its own special position in the world of knowledge. This position it can share with no other branch of natural science, first, because of the uniqueness of its method, which allows for the employment of an introspective technique; second, because of the character of its subject matter which falls partly in the field of science, and partly in the field of philosophy. Of course, the use of self observation must be exact and experimentally governed, if its records are to have a universal value. To deny, however, the validity of these records and of the conclusions drawn from them, is to make psychology simply a history of individuals. Indeed, if introspection is illegitimate as an investigative method, then psychology cannot possibly be anything more than an offshoot of physiology. It can hope for little or no enlightenment, for example, on the problems of human thinking and human willing—problems of capital importance for the analysis of human nature. Moreover, if the subject matter of psychology is simultaneously scientific and philosophic in kind, then the science of mind must be more closely related to philosophy than is any other natural science.

Wundt was a naturalist in psychology. Deeply immersed in his physiological studies, he was prone to undervalue the significance of mental functions for the life of man. He was

more interested in somatic correlates than in the conscious acts with which such correlation takes place. In fact, he was willing to abandon altogether the idea that psychic processes, such as volition, can be causally connected with bodily acts, rather than disturb the order and rigidly determined economy of physical operations. Külpe, on the contrary, exhibited a decided preference for the psychic features of man's life. For him, thinking was a purely psychological phenomenon, something to be studied in and for itself and described, if possible, in purely psychological terms. To secure this end, the naïve *Selbstbeobachtung* of Wundt —simply having an experience and later recording it—was not sufficient. In the hands of Külpe and his pupils, self observation became controlled observation. The fertility of the method has been proved over and over again by the work of the Würzburgers. It is sufficient to mention here the splendid researches of Karl Bühler on ideational processes, and of Narziss Ach on the determining tendencies of the will-act.

VI

The third dominant strain to be noted in the development of modern psychology, is phenomenological. It appears very strongly in the work of Carl Stumpf. Now the attention of the investigator is directed towards an analysis of conscious experiences, precisely as these experiences occur to the subject in their virginal immediacy and without implications. This method, it may be said, is a propædeutic to all the natural sciences, but especially to the science of mind. Because of its demands on pure consciousness, phenomenology is closely related to introspectionism. It owes a great deal to the intentional psychology of Franz Brentano who was the first to bring out forcibly the importance of the distinction between the contents of consciousness and its functions. Edmund Husserl, whose name is intimately linked with this phase in the evolution of the science of mind, describes phenomenological psychology as a study of the types and forms of intentional psychology.

VII

Significantly enough, most of the story of modern psychology thus far related, has been confined to the ranks of German scholars. In France and America, the Wundtian concept of psychology as a pure science, on a par with any other positive science, continued to have its vigorous supporters. But, whereas the naturalistic phase encountered no serious obstacles from the early American investigators, it was destined to meet the sternest sort of opposition from the French. Thus, Henri Bergson and Alfred Binet were its avowed enemies from the start. The work of Binet, in particular, was noteworthy because of its basic resemblance, both in content and in spirit, to the labors of Külpe in Germany. With the exception of Charles Spearman's efforts in England, no outstanding contributions were made by the British psychologists to the researches of Wundt and Külpe. The accomplishments of Spearman in the field of factorial analysis, like those of Binet on intelligence, are more in the temper and tradition of the Würzburg school than in the Wundtian manner. Spearman is significant especially for his recognition of the need of building up a science of mind on a basis of sound philosophic principles, a feeling shared by the American, Thomas Verner Moore, who has done much to promote the ideas of Spearman in the United States. The factorialist, whether he admits it or not, is really a faculty psychologist. This is true of every investigator in the field of psychometrics. He is working in the best Aristotelian and Thomistic tradition, since the ground that he covers is concerned with the acts and powers, or the performances and abilities, of man.

The early history of scientific psychology in Italy reveals no marked originality of views. Federico Kiesow followed the methods of his teacher Wundt with marked fidelity and with no better results. Sante de Sanctis likewise organized huge amounts of research work on the principle that psychology is as objectively scientific as any other natural discipline. Vittoris Benussi was a student of the Austrian school of Graz, and his

experimental programmes were designed to clarify the different classes of elementary mental experiences, according to the groundplan drawn up by Alexius Meinong, founder of the school. Most important of all, Agostino Gemelli defended the legitimacy and value of the experimental method in psychology, recognized introspection as an indispensable tool in the analysis of mental phenomena, and insisted on the need of rehabilitating the Aristotelian concept of soul if one is to arrive at a complete doctrine of psychological life.

VIII

What we have said up to this point is a fairly comprehensive summary of the trends in scientific psychology before 1914. After the war (during which research was directed, in the main, towards practical ends) we witness a lively resumption of interest in psychological studies. The outlines of three distinct systems now make their appearance: the gestalt school, whose principal exponents were Max Wertheimer, Wolfgang Köhler, and Kurt Koffka; the eidetic school, represented by Erich Jaensch; and the behavioristic school, with John B. Watson at its head. Aligned historically with the behaviorists is the Russian school of reflexology, with which the names of Vladimir Bechterev and Ivan Pavlov are prominently associated. A great deal of experimental research has been done under the aegis of these three systems, but the systems themselves, as theoretic constructions, have shown innumerable weaknesses and partialities. Other schools, voicing their dissatisfaction with the present modes and areas of investigation, and particularly with the restricted character of such investigation, have begun to put forward claims for admittance into the circle of psychology's official family. The personalistic doctrines of William Stern, for instance, seem to be gaining ground in several quarters. They are significant for the reason, already alluded to, that they would orientate the researcher once more towards a whole-making concept of the subject matter of psychology. The same observation may be made on the total-

ity school of Felix Kruger and Otto Klem, and on the *Verstandnispsychologie* or understanding psychology of Eduard Spranger and his teacher Wilhelm Dilthey. Such views, however, may turn out to be holistic in name rather than in fact.

IX

If there is one psychological system in the contemporary milieu which may be said to occupy a position of preëminence over other systems, it is the gestalt school. How long this superiority will endure is difficult to predict; yet, its birth could have been foretold as a logical reaction to the excessive associationalistic tendencies in the theories of Wundt and his followers. In outlook, gestaltism is squarely set against two false attitudes in psychology: first, the presumption that a science of mind can be founded simply on the analysis of conscious states; second, the pretense that conscious life can be conceived of as a mosaic of elementary sensations, images, and feelings. The first position is defended in the content psychology of Wundt; the second, in the structural psychology of his pupil, Edward B. Titchener. The present successes of the gestalt theory can be understood only if we remember that before the beginning of the present century, psychological phenomena were theorized about and interpreted mainly in terms of physiology. Quite naturally, much was said and written about the quantities and types of sensations, since it is within this fertile area that psychology makes its closest observable contact with physiology. The experimental work of the gestaltists changed all this, by shifting the axis of analysis from sensations to perceptions. Out of the bosom of long and tedious inquiries, especially on the processes of vision, was born the idea that the very first datum of psychological experience is that of *Gestalt* or form. Conscious life is primitively patterned into wholes, each whole having its own degree of configuration. This awareness of form or of patterned experience is an immediate datum, and nothing antedates it in the psychological order. Accordingly, sensations do not exist. Neither is there any need for postulating an

active attention whereby the discrete units of sense experience are brought together, selected, and organized. This is all accomplished by the *Gestalt* which is fitted upon experience natively. One thinks, at once, in such an explication, of the a priori forms of Kant; but the promulgation of another complementary principle eliminates, theoretically at any rate, the prospect of making the form-school an offshoot of Kant's idealism. This second principle states that psychological processes are isomorphic with physiological processes, which means that they have the same construction as the processes in the central nervous system. Going a step further, it is likely, according to Köhler, that neurological processes are patterned on a similar configuration of events in physical nature. If this is so, it is hard to see how the gestalt theory escapes the charge of out-and-out materialism since perceptual functions are reduced, in their final analysis, to a schema of purely cosmic forces.[4]

X

In spite of the vigorous efforts of its founder, the eidetic psychology of Erich Jaensch and his Marburg school has very much declined in general appreciation. Eidetic imagery is an undoubted phenomenon of youthful experience. The fact that it is of such wide incidence to childhood makes it of great interest, of course, to the psychologist. *Anschauungsbilder* are both spontaneous in origin and rich in the delineation of detail. Their reproduction is always easy and immediate. An eidetic individual is one who possesses the ability to project unusually lifelike images of the eidetic sort. Such an ability represents an excessive form of phantasmal function. Its unusualness becomes more pronounced as the individual grows into adulthood. On a basis of observed facts, in the eidetic field, Jaensch has constructed a whole system of psychology. He is concerned, especially, with the determination of personality types which he has arranged in two categories, to correspond with the

[4] *Vide* J. Lindworsky, "Zu Grundfragen der Gestaltpsychologie," *Stimmen der Zeit*, 1924, vol. 127, no. 8.

types of eidetic image manifested by the subject in his perception of the external world. These are: basedowoid or B type, related to Basedow's disease, which is a toxic condition of the thyroid gland; and, tetanoid or T type, related to tetany, which is a dysfunction of the parathyroid gland. In the first grouping, the eidetic image is amenable to control, behaving like the ordinary products of imagination and memory; in the second, the eidetic image has more permanent features, since its form cannot be changed at the command of will. There is a rough resemblance, in these two classifications, to Jung's introverts and extroverts. It is, perhaps, too early to predict what may be the final value of such distinctions. In any event, the Jaenschian typology has gained no very wide recognition among students of mind. Even the author himself does not appear to have overmuch faith in its ultimate survival. Its wholesale reduction of psychological phenomena to terms of imagery is a weakness that is bound to prove fatal. From a philosophic aspect, it is nothing more than a refined form of materialism on a par with the deterministic concepts of the gestaltists and the positivistic notions of the Wundtians.

XI

As its name indicates, the behavioristic school makes external conduct the object of psychological investigation. It is founded on the principle that, for a complete analysis of human nature, one need simply know how man responds to the presentation of stimuli. Accordingly, the less stock set on consciousness, and all its works and pomps, the more possibility there is of a completely objective and scientific record of human behavior. The best material for research, therefore, is not the activity of the human adult, but that of the child or the animal. Here the subject is not conscious of being conscious, and the pattern of behavior is not so liable to be twisted and distorted out of normal shape. In practise, behaviorism is simply a physiological discipline. It is closely related, in its origins, to the functionalism of John Dewey, who was the first American to

insist on the role of reflex arcs in the adjustment of the organism to its surroundings. Man himself, according to Dewey, is just a function or a process. Concepts of this sort are at once suggestive of the phenomenalism of Hume. Also linked up with the behavioristic position is the response psychology of Edward T. Thorndike and his associates, for whom the operations of human learning are explained in terms of stimulus-response bonds. Walter S. Hunter, Karl S. Lashley, Edward C. Tolman, and Albert P. Weiss are some of the better-known experimentalists who have carried on the work of Watson. Animal studies, pursued by Köhler, Lashley, Robert M. Yerkes, and Joseph A. Gengerelli, have contributed to the development of comparative psychology. The fundamental outlook of all the behavioristic schools, so far as the analysis of human nature is concerned, is simply a masked materialism, resulting in either the rationalization of the animal or de-rationalization of man.

We might add, here, that the field of research for the gestaltists is also largely given over to animal psychology. In this respect, they are very much like the behaviorists. The two groups are further alike in their mutual rebellion against the over-technical kind of introspection which was practised by Titchener and the structuralists. But, most important of all, both schools find a kinship in their mutual assumption, either explicit or implicit, of a mere difference of degree between the achievements of man and beast. Thus, the behaviorist applies his concept of conditioned reflexes to the explication of human and animal conduct without distinction. Similarly, the gestaltist employs his theory of perceptual wholes to resolve the intricacies of human and animal learning alike. The two systems differ to this extent: that the behaviorist appears to be primarily interested in the sensorimotor foundations of human behavior and in the biological role of the emotions; whereas the gestaltist is mainly concerned with configurations in the visual field and with problem solving. The latter is more ingenious in devising his experiments, more sophisticated in constructing his neurological hypotheses, than the former. Yet

the physiological bases of the two schools would seem to be the same. Köhler, for example, recognizes the studies of Lashley on neural mechanisms as basic to his own theories.

XII

These, in the main, are the leading systems of psychological research. Even so brief a survey as we have made is sufficient to indicate the distressing difficulties under which the science of psychology, as a whole, is laboring. The root of the trouble, as I think, lies in the failure of the investigators to appreciate the proper scope of their discipline. They cannot agree on the subject matter of psychology. Apparently, they have overlooked or forgotten the fact that, in order to build up a true science of mind, one must study, not this or that particular function of consciousness to the exclusion of other data, not somatic processes as a substitute for psychic processes, not the evolutionary tendencies of the organism or its motor responses to stimuli, but man, in all his various manifestations. I would go a step further and say that the failure of the investigators is also due to their inability to appreciate the true nature of the subject matter of research. On what grounds, for example, does the behaviorist proceed *as if* man were merely an animal? Or by what antecedent evidence does the structuralist or the gestaltist proceed *as if* all man's conscious activities were reducible to a complexus of sensations or perceptions? Such methodological principles may be quite legitimate for the physiologist, or even for the animal psychologist, but for the student of human nature, they are wholly false and unwarranted. If it is admitted, as I think we can admit, that psychology has the potentialities of becoming a well-established science, this does not mean that it can do so without the aid of philosophy, or in spite of such aid. Aristotle could have foretold the confusion and polemic of modern psychology had he known the false metaphysical premisses with which the majority of investigators begin their studies, or the equally false metaphysical conclusions with which many end their labors.

Mere acquaintance with the facts of the laboratory does not warrant the making of philosophic pronouncements on the nature of man; yet, acquaintance with the nature of man is required if the observer of the facts is properly to understand them, even in their scientific aspects, and if he is to exercise the correct perspective upon them in their relation to the whole of psychological knowledge.

XIII

The leading criticism of the official systems of psychology has come from the psychoanalytic school. Now we step from the laboratory into the clinic; and while the method of gathering data is no longer experimental in character, yet it is employed over a field of observation that is wider and better calculated to give us the synolistic or whole-making approach which psychology needs today. The great merit of Sigmund Freud and his school is that of having shown the real importance of unconscious mental processes and their influence on conscious activities, particularly in the orientation of the individual towards a normal goal of life. Of course, other psychologists had made investigative studies of these unconscious phenomena. Jean Charcot, for example, and his disciples, Pierre Janet and Theodule Ribot, contributed several valuable analyses on obsessions and hysterias. But Freud was the first to show the intrinsic meaning of unconscious processes for the psychological pattern of individual life. In order to clarify the associations between the manifest and latent contents of the mind, it was necessary to study a wide expanse of pathological data. The abnormal, in mental phenomena, had been decidedly neglected by the official psychologists. Freud found it a fertile region for exploration. On a basis of certain observed facts, he built a psychological system which, in its roots, is simply a revival of the old associationalistic doctrine, with instincts or instinctive urges supplying the role once played by sensations and images. Freudianism, however, is not merely a theory of instincts, or a branch of psychiatric science, or a method of probing the depths of the unconscious. More seriously, it is

proposed as a philosophy of life, and a philosophy of the grossest materialism. In fact, towards the end of his career, the writings of Freud show little or no concern with psychological data, as such. Psychoanalysis has had its ardent defenders, but it has also given rise to dissident schools. The foremost of these latter are the systems of Carl Jung and Alfred Adler. Jung's name is linked up with the beginnings of type psychology; just as Adler's name is prominent in the development of character psychology. The very existence of psychoanalysis and its derivative disciplines is proof that the official psychologists have been too narrow in setting the boundaries of investigation, either within the area of consciousness exclusively, or within the dimensions of objective behavior exclusively.

Obviously allied to the theories of Freud, Jung, and Adler is the rising science of individual differences, which some investigators, like Emil Utitz and Ernst Kretschmer, regard as a completely established and autonomous discipline. It is sometimes referred to as the psychology of individual criteria, or, more simply, as criteriology. The study of such criteria has been given great impulse in the writings of Ludwig Klages and Eduard Spranger, both of whom have attempted to set up a philosophic superstructure on their scientific work. The results represent a rather unsuccessful adventuring into the realms of idealism. They are interesting, nevertheless, as symptomatic of a basic need which investigators generally are showing, of an ultimate interpretation for the phenomena of human nature. The point about the whole matter is not that a science of psychology cannot be integrated with a philosophy of psychology, but that the science of psychology is one sort of discipline, and the philosophy of psychology is something entirely different. To neglect this distinction is to fall either into a materialistic position, like that of the behaviorist or the Freudian; or into an idealistic point of view, like that of the criteriologists, Dilthey and Spranger; or into an exaggerated dualism, like the phenomenalistic attitude of Husserl, Meinong, and their followers. On the other hand, to say that scientific psychology has no organic connection with the philosophy of psychology is to picture the

former as a mere summary of facts, or an enumeration of accidental relationships. But man, who is the proper object of psychological investigation, simply cannot be studied in this unreal manner.

XIV

So multiple and changing are the manifestations of human life that it is impossible to trust to a single method or a single system for an analysis of these manifestations. The techniques of psychophysiology can still be employed to advantage and yield new results, especially in determining more explicitly the profound intercommunications between psychic and somatic activities. The methods of direct experimentation, wherein the introspective tool is cautiously used, also will yield further insights, particularly in the field of purely psychic processes, such as thought and volition. Again, phenomenal observation of the type practised by the gestaltist, can, if properly developed, widen our knowledge of perceptual functions, as a point of departure for the investigation of conceptual functions. The objective methods of the behaviorist, too, will extend our grasp of the mechanisms of external reaction, reflex movements, and locomotive patterns of conduct. Finally, the exploration of the unconscious by the clinical techniques of the psychoanalyst will clarify more and more the import of man's carefully concealed mental abnormalities. The thing to remember, always, is that no single group of experiments, no analysis of individual operations, no exclusive use of one method, will give us a complete picture of human nature. Moreover, it must be remembered that no amount of factual information which is not properly ordered and integrated with a true philosophic concept of man, can ever serve its final purpose of being built up into a permanent science of psychology.

XV

As we examine, in retrospect, the work of the investigators, one significant point strikes us immediately. It is the fewness of the generalizations that have emerged from inductive studies.

We have no theoretic psychology, in the sense that we have a theoretic physics or a theoretic chemistry. Perhaps the situation can be best expressed by asking: where are the universally recognized laws to cover such processes as sensation, perception, imagination, memory, learning, intellection, attention, association, emotional response, volition, in the same way that universally recognized laws cover the phenomena of matter? Of course, there is an abundance of specialized information about the acts and powers of man. Indeed, on some problems, investigators have accumulated enormous quantities of data; but we are speaking here of laws that have been established on a purely objective basis, and are commonly recognized in all quarters. Johannes Lindworsky, for example, has made a very commendable attempt to formulate a theoretic psychology without appealing directly to philosophic concepts. The attempt, however, does not satisfy the demands of strict theory, and the conclusions are too abstract to be of value to a humanistic science like psychology. Indeed, the most significant generalizations that have been achieved thus far, are nothing more than common-sense records of matters of public experience, to attain which no expert knowledge or instrumental technique is required. We have learned a great deal about the structure and functioning of the sense organs. The role of the nervous system in the activation of conscious processes is better known. The significance of the cortex in the conditioning of reflexes is better understood. The part played by body resonances in the operations of the animal appetites has been clarified. The effects of fatigue, glandular secretions, and drugs of different sorts, on mental acuity, have been carefully studied. But, in the last analysis, these are all topics of physiological investigation. Few, if any purely psychological descriptions have been contributed by the investigator to the content of scientific psychology; just as few, if any, successful attempts have been made to formulate a system of theoretic principles as a working basis for future psychological research.

XVI

Where the schools have erred, of course, is in extending to the whole of man's psychological life, what is demonstrably true of only a part of it. We have already noted how, for the behaviorist, reflex action explains everything; for the gestaltist, perceptual patterns, with isomorphic structures in the nervous system, tell the whole story of man's conscious life; for the disciples of the Marburg school, the eidetic image is the supreme fact in the development of human personality; for the Freudian, the interplay of instincts is the final principle of all human achievement. But, reflexes, percepts, images, and instincts are only particular problems in the whole of man's psychological life. What we need today, as Aquinas would indicate, is really less of psychology and more of anthropology, using the term " anthropology " in its traditional meaning to signify the study of man. For, that is what psychology should be: the study of man, as man, not as a concatenation of reflexes, or a sum of perceptual configurations, or a series of imaginal processes, or a complexus of instinctive responses. Such things are simply isolated events in the history of human nature, and they have no meaning except in relation to the whole nature. Further, the study of man, as man, means the study of man as a besouled organism, or as a creature composed of matter and spirit, whose operations fall within the dimension of scientific analysis, but whose fundamental nature is the proper study of philosophy.

Just as there is no one idea deep enough to exhaust the contents of reality, no one term or proposition which completely describes it, so there is no single formula to express, in all its richness of meaning, the notion of human nature. One representation of it is, however, more full and more exact than another. If we are looking for an idea that expresses the central aspect of philosophic psychology, then the concept of man as a creature composed of body and soul, is as faultless as any. Of course, such a concept is really very complex. Accordingly, it is allowable, for the sake of clearer understanding, to consider its different facets as though they were sepa-

rate realities. In this way, we are justified in studying the acts and powers and habits of man, one by one, as though they were discrete properties or accidents of human nature; but all such peripheral entities derive their significance from the fact that they are rooted in the substance of man. All, therefore, must be analyzed and interpreted, eventually, in terms of this central substance which is, itself, a composition of matter and form. From the principle of a substantial union between body and soul, therefore, as from a fountainhead, spring all the peripheral truths that complete our phenomenal analysis of man. These truths, from their position of dependency on the central principle, can touch only the accidents of man. We may designate them truths of the structural order, in the sense that powers are accidental parts of a nature; or we may call them truths of the operational order, in the sense that the movements of powers are accidental manifestations of a nature. The point is that structures and operations do not constitute a nature but presuppose it. This being the case, it is of capital importance that we understand the fundamental constituency of man's nature before we theorize about the meaning of his attributes. Understanding his essence, we can understand the arrangement and distinction of the acts and powers that flow from his essence and exhibit it, phenomenally, to scientist and philosopher alike. Thus, it becomes as wrong for the scientist as for the philosopher, to say or imply that man does not share some of his acts and powers with the plant and animal kingdoms, or that he is not essentially distinct, by other acts and powers, from both these orders of being. Putting the matter more concretely, I should say that it shows greater conformity with the demands of scientific evidence to regard man as the proper subject of rational, sensitive, and vegetative functions, and to look upon his soul as the basic operational principle by which he lives, feels, and thinks, than to attempt a monistic or falsely dualistic solution of the problems of human psychology. The investigator who recognizes the human person as a substance compounded of mind and matter, will find no difficulty in grasping the significance of the data which he studies in the laboratory

or the clinical chambers. For one who shares, with Aquinas, the view that man is a synolon, made up of contrasted psychic and somatic elements, there can be no idealistic fear that psychology will end by materializing the spirit of man, just as there can be no positivistic fear that psychology will vanish into the realm of the unknowable by dematerializing the body of man.

XVII

Despite the fact that it was born in an atmosphere of positivism, scientific psychology has profited by its separation from the field of philosophy, just as philosophic psychology has found it to its advantage to have its phenomenal area studied by the investigator. Thus, science is kept within proper bounds, at the same time that it is supplied with principles by which to interpret its data and formulate its laws. Similarly, philosophy is restricted to the goals and methods that are appropriate to its speculative nature, at the same time that it is compelled to reexamine its doctrines in the light of experimental evidence, to extend the application of its principles, and to explore the possibilities of clarifying its doctrines by modern instance and example. Every perennial philosophy has a twofold life: the eternal life of its spirit; and the temporal life of its body. Its eternal life is, of course, unchangeable, because it is the very essence or truth of it, the thing that sets it apart, at once, from all false interpretations of reality. Its temporal life, on the other hand, is changeable. It grows with the growth of time, with the slow grandeur of centuries, with the discovery of new information. This is the life which enriches itself with the achievements of science, with the creations of art, with the history of nations. Psychology, as a philosophic discipline, has such a dual life. It faces time and eternity. It looks to the metaphysician in order to see the supreme ontological meaning of the truths which it proclaims; but it also looks to the work of the investigator in order to clarify its knowledge of the principles on which it is grounded.

Nor need the philosopher have any fear of the results of scientific inquiry. It is true that the positivists in psychology

have laid their trust in the methods of empirical investigation to free their science from the incubus of the soul; but positivism is simply a mental attitude which cannot change the intrinsic character of the findings which the investigative organ brings to light. There is really no substance to the shadows that cling to the atmosphere of the materialist's laboratory or clinic. The diffidence which some philosophers have exhibited toward the experimental method in psychology is due, not to their alarm at its being applied to immaterial phenomena like thoughts and volitions, but rather to the fact that the experimental tool is manipulated only too often by those who have no philosophic training or insight, and who therefore, are unqualified to recognize the existence and meaning of the immaterial accomplishments of man.

XVIII

In concluding, let us summarize the results of our examination of the modern systems in psychology. And since we are interested primarily in correcting false attitudes let us indicate once more, briefly, just where things have gone awry.

The first mistake is in the point of view that the sole subject matter of scientific psychology is either consciousness and its phenomena, or behavior and its phenomena. Obviously, the Cartesian wedge is still doing its work effectively when it can divide investigators into such widely opposed camps. A dichotomy of this sort not only fails to recognize the difference between the psychological, as such, and the physiological, but it also fails to see that man reconciles both within the depths of his human nature. And even in the field of consciousness alone, or of behavior alone, there is the further failure to distinguish between phenomena that are rational in kind, and phenomena that are simply sensitive or vegetative in character.

The second mistake is in the investigator's complete abandonment of philosophic criteria for his work. Out of this abandonment comes the loss of the precious concept of the soul, and its ensuing loss of the concept of human nature. Of course, I do not mean to say that it is the scientist's business to investi-

gate the soul or the nature of man, for these are philosophic problems. But surely, if the scientist cannot successfully prosecute his work and build up his science without a truthful knowledge about human nature, then such knowledge must be presupposed to his investigations. At any rate, he must not theorize in a way that would negate the correct philosophic analysis of man. This, however, is just what he has too often done. We are forced to conclude, therefore, that the sad state of affairs in the science of psychology today must be due, in no small measure, to bad philosophic influences. Such can be shown to be the case, historically, I believe. Thus, under the influence of Kant, on the one hand, and of Comte, on the other, the scientists have been completely overcome by their special preferences, either for the informations of subjective consciousness alone, or for the data of objective behavior alone. And so we witness a convergence, from idealistic and positivistic streams, of concepts that mark the investigator as a false dualist, if he is not already an out-and-out materialistic monist. With the disappearance of the notion of substance, the notion of soul vanished out of reality. This made it relatively easy to discard the idea of consciousness in favor of the idea of behavior. Without a soul, psychology is like a temple without a deity, or a home without a family spirit. Of course, phenomena constitute the proper area of investigation for the scientist, in psychology as in any other discipline. But concentration on phenomena alone, as events have shown, tends to reduce psychology to the level of pure physiology. This is true in the case of the Wundtian as well as the behaviorist, of the gestaltist as well as the response psychologist. Moreover, the prejudice created by the extraordinary progress of the experimental sciences, as contrasted with the sterility of philosophic discussion at its worst, has filled the minds of scholars with a distrust of speculation. This attitude has been strengthened by the fact that non-psychological sciences depend on a method that is strictly objective, whereas psychology must fall back on the data of introspection in order to resolve its major problems. The latter circumstance has led men gradually to think that the temper of

psychological investigation is at basic loggerheads with any kind of external observation, with the result that they either have concentrated too much on the phenomenally conscious aspects of their subject matter, or else have given themselves up exclusively to the study of objective behavior.

Finally, let us urge once more the point that not every philosophy is useful to the science of psychology, but only that analysis which expounds the truth of human nature. Such, I take it, is the analysis which was formulated over two thousand years ago by Aristotle, which was subsequently taken over, refined, and developed by Aquinas, and which presently is known as the traditional psychology. This is the position which denies the idealistic creed that psychology is nothing but a philosophy of spirit, and, with equal vigor, denies the positivistic position that psychology is simply a physiological discipline. Every investigator, at some time or other, is confronted with the task of passing judgment on his work. His research programmes can be marred and distorted, and his conclusions invalidated by wrong philosophic premisses which, wittingly or unwittingly, he has accepted as a basis of his inductive procedures. Now, the psychologist is a student of human nature; and human nature fairly bristles with problems that require the combined efforts of the scientist and philosopher, if adequate solutions are to be reached. It is difficult to see, then, how the investigator can avoid assuming some definite philosophic attitude towards the subject matter which he is studying. In this case, the subject matter is man, regarding whom there can be but one satisfactory attitude. It is the position which recognizes in every human being, regardless of race or age, a creature possessed of soul and body; a cosmic entity made out of spirit and matter; an organism quickened with a principle of rational life; a corporeal substance that not only vegetates with the plants and senses with the animals, but also, and more importantly, thinks with the angels and reflects on its ultimate destiny.

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THE REJECTION AND PROTECTION OF FAITH

SOMETIMES, a man who withdraws his allegiance to the Catholic Church on the plea of " lost faith " is viewed with sympathy by his former co-religionists, much as a mechanic whose hand has been cut off is commiserated by his fellows. More than frequent, this occurrence is common; it is the outgrowth of an attitude which is widespread. The boy who goes to a state university well grounded in the principles of his religion, and returns unprincipled because that ground has been replaced with the shifting sands of chronic doubt, is generally pitied, rather than blamed. How often it is said, " Poor chap! He has no faith; his studies took it away from him." One pities the habitually vicious youth who " loses his liberty " because he has killed a man in cold blood. Yet such regret recognizes that the murderer is responsible for his own plight; the loss he suffers is self inflicted. The point of view toward " loss of faith " bears a different stamp; the loser is thought of as more sinned against than sinning. Something has been taken from him—as if faith were carried around in the head as a purse is carried in the pocket, an easy prey to the wily mind of an intellectual light-fingers.

This consideration of defection from the faith as a sort of unavoidable, albeit tragic, plight into which a man is pushed, or as a sort of loss inflicted on a man from the outside misses, almost completely, the true role that man himself plays in faith. If we speak precisely, we cannot say that a man loses his faith. Actually, a man cannot lose his faith; it is an impossibility. Many things man has he can lose, things which belong to him more properly than faith does. Arms, legs, life itself, may be lost. A man can even lose his mind; circumstances of which he has no mastery whatsoever can enter in and unseat his reason, but while that reason rules no book, no school, no teacher, no education has power to make a man lose his faith. These are circumstances in which a man places himself, and which, all

too easily, may occasion the rejection of faith; they cannot take it from him. A man may be deprived of his faith, but the deprivation is self-imposed; a man does not lose his faith; he throws it away.

When a fine roadster has been hustled away from a man's door at midnight to have its engine number changed by a gang of auto thieves, the owner has been imposed upon. He has suffered the loss of his car. There is no parity between this and loss of faith. Even though a Catholic leaves his faith in a road where it might be said to tempt every faith-stealer in the world, it just cannot be sneaked off while its owner is busy with other matters. Pry and push as the world will, only the possessor of faith has the key which can release it. "Loss" of faith is not a mere privation imposed on a man; it is not only a withdrawal of assent to doctrines which were once firmly adhered to, for giving up the faith involves a positive act of the will moving the intellect to deny doctrines it once affirmed.

This downright pertinacity of the will present in every departure from the faith is commonly overlooked. Very often it is thought that God, somehow, is responsible for a man's defection, as if He suddenly put out the light of faith in a man's mind, for some reason of His own and without any action on the man's part. This sort of explanation is far from rare. Who has not heard the would-be pious remark, "Well, the Lord, for some reason He understands took his faith away from him." If such an explanation is far from rare, it as far from being correct. Because in all things God is eternal, His love for man too, is eternal, immutable. Faith, by which man comes to dwell in God, is an effect of that love; it is through faith that man rises to the high estate which is the very culmination of God's love for him.[1] Truly, faith is a gift given only by God, but He never takes it away. Faith He bestows by moving the will with His grace; grace sufficient to protect that faith He

[1] H. Denziger et J. B. Umberg, S. J., *Enchiridion Symbolorum* (18th-20th ed.; Freiburg in Br., 1932), 801. Per fidem ideo justificari dicamur, quia "fides est humanae salutis initium," fundamentum et radix omnis justificationis.

always gives it; [2] it is a perennial gift. To maintain that He would recall the gift, by causing the will to move against His truth is to conceive of God as changeable and capricious. Faith is the foundation of the spiritual life; it is the rock on which all else is built.[3] When the foundation is removed the superstructure tumbles in ruin. How could it ever be that He Who rears an everlasting dwelling for man in the realms of Heaven would dig from a man's soul that home's foundation which He Himself has laid? When the effect of divine love leaves a man's soul, it is because man has rooted it out.[4] If faith is pried from under the edifice of the spiritual life, only its owner is to blame.

If faith is not lifted out of the soul, neither does it roll out, as a diamond rolls from its setting. Long years away from church, repeated and enduring excursions in sin, might encrust the mind with indifference, even with forgetfulness. Still, until a man has ceased to believe, by disbelieving, his faith is intact. All signs of a Christian life may depart, but the foundation remains until it is wilfully dug up. In this sense, faith is a strong, a tenacious thing. Nothing can dislodge, nothing can break its hold except the will of the man who has once accepted it.

Were faith what Protestantism has made of it, a feeling of God in the conscience and heart, or "an instinctive personal communion with the Infinite," then truly it would be something we could grow out of. Indeed, we could grow out of it, into it, and out of it again, as one can grow in and out of a grouch, depending on the antics of the barometer or the whimsy of the stock market. Such a "faith" lies on the very surface of a man's life; it cannot touch him closely, intimately, for it depends on his feeling of confidence in God, his awareness of the poetry of existence, and these, in turn, often depend on the state of one's liver. The rather odd results of such a "faith"

[2] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 112, a. 3, ad 2um. Defectus gratiae prima causa est ex nobis; sed collationis gratiae prima causa est a Deo.

[3] *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 16, a. 1, ad 1um. Fides est necessaria tamquam principium spiritualis vitae.

[4] *Ibid.*, q. 2, a. 9. Ipsum credere est actus intellectus assentientis veritati divinae ex imperio voluntatis a Deo motae per gratiam.

are a bit disconcerting. On a glorious October morning, a fine clear head, inspired and lifted up by a blaze of foliage aflame with death, could bow in adoration of the God it feels must be. In the dull greyness of the slushy March, an aching brow jumping to the beat of diseased sinuses would bow only to a pillow, feeling the world but a swirling hodge-podge in the midst of a void. But, this is not faith; this is the reaction of nerves and organs to the irritants of life.

Faith bites deep into a man's nature, bites deep with a grip of iron that is not shaken by all the hammerings of the world. In all the allegiances which fill a man's life, there is none more complete, more absolute, more absorbing than the act of faith. No doubt, no question weakens its adherence to the truths which God has revealed. In everyday life, assent is given to a multitude of truths. Reason tells a man that if all his money is gone he has no more to spend, and he assents. It is certain; the evidence of empty pockets forces the mind to say so. In faith, because God has said so, these truths, these doctrines, are accepted as true; it is certain, not on the word of human reason, but on the awful testimony of God. Under the direct aegis of divine grace, acceptance of the truths of faith is presented to the human will as a most desirable good. The good is presented, assent to these doctrines on the word of Divine Wisdom is commanded, and the intellect under the influence of the will, backed up by the drive of Omnipotence, fills itself with the truths, embraces them—believes.

The peculiar tenacity of faith is traceable to this complete commitment of the will, under the action of grace, to the good, assent to divinely revealed truth. In the assent thus commanded the intellect is fastened, locked, much as the gears of a car are secured in high speed by the operation of the hand shift. Only through a new movement of the shift can the gears be changed to another speed, and only through a positive act of the will can the assent of the will be moved. Assent once commanded is withdrawn only by dissent.[5]

[5] *Ibid.*, q. 10, a. 2. Dissentire, qui est proprius actus infidelitatis, est actus intellectus sed moti a voluntate, sicut et assentire.

Rejection of faith, or dissent to revealed truths, is generally conceived to be a purely intellectual affair, as if the mind which once saw and understood the Church's doctrines suddenly ceases to see and understand them. It is this popular misconception which would trace " loss of faith " to something wrong in a man's head, whereas it must always be traceable to something very wrong in a man's will. Protestantism, of course, roots faith in the emotional needs, and so, since a man cannot be held responsible for not feeling the need, he is not to be blamed for lacking a faith those needs would engender. Catholics, on the other hand, seem too liable to think that what a man's mind sees or does not see in the doctrines of the Church will spell the difference between acceptance or rejection of those same doctrines. If assent to the Church's teachings depended on what we *see* of them, then no one could possibly be a Catholic. The unshakeable certitude with which the mind affirms the truth of Christian doctrine is not based on the hold man's intellect can make on those truths; rather, that certitude is founded on the truth of God. With his own mind, man cannot see that all these truths have to be true as he can see that a mathematical formula has to be true.[6] All he can hope to see with his own mind is that they have to be true, because the divine mind has revealed them as true.[7] The white light of faith does not fall in luminous splendor on such truths as the Trinity, so that the believing mind can see It as an inescapable truth like the multiplication table. A human mind, swinging the searchlight of faith back and forth over the mysteries of God can see only an outline, as of a shrouded figure on a pedestal. One thing, however, which bears no shroud is the pedestal itself. So sharply does that stand out that the intellect, in most things insistent on seeing before accepting, bows down to what it cannot see because it sees so clearly that the unseen stands on the shining rock of God's word.

[6] *Ibid.*, q. 1, a. 4. Nec fides nec opinio potest esse de ipsis visis aut secundum sensum aut secundum intellectum.

[7] *Ibid.*, q. 2, a. 2. Actus fidei ponitur credere Deo, quia . . . formale objectum fidei est veritas prima, cui inhaeret homo ut propter eam creditis assentiatur.

When the intellect never accepts the mysteries of the Church because it *understands* their truth, it is obvious nonsense to maintain that it suddenly refuses to accept them because it has ceased to understand their truth. All the pondering and study in the world cannot show how the mysteries of faith are true; neither can all the study and pondering in the world produce a how or a why they are not true. They are beyond the penetration of the mind.

In the ordinary processes of intellectual operation, the mind has, or at least can have, a complete view of the proposition known. Not only can it know, but it has a natural desire, an appetite to slip behind the appearances of things and penetrate to their heart until it knows them completely. This eternal curiosity of the human mind is like a fire which endeavors to devour all it meets. So deep rooted is its urge to burn that it licks angrily even at an asbestos barrier, and continues to dart at it until dead. Natural desire knows no repose. The restless flame of the human mind, which turns into itself all it encounters, naturally hurls itself at the impenetrable truths of divine faith in an endeavor to penetrate them. It is inevitable that the intellect be restive in the presence of faith's obscurity, restive, not because it sees falsehood in what it accepts, but simply because it cannot see enough. Faith's object is God Himself, but God seen obscurely, as in a dark glass; the mind whose habitual occupation is making the obscure clear wants to get behind that dark glass.

The intellectual unrest, which often stirs in the consciousness in the form of questions, is what good people anxiously consider, "temptations against faith." Actually, it is only the sign of a healthy faculty endeavoring to exercise its normal mode of action. The very concern such activity occasions is a fair indication that it offers no threat to faith. Such mental squirmings cannot be a direct threat to the mind's acceptance of revealed truth, no matter how often they rise, nor how long they last. Indeed, the simple expedient of an "I believe," imperated by the will which represses the mind's fidgeting, is another cord binding the intellect to its assent.

Confronted with knowledge nullifying previously known evidence, which had caused the intellect to accept one side in a given question, the mind reverses its decision. One bit of testimony setting at naught preceding testimonies will cause a jury to change its verdict. But, the mind can never be a juryman sitting in judgment on the doctrines of the church through an appraisal of what it sees in those doctrines. It is not an estimation of what the truths say that inspires the intellect's adherence to them; it is the veracity of Him Who says them. The mind assents *to* the doctrines, but not *because* of the doctrines. The intellect cannot withdraw its assent, because in the matter of faith it does not control its assent.[8] Only the conformity of man's will to the divine will can command the assent of faith, and only man's rejection of the divine will can retract it. Hence, so long as the will is firmly fixed in its adherence to the good it sees in the acceptance of God's word on God's authority, all the strainings of the intellect can be only on occasion for making firmer the will's determination.

A strong knight is the will which, girt with the armor of divine grace, defends the fortress of faith against all comers. Unfortunately, though, this defender, unconquerable in battle, can and often does abandon his post. It is the will, under the direction of God's aid, which causes the assent to faith;[9] it is the will, with that same aid, which maintains and defends the assent to faith; and, it is the will, of its own power, which demolishes the assent of faith.[10] Because the will is the guardian of faith, it is against the will that all frontal attacks on the faith are directed.

One of the most devastating attacks the will has to meet, in this regard, is the advance of pride. It is devastating because insidious; its greatest attack is in seeming not to attack, for it

[8] Denziger-Umberg, *op. cit.*, 1794. Illi qui fidem sub Ecclesiae magisterio susceperunt, nullam unquam habere possunt justam causam mutandi aut in dubium fidem eandem revocandi.

[9] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 2, a. 1, ad 3um. Intellectus credentis determinatur ad unum, non per rationem sed per voluntatem.

[10] *Ibid.*, q. 10, a. 2, ad 2um. Contemptus voluntatis causat dissensum intellectus, in quo perficitur ratio infidelitatis.

offers the victory of self-sufficiency. God endowed man with a certain measure of self-sufficiency, that he might obtain an eternal crown by ordaining the gift to its giver, but man sometimes suffers under the illusion that his self-sufficiency is perfect enough to justify him in putting a crown on himself. Faith is definitely a subjection; it is an admission that God knows so much more about Himself than man does, that man can accept His word for it. Once the will has accepted this subjection as a good, it is not thereby invulnerable to the attacks of pride. Few men, perhaps, become so intent on their own general excellence that, recognizing a subjection in the assent of faith, they recall that assent merely to express their distaste for all restraint. Pride is a great master at camouflage and make-up. In itself, it has no beauty, and so it must assume pleasant shapes before it can slink into a man's will.

"Enlightenment" might be the reason a rapidly advancing scientist would give for rejecting the teachings he learned in the nursery and came to revere as a college boy. Courageous analysis, on the other hand, would probably assure him that he who had come to see so many of the world's mysteries, could not possibly admit mysteries which were unseeable. It affronts the powers of his mind. So, curiously, while it is the will which alone can demolish faith, often enough the will is hammered at through the mind. The difference is, of course, that the will, always given sufficient aid by Almighty God, can resist—indeed, can turn aside—all the hammering in the world. It is in this sense, and this sense alone, that a man can "read himself out of the Church." His reading is not marshalling arguments to nullify the evidence on which he first believed; there never was such evidence. All his learning, unaccompanied by an objective realization of his dependency on Almighty God, is but storing up in his rational appetite motives for demanding that his intellect be allowed to see for itself. This is not to say that an increase in knowledge lays a temptation against faith. It is to say that a growing confidence in the powers of one's mind to achieve truth, without the realization that there are great unchartered realms on which man's mind

cannot so much as cast the light of a spark—this is to court intellectual pride.

Many young people who have snuffed their lamp of faith with the darkness of agnostic ignorance would never admit giving up their heritage because of intellectual pride. Yet the endeavor to measure truths of faith with the implements of the physics laboratory, or the symbols of the slide-rule, demonstrate the great heights of intellectual greatness to which a man thinks he has attained. These things never were measurable, but the mere endeavor to measure them shows, undeniably, that the will has ceased to adhere to the word of their unmeasurable Maker. Of course, the more habitually the mind becomes accustomed to seeing what lies at the bottom of things, so much stronger grows its appetite to penetrate even divine things. Habit adds to a tendency which is natural; it builds a second nature. The ordinary restiveness of the intellect before the obscurity of faith's truths will probably be increased in a man whose pursuits are scholarly. It will never be increased beyond control, but the strength of the will needs constant increase to insure control, for human nature is prone to evil.

Here is apparent the necessity, the crying necessity, for insistence on the need of strengthening the will in its adherence to the faith. In our time, there is a laudable movement, ever growing, to educate our people in the truths of their faith. This is a great and a good thing, but if it is only adding to the extension of knowledge, with no intensification of assent *it is a positive danger*. Truly enough, if what can be taught about the Church's doctrines is well taught, there should be a voluntary acceptance corresponding to the knowledge gained. However, it is quite possible for examination of the most sublime articles of faith to become a mere academic discussion. In such cases, the intellect is being led, directly, to exercise its desire to penetrate, on the impenetrable, and if the will is not strong the frustrated intellect can well furnish an apparent motive for apostacy.

Aside from this, failure to emphasize the fact that every teaching of the Church is destined to *live* in the faithful,

deprives them, not alone of grace, but also of the resultant fortification of will which they so gravely need in the world of today. A doctrine studied can lie in the mind like the multiplication table. It lives in a man only when what he has learned of it is the occasion of another act of assent to God's revelation.

Pride attacks the main body of faith's defense, the will itself. There is another enemy, which might be said to work through diplomacy, winning over the allies of the will, and so weakening its resistance. This arch-intriguer against the stronghold of faith is *fear*, and it employs a host of agents which corrupt man's lower appetites causing them to fight against the will's adherence to the good of faith's assent. Fear, like pride, can impede the will's first acceptance of faith; too, like pride, it can attack that acceptance once given.[11]

Many men have come to the threshold of the Church, and have refused to cross it because of an attachment to the delights which they must part with at the door. This is fear, the recoil of the sense appetite before the sad prospect of being denied an illicit love to which it has become accustomed. What has happened? Two goods are presented to the will, adherence to unseen truths on the authority of God, and these particular sensible goods which gratify the lower appetite. The will is free; God's grace inclines it to one side, the clamor of the appetite's fear inclines it to the other. If one is chosen, the other must be rejected; the will flees the privation of the good, rejecting assent to God's truths.

It is quite possible for a Catholic, without ever withdrawing his acceptance of the Church's doctrines, to submit his affections to some forbidden object. A man can sin away his life in slavery to lust, or insobriety, or cupidity, and never have his pet weakness affect his will to belief. But, any man who chains

[11] In *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 4, a. 7, St. Thomas speaks of pride and fear as impediments to faith; later, (*op. cit.*, q. 11, a. 1) he considers pride and cupidity the remote causes of rejecting the faith. Cupidity, which places a man's end in creatures, (cf. *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 24, a. 10, ad 2um) while it rises in the concupiscible appetite, will generate fear in the irascible appetite, when loss of the creature-end threatens.

his sense appetite to evil ways is taking at least remote liberty with his faith, for if the day dawns when adhering to that faith comes into conflict with indulging his appetite he will find a strongly armed enemy within the walls. Every illicit humoring of the sense appetite, nourishes a monster whose appetite but increases with feeding. The will grows flabby through lack of exercise, and falls into a poor state for withstanding the clamors of the beast it has nursed. If a drawn battle is waged between faith and some pleasure, a softened will easily gives in to the inordinate activity of the passions, and faith is betrayed by its appointed defender.

When the two forces of pride and fear join ranks against the will, although still the master and always the potential conqueror, the will has a real battle to wage. This happens far from rarely, where Catholics put themselves into occasions, circumstances, where man's intellect and lower faculties are unduly flattered. It is in this connection that young Catholics court the tragedy of apostacy in the agnostic and pagan atmosphere of some educational institutions. When a youth is listening to lectures which claim to show that man is a victim of his environment, at the same time living in an environment which makes him desire to be its victim, who will say that he is not putting the root of his spiritual life in jeopardy? Indeed, given the tendency of human nature to evil, only the repeated and conscious subjection of will to divine grace can save the faith of one so placed.

All the lectures and all the bad example in the world cannot directly affect the intellect's assent to the truths of faith. Nothing can *directly* affect it except the will, but the will can be cajoled into exchanging the good of divine truth for the pottage of deceived self-sufficiency in intellectual matters and unrestrained indulgence in sense pleasure. Only humility, which sees man's mind in its essential dependence on the wisdom of God, can counteract the multiform temptations to pride offered by the modern world, and in particular by modern education. Only a wise and guarded temperance in the use of sensible goods can nullify the temptations to sensual unrestraint

which abound on every side. The white diamond of faith shines steadily in the inner sanctuary of the mind. It cannot be lost, nor mislaid, nor stolen. Only its guardian, the will, can barter it for something less than itself. Pride and sensuality ever lie in wait to corrupt the fidelity of that guard. The will they can never reach while his trusted escort—humility and temperance—swords unsheathed, stand at the gate.

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CONCERNING A "CRITICAL REVIEW"[1]

"It must be presupposed that every good Christian should be readier to excuse than to condemn a proposition advanced by his neighbour; and if he cannot justify it, let him enquire into the meaning of the author: if the latter be in error, correct him lovingly; should that not suffice, then let him employ every suitable means, so that his neighbour, rightly understanding it, may be saved from error."—St. Ignatius Loyola.

WHEN I wrote the Foreword to *The Problem of Species*, by Mortimer J. Adler, and when I noted in that foreword, along with my esteem and admiration for the author, the divergences which separate us—and to which I do not have to return here—concerning the problems studied in his book, I thought that everyone would see, in this dialogue between two philosophers who are attached to the same principles but take different stands on certain conclusions, an example of what a discussion at once free and respectful on things of the mind could be.

I was too much of an optimist. Certain critics, apparently little desirous of thus understanding philosophical discussion, have misused the foreword to decry the value of the work. Since Mr. Muller-Thym does me the honor of quoting me, he might also have done me the honor of thinking that I do not intend my introductions to torpedo the books of my friends, and that if *The Problem of Species* had as little merit as he says, I should not have cared to recommend its being read. It is left for me to apologize to Mortimer Adler for the abuse thus made of the liberality with which he permitted a discussion of his views to take place in his own book.

The central question of Mr. Adler's book concerns the philosophy of nature. It is to determine whether real species are reducible to a small number of large classes or if they form a vast multiplicity, and also to determine the order or hierarchy

[1] Bernard J. Muller-Thym, "Dr. Adler's 'Problem of Species': A Critical Review," *The Modern Schoolman*, November, 1940.

of real species.[2] The fact that the taxonomic species of the positive sciences do not necessarily coincide with real species is ground for asking this question—without denying, for this reason, that there exist many sciences of nature, which correspond in a sense to the Aristotelian notion of science. (Even if Mr. Adler had denied this last point, he would not have committed heresy against principles. In the eyes of Aristotle and St. Thomas, the philosophy of nature embraced in its unity all the sciences of nature: and it is precisely this conception which, in my opinion, the developments of empiriological science oblige us to revise.) But the problem of the number of species presupposes, as a necessary preamble, a more profound question, that of the relation between the " species " of the logician and the " species " of the philosopher of nature. On this preliminary question I think that Mr. Adler subscribed in advance to many of the views expounded by Mr. Muller-Thym in order to destroy, not so much Mr. Adler's book (the argumentation of which he does not discuss), as Mr. Adler himself, whose competence he claims to deny. Misled by Mr. Adler's terminology, Mr. Muller-Thym has not accomplished the very duty of a critic, which is, in such a case, to elucidate the obscurities due to the vocabulary and to try to see whether and at what precise point these obscurities have brought about some confusion in the doctrinal elaboration of the work.

Mr. Adler said " ontological species " and " logical species " instead of saying " species understood in the ontological sense " or " species understood in the logical sense." It is regrettable that Mr. Muller-Thym did not follow the rules of interpretation outlined by St. Ignatius, who advises us in such cases to have regard to the thought rather than the words; and that he did not try to surmount the obstacles created by the words in the present discussion.[3] In any event, the distinction be-

[2] This question is too complicated to be discussed here. I should like only to note that what is true in the remarks of Dr. Adler concerning this is that real species are hierarchically disposed and no two of them have the same degree of perfection.

[3] Mr. Adler himself has given explicit cautions to his use of the word species (cf. p. xiii; p. 12; fn. 163a on p. 139). Incidentally I should like to note that the

tween species *understood in the logical sense* and species *understood in the ontological sense*[4] is a necessary one. Those who hold, as I do, that the real species of the material world are very great in number, will say that the three or four large classes of substances — *inanimate corporeal being* (whether *elemental* or *mixed*), *vegetative being*, *animal being* (abstracting from *human being*, which is a real species) — can be called " species " only in a logical sense. Those who think, with Mr. Adler, that these three or four large classes are, along with *human being*, the only real species, will say that the multitude of more particularized species are species taken only in the logical sense. Neither of the two sides will deny for this reason that when it is a question of real species the species logically taken correspond to the species ontologically taken and to the essences. But in the case of the first group they intend that the word species applied to the major classes has only a logical value, because these major classes are in reality genera. In the case of the second they intend that the word species applied to the multitude of minor classes has only a logical value, because these minor classes do not represent real species.[5]

Not all those who seek to be inspired by Aristotle and St. Thomas in their thought upon modern problems have the privilege of being pupils of Mr. Muller-Thym. If Thomism is called to live outside schools and to animate more or less widely contemporary researches, it is natural that the new data contributed by sciences, on the one hand, and on the other, the difficulties intrinsic to the doctrine, lead many minds to question—rightly or wrongly—many points considered established by those who follow the tradition of the great commentators. I am attached to this tradition with all my heart, but I am aware that it will live in the present only if it accepts this

" species ontologically considered " is not exactly the " specific nature," but rather an application of the logical notion of species to designate the specific nature.

[4] In this case species remains still a logical entity, but this second intention is then related to the ontological order of essences or of *primae intentiones*.

[5] Mr. Adler has emphasized (p. 138 of his book) the divergent significations of the words " species " and " genus " according as these words are used in the exposition of the first or the second theory concerning the number and order of species.

questioning with good grace: either in order better to explain the points in question, or to revise the interpretation of them. If, under such circumstances, Mr. Muller-Thym feels obliged from time to time, in order to " discipline " his contemporaries, to write a book wherein he will bring to light the treasures of the *philosophia perennis*, this will be a benefit for everyone: for all of us, who will profit from his learning, and for him as well, who would then be acting as a disciple of Thomas Aquinas in the spirit of Thomas Aquinas, and with the intellectual kindness of Thomas Aquinas. This was the course followed by Father Gerard Smith, S. J., in his recent review of Mr. Adler's work in *Thought* (December, 1940, pp. 710-712). In reality, we should rejoice in controversies with such qualified philosophers as Mr. Adler on those abstract and abstruse problems which concern human wisdom, that is to say, what is of major interest to man. These controversies offer us a profitable stimulation of the intellect, and a precious opportunity for deeper insight in perdurable truths.

As a matter of fact, I doubt that Mr. Muller-Thym understood the real aim of Mr. Adler's book. Mr. Adler did not intend to reform Scholasticism, but rather to explain certain points concerning which critical elucidations are desirable, and those which seem to him to remain open to discussion. Moreover, it is not conclusively, but only tentatively, and as hypotheses, that he offers the solutions he proposes. Here is nothing to arouse anyone's indignation.

A careful reading of Mr. Muller-Thym's article makes it clear that he has without doubt established that he and Mr. Adler differ on important points of doctrine; but he has nowhere established the accusations of incompetence he levels against Mr. Adler.[6] For my own part, I had indicated in my

[6] Mr. Muller-Thym charges Mr. Adler with misusing the text of *Summa theologica* I, 88, ad 4, and on the other hand with not using the text of the same work I, 66, 2, ad 2. It is to be remarked that Mr. Adler's reference to the first of these texts occurs only in a brief footnote (5 a), and it is obvious that the only intention here is to point out that St. Thomas does make a distinction between natural and logical genera; the intention is plainly not to say that St. Thomas's distinction is the same as the author's distinction between ontological and logical species. On

foreword the points on which I also am in disagreement with Mortimer Adler—the idea of attributing this disagreement to the incompetence of the person with whom I was carrying on the discussion would have seemed to me as absurd as it is incongruous. The criticism of Mr. Adler upon which Mr. Muller-Thym repeatedly insists concerns the identification (erroneous indeed) of species and substantial form—a point which is very important in itself, but which is touched upon only incidentally (and tentatively) in *The Problem of Species*, and which, according to Mr. Adler himself, plays no part in the argumentation of his book.[7] And it is clear that if Mr. Adler is mistaken on this, it is not through incompetence nor through ignorance of the question. Moreover, if we may judge by the few indications which he gives on this point, it is possible that when elaborating the problem more completely, he will be led to rectify the thesis—certainly and in principle contrary to Thomas Aquinas—which he now favors (even though he does not affirm it conclusively) and which results from his following Averroes on this point. For Mr. Adler is evidently expecting the objection: in the species (as second intention) of a material being, such as *human being*, matter is contained; but the substantial form is immaterial as such; so that if species and substantial form are identified, it is necessary to say either that the human species does not contain matter, or that the human soul is material, both of which are impossible. I suppose that Mr. Adler would reply that, in his view, man contains matter but that human species does not. In truth, however, to hold that the species of a material being does not include matter, is the very error of Plato. That which troubles Mr. Adler here, is the fact that it seems impossible to him to say that the species (as second intention) contains matter. But—

the other hand, the text of I, 66, 2, ad 2 does not modify, as Mr. Muller-Thym seems to suggest, that of I, 88, 2, ad 4. Is it necessary to add, in order to answer a particularly unkind insinuation, that works of St. Thomas which have not been translated have been used by Mr. Adler as well as those which do exist in translation?

[7] Mr. Adler was careful to point out that, in his eyes, this matter plays no part at all in the argumentation of his book. (Cf. Chapter II, p. 16.)

precisely because species remains always in itself a logical entity, even when taken in the ontological sense—species does not contain real matter any more than it does real form; species contains *represented* or signified matter as well as *represented* or signified form: and the word " matter " is not at all rendered equivocal by such a doctrine. This amounts to saying that, carried along by his desire to find a more rigid vocabulary, Mortimer Adler has himself picked a quarrel with St. Thomas over words, and a most unfortunate one. For his manner of emphasizing the immateriality of species is calculated not only to cause in persons like Mr. Muller-Thym an irritation which would be legitimate if it were moderate (*irascimini, et nolite peccare*), but also to create the most serious doctrinal misunderstandings. I hope that Mortimer Adler will not continue to insist on this point in his future writings. He can certainly do so without therefore having to accuse himself of having been ignorant of the question.

One of the objectives which Mr. Adler is rightly seeking is that of making a place, in the Thomist philosophy of nature, for the evolutionary dynamism and the reality of historical becoming which the developments of modern science force us to recognize in material nature. Mr. Muller-Thym also holds this to be necessary, while at the same time he makes a great show of disdain for the method followed by Mr. Adler. But what does he himself tell us on the subject? I am afraid that the discussion may have carried him beyond his own real thought as well as beyond Aristotelian orthodoxy. For he tells us—rightly, in my view—that the more one descends toward matter, the more (real) species are multiplied,[8] but he adds that the more one descends toward matter, the more do species lose their determination and fixity. On the other hand, he rightly admits that real species correspond to essences. Now it is quite true that a material essence can be transformed into another by the movement of generation and corruption, and that

[8] Is this assertion absolutely true? It is likely that species are more numerous in the biological sphere than in the chemical one. Many questions too complicated to be discussed here arise with regard to the degrees of emergence of material forms from matter.

material species are, consequently, *existentially* unstable. But that an essence is determined in a more or less uncertain or more or less vague way by its specific form, and that, as a consequence, species are less and less determined and less and less fixed in the order of essence according as one descends toward matter—I can scarcely believe this to be Mr. Muller-Thym's view. This, however, is what he seems to be saying when he invokes this progressive indetermination against Mr. Adler, all of whose discussion bears on the notion of species considered from the point of view of essence and intelligible constituent.

But, after all, the most important question raised by Mr. Muller-Thym's article is not of the same kind as the above discussions. The question is, whether it is permissible to use against another the polemical procedures used in his article. To treat a philosopher of the worth and quality of Mortimer Adler with such a show of contempt, and like an ignorant person to be sent back to school—this is a sign of disrespect for another's thought which cannot be regarded lightly. To strive to discredit before the public, with the arrogance and intent to annihilate shown throughout the article in *The Modern Schoolman*, a man who has entered into combat for philosophical truth with the vigor and generosity of Mortimer Adler—this is a moral fault against the common good of philosophy. I do not say this to grieve Mr. Muller-Thym. I believe that when he has more experience, he will perceive that the worst way of being an idealist *in actu exercito*, and the most unfitting for a Thomist, is to count subjective causality for nothing. That is to say, the reality of the human persons who think, who seek, and who struggle, and of the concrete conflicts in which the culture of an epoch is engaged, cannot be disregarded. We must not make of the concepts which should communicate the truth to our neighbors, a dehumanized world in which we entrench ourselves in order to shoot arrows at those who do combat for the common cause in the open. I believe that, when he has the benefit of wider experience, Mr. Muller-Thym will regret the injustice he has done today.

It seems to me an urgent matter to be on guard against those practices of controversy which, if they are allowed to

become established, would ruin and render sterile the Thomist renaissance of today just as once they ruined and rendered sterile Scholasticism of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. If Mr. Adler should wish to answer Mr. Muller-Thym in the same tone as the latter's article, it certainly would not be difficult to do so. And how would the truth profit thereby? St. Thomas is the private property of no school. He belongs only to God, and to those souls called to drink from his springs and to whom he gave himself, laboring in prayer and in tears to increase the light in them. The Thomist renaissance of our day has a chance of bearing fruit only if all those who take part in the work with good will, whether they belong to one school or another, put forth their efforts in a spirit of brotherly cooperation, and thus make useful and fruitful for one another their inevitable divergences and oppositions. It is a privilege for America that interest in Thomism has risen here both from Catholic initiative and from the spontaneous initiative of men who are most conscious of the needs and problems of American culture. It is a privilege for Thomism to be able to develop in the spirit of free cooperation which characterizes this country, and, at a moment when darkness is being spread over Europe, to be able to continue here taking root in the life of the world and of civilization. It would not take many badly conducted quarrels and misunderstandings caused by the ferment of rivalry natural to scholars to endanger these benefits of Providence. I hope that Mr. Muller-Thym will understand what I have tried to explain here, the more so in that in speculative matters and in the general interpretation of the Thomist synthesis, I believe our positions to be in agreement. I trust that he will also understand that the friendship which binds me to the masters under whose guidance he has studied Saint Thomas (but who are not accustomed to use such procedures in controversy) and the friendship which binds me to Mortimer Adler are my authority for writing as I have.

As to Mortimer Adler, his work and what he has accomplished are great enough for him not to be distressed by any obstacles he may meet on the path. He has done much to awaken minds to the truths of the *philosophia perennis*. All

those who try to be attentive to the ways and paradoxes of Providence admire the highly significant fact that one of the most active workers for the Thomist renaissance is a man who, without belonging to the Catholic Church, has become with magnificent fervor a disciple of the Angelic Doctor.

All those who know him are aware that, having discovered by himself the value of the philosophy of Saint Thomas, at this privileged moment of decisive intellectual encounters, he has not ceased since making his discovery to study and to examine that philosophy; they know that his intellectual enthusiasm is allied to that constant care, without which one is not a philosopher, of correcting oneself and of advancing in the truth loved more than self. He is attacked today from many different quarters— this is the sign that his work is bearing fruit.

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A COMPARISON BETWEEN HUMAN AND DIVINE FRIENDSHIP

IT is a defined dogma of faith that between God and a man in the state of sanctifying grace, there exists true friendship. The Council of Trent declares that by justification man is changed from an enemy into a friend of God.[1] Undoubtedly, the Council is here using the word " friend " in its literal sense, not simply as a figure of speech, a mere poetic metaphor. True, the term " friend " applied to God and to man is of necessity an analogous one, as is every term that is applied to both God and man. It must be remembered, however, that even an analogous predication is a *true* predication. Between friendship as it exists among men and friendship as it exists between man and God, there must be, therefore, a similarity sufficient to guarantee the literal truth of the statement that by justification man is changed from an enemy to a friend of God. Christ Himself did not hesitate to use the word " friend " according to its true and literal sense referring to the relationship of the Apostles to Himself: " Greater love than this no man hath that a man lay down his life for his friends. You are my friends if you do the things that I command you. I will not now call you servants, for the servant knoweth not what his lord doth. But I have called you friends because all things whatsoever I have heard of my Father, I have made known to you."[2] It is evident that Christ is here using the term " friends " in the commonly accepted sense of the word, the only sense in which it would have been understood by the Apostles, and the only sense in which it would have conveyed to them the idea which Christ was attempting to impress upon them. It is also evident that in calling His Apostles " friends," Christ is referring to a relationship between them and Himself, not only according to His human nature, but according to His

[1] Session 6, Chapter 7 (*Denz.*, 799). [2] *John* xv, 13-15.

divine nature as well, because He uses the term in reference to His work of Redemption, which He accomplished principally by reason of His divine nature, and in reference to His right to command them in all things and to make known to them the Will of His Father, both of which prerogatives belong to Christ as God.

In spite of the words of Christ and in spite of the declaration of the Council of Trent, there is still a strong tendency, on man's part, to think of friendship with God as some sort of vague, imaginative relationship having little foundation in reality. No doubt this is due chiefly to the apparently enormous difficulties which immediately present themselves when man attempts to conceive of himself as a friend of God or of God as a friend of his in the literal sense of the word, since by " friend " he ordinarily understands an equal whom he can see with corporal eyes, whom he can know intimately, someone with whom he can converse familiarly, whose hand he can shake occasionally. Perhaps it is humility which prompts him to say, " How could two extremes so infinitely distant as are God and man possibly have enough in common to be truly friends of each other? " Much that has been written on the subject, by ignoring the difficulties and failing to give the basic foundation for the postulation of such a friendship, has tended only to foster the impression that the predication of friendship between man and God is simply a pleasant bit of sentimental hyperbole, instead of the profound and ineffable reality that it is. It would seem to be to good advantage, then, to face squarely some of these difficulties and to consider the reasonable foundation upon which rests the declaration of Trent that by grace man truly becomes a friend of God.

There is, moreover, a practical advantage to be derived from emphasizing the fact that a true, personal friendship exists between God and the just man. Owing to the material element of man's nature, sensible things are constantly clamoring for man's recognition and striving to distract him from God. Too often he succumbs, little by little, to their importuning, with the result that for him God gradually becomes farther and farther

removed, receding at last into a vague, far-off place, called heaven, where He presumably amuses Himself rearranging the stars and plotting how to get even with man for ignoring Him. It is a difficult thing for man to love with all his heart and soul, mind and strength, something purely spiritual; yet, that is the way in which he has been commanded to love God. In the first place, he is not always sure just what it means to love God. Love is a broad term and, according to its present-day use or abuse, might connote anything from the most heroic charity to the lowest biological passion. The more man appreciates the fact that between himself and God there exists a true friendship, the better he understands the nature of the love God has for him and the nature of the love he should have for God. He thus acquires a more concrete conception upon which to model his love for God, and this, in turn, is conducive to an intensification of that love. Since it is in accordance with the nature of the human intellect to arrive at a knowledge of things less known through the medium of things better known, it appears that the best means of acquiring a greater appreciation of man's friendship with God would be to examine it in the light of the friendship which he has with his fellowman. A comparison of this kind must not be considered as an attempt to humanize God by reducing Him to the level of a human friend, but rather as an attempt to divinize man by a consideration of the great dignity to which friendship with God elevates him.

The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to show that between a just man and God there exists a true friendship, friendship according to the commonly accepted and literal sense of the word, friendship as it is understood to exist between man and man, always allowing for the necessarily analogous nature of the predication of friendship between man and God. This purpose we shall attempt to accomplish by considering the foundations upon which the predication of friendship with God rests, foundations which are rooted, ultimately, in the very nature of God and in the nature of man, more proximately, in the community of life established between God and man by sanctifying grace.

I. SIMILITUDE

Before discussing the essence of true friendship, which, according to Aristotle, consists in mutual benevolence, mutually known, and based on an honest good,[3] we shall consider two basic prerequisites, or dispositive causes, of any friendship, namely, similarity and communication between the friends. In this section we shall treat of the first of these, similitude, showing in what way this prerequisite is realized between man and God, as a basis for a possible friendship.

At the outset, it must be noted that any relationship which is spoken of as existing between man and God is understood to exist, really and formally, only in man, since real non-subsistent relation is something which pertains to the created order only. It is in God only insofar as we place it there by an act of the intellect. With regard to the relationship of similarity, therefore, though we can truly say that man is similar to God in some way, we cannot say that God is similar to man, except by a similitude conceived in our own minds. However, it is not necessary to say that God is similar to man in order to establish a basis for friendship between them, since friendship, as well as anything else which is predicated of God and man, is predicated only analogously.

According to Aristotle, similitude signifies a unity, or agreement, in quality, of many things.[4] Similitude is distinguished from the things which are similar as the foundation of a relationship is distinguished from the subjects of the relation. Similitude, therefore, is itself a quality, by reason of which many subjects are referred to each other by the relation of similarity. Quality is sometimes taken, in a broader sense, to designate also the substantial form itself, by reason of which many things are said to be similar in species, or in genus, or according to analogy. In this sense similitude might be said to signify a unity or communication in form.

[3] St. Thomas. *In decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum Expositio*, VIII, 2, nn. 1551, ff. (Ed. Pirrota).

[4] *In X Metaph*, l. 4, n. 199 (ed. Cathala).

What sort of similitude is required for human friendship? First, and fundamentally, a similitude of species is demanded, for, as Aristotle says, the love which a man is said to have for inanimate things, like wine or gold, cannot be called friendship. St. Thomas extends the application to animate, but irrational, things noting that it is ridiculous to say one has friendship for wine or for a horse.[5] He assigns similarity of form as the primary cause of the love of friendship: "By reason of the fact that two things are similar, as having one form, they are, in a sense, one in that form; thus two men are one in the species of humanity, and, therefore, the affection of one tends toward the other as to that which is one with himself and he wishes good to the other as to himself."[6] Immediately this raises the question: how, then, can there be between God and man a similarity sufficient to serve as a basis for friendship? Far from being of the same species, the human nature and the divine nature are infinitely farther apart than any two species possibly could be, for species is a created thing and in no way even comparable to Divinity. The difficulty cannot be dismissed by saying that the requirement of similarity of species pertains only to the natural order, whereas the love by which man loves God is the infused virtue of Charity, which belongs to the supernatural order. Grace perfects nature, rather than destroys it, and if it is natural for man to love with a love of friendship only that which is similar to himself, the infusion of grace does not destroy that natural propensity but only elevates and perfects it.

Similitude, even of species, is a very fundamental, but remote, basis of friendship. Real friendship, in the ordinary sense of the word, requires more than mere specific similarity. It demands some sort of proportion in the accidental qualities pertaining to the species, some equality of intellectual endowment, some similarity of appetites, some parity of temperament, of character, even of social status. The examples which Aristotle gives of persons too unequal to be capable of real friendship are: a king and a pauper, a very good man and a very bad one, a

[5] *In VIII Eth.*, l. 2, nn. 1557. [6] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 27, a. 3.

wise man and a foolish one.[7] Even supposing, then, that we are able to establish between the Divine and human nature some link to serve as a remote basis for friendship, how could we possibly set up between God and man an equilibrium sufficient for the intimacy required of friendship? It could be answered that the predication of friendship between God and man is only an analogy and therefore, the requirements of human friendship do not hold with regard to Divine friendship. An analogous predication, however, is a true predication, although it applies in different ways to the different analogates, and it requires, therefore, a true basis of similarity between the analogates.

In what consists the similarity, necessary as a fundamental basis of friendship between man and God, which corresponds, analogically, to the similarity of species, necessary as a fundamental basis for friendship between man and man? One answer to the question is found in the first chapter of Genesis: "And He (God) said: Let us make man to our image and likeness. And God created man to his own image; to the image of God, he created him."[8] Since man was created to the image of God, he must in some way be similar to God, since similarity to that which it represents is one of the essential notes of an image.

St. Thomas defines an image as "that which proceeds from another, similar to that other in species or, at least, in representation of species (*in signo speciei*)";[9] or again, as "that which proceeds from another in similitude of species, either in the same nature or in another nature."[10] The first thing required, therefore, is that the image proceed in some way from the thing imaged. In the case of creatures, it is evident that this requirement is fulfilled by the very fact that they are creatures, i. e., that they proceed from God by creation. The thing proceeding must be either of the same specific nature as that from which it proceeds, or, if it is of another nature, it must in some way signify, or represent the nature of the thing from which it proceeds.[11]

[7] Cf. *In VIII Eth.*, l. 8, n. 1653.
[8] *Gen.*, i, 26, 27.
[9] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 35, a. 1.
[10] *Ibid.*, a. 2, ad 3um.
[11] *Ibid.*

In a broad sense, all creatures are similar to God through representation, inasmuch as they are effects of God and represent, or imitate, in a finite way the nature of God by reason of their created participation of His absolute Being, Goodness, Truth, etc. Intellectual creatures are similar to God in a much more perfect way even in the physical order, since intellectuality is a greater perfection in the metaphysical grades than are being and life, and therefore the intellectual nature more closely imitates and more vividly represents the all-perfect nature of God, which is essentially an intellectual nature. It is almost the unanimous teaching of the Fathers of the Church that in the physical order man was " created to the image of God" precisely because he was created as an intellectual being.[12]

All the examples given thus far are of representation and similitude pertaining to the physical order only. There is a much more perfect type of image, that, namely, which is achieved in the intentional order, by the act of the intellect itself. In the order of knowledge, a similitude of the thing known is found in the intellect, inasmuch as the species of the thing known is in the intellect. This species or concept is the object itself intentionally present in the intellect in such a way that the intellect in act *is* the thing known in act. The object of human knowledge is the essence of material things, which is arrived at by a process of abstraction ultimately from the material things themselves as they are presented to the sense. This abstraction is necessary in order that the object itself may be proportioned to the intellect, which is immaterial in nature and must, therefore, operate in an immaterial manner and immediately upon an immaterial object. Through the operation of the intellect, an intentional identity is established between the form of the intellect in act and the form of the object known. Thus the intellect becomes the object known through an image drawn from the object itself by abstraction.

With regard to the knowledge of God, man by his natural

[12] St. Thomas. Prologue to I-II, *Summa Theologica.*

powers cannot know God as He is in Himself, since God as He is in Himself completely exceeds every created mode of being and immateriality and therefore can in no way be an object proportioned to a created intellect, in its natural state. Man can, however, by his natural powers achieve a natural knowledge of God by abstracting from all finite being and ascending to the notion of an Infinite Being, a First Cause and Prime Mover; by a process of reasoning he can even arrive at some notion of God's attributes and perfections. Though in so doing he knows God only in a way proportionate to his own intellect, he is, nevertheless, achieving the ultimate in natural human knowledge, for the least knowledge of the greatest things is more perfect than the greatest knowledge of the least things. The form of God with which man thus becomes intentionally identified, though it does not represent the intrinsic nature of God, is, nevertheless, a true form, representing God as perfectly as He can be represented in the merely natural order, and the assimilation or conformity to God which man thus achieves is the closest assimilation to God which is attainable by the purely natural powers of the human intellect. This is, moreover, the basis for a more perfect assimilation to God which is achieved through grace, for it is by reason of man's natural ability to become assimilated to God through knowledge and love, that he is capable of being elevated to a state of supernatural knowledge, love, and similarity by grace. This natural capability is, therefore, also the basis for true friendship with God, which is formally achieved by grace. With regard to divine friendship, then, we may say that the natural ability of man to become intentionally assimilated to God corresponds analogically but truly to the similarity of species which is the fundamental basis of friendship between man and man. Just as the possibility of friendship between man and man rests fundamentally upon the fact that one is similar to the other in species, so the possibility of friendship between man and God rests fundamentally upon the fact that man is capable of bearing within himself, by the natural act of his intellect, an intentional similitude to God.

Immediately an objection proposes itself. If we give as a remote basis of friendship between man and God, the ability of man's intellect to become intentionally identified with God as an Infinite Being, First Cause, etc., why would not the same thing hold with regard to his knowledge of any other being? His intellect also becomes intentionally identified with a horse, for instance, when he knows the horse. It would seem, therefore, that this ability to be assimilated through knowledge would establish as much of a basis for friendship between himself and the horse as between himself and God. The point is that in knowing the horse, he also knows that the horse is by nature incapable of knowing him with intellectual knowledge, or of having benevolence toward him, nor does he love the horse for the horse's sake—all of which are required for friendship. His ability to know the horse, then, can in no way establish a basis of friendship between himself and the horse, since the horse is of a different species. In knowing God, however, even with natural knowledge, he knows that God is capable of intellectual knowledge and of benevolence toward him, and therefore that friendship between himself and God is in some way possible. This applies also to man's knowledge of another man, for when we say that similarity of species is the foundation for human friendship, we do not mean species merely as such, but this particular human species which is capable of the knowledge and love required for friendship.

As we have said, similarity of species is only a very remote basis of friendship between man and man. Real friendship, in the ordinary sense of the word, because of the intimacy and community of interests which it implies, requires, over and above similarity of species, a similarity in many of the accidental qualities pertaining to the species. In divine friendship, where is there to be found the accidental similarity between man and God which corresponds analogically to the similarity of accidental qualities necessary as a proximate basis of human friendship? It is found in the mysterious and ineffable participation in and conformity to the divine nature, effected in man by sanctifying grace, which is a supernatural

gift infused into the soul by God, whereby man is elevated to the supernatural order, becoming, in a sense, a sharer of the divine nature, an adopted son of God, and an heir of eternal glory.[13] The participation in the divine nature effected by sanctifying grace is not a mere moral participation; it is a physical, formal, and objective participation whereby the soul is intrinsically assimilated to the Deity, not as to all things, but in such a way that man becomes a sharer of God's own proper life, and possesses God as an object known and loved as God knows and loves Himself. Sanctifying grace is not a substance or a substantial form by which the soul is changed into some other being; it is a supernatural accident after the mode of a quality, laying the proximate foundation for the friendship of justified man to God. Grace is, moreover, an entitative habit, intrinsically inhering in the essence of the soul and operating through the habits subjected in the potencies of the soul, especially through charity, which, though really distinguished from sanctifying grace strictly so called, is indissolubly connected with it.[14]

By the theological virtue of *faith*, a much more perfect image of God is achieved in the intellect of man than is attained by the merely natural knowledge of God. While by natural knowledge the intellect knows God under the limitations of an object proportioned to its own mode of being and knowing, in supernatural knowledge through faith, the intellect is elevated to know God as He is in Himself, not clearly and perfectly as in the beatific vision, but in an obscure and veiled manner, by adhering to the divine truth on the authority of God Himself revealing, which divine truth, as it is in God, is not really distinct from the Divine Essence Itself. Thus the intellect, enlightened by faith, has as its object that which is also the proper object of the divine intellect, though it knows that object in a mode different and far inferior to the mode in which God Himself and even the angels and the blessed know it, i. e., the human intellect does

[13] Cf. *Conc. Trid.*, Sess. 6, ch. 11; *II Pet.*, i, 4; *Rom.*, v, 5, sq.

[14] Cf. *Conc. Vienn.*, 1311 (*Denz.* 483); *Conc. Trid., loc. cit.; Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 110, aa. 2, 3, 4, etc.

not see its object as it is in itself but believes it with certitude on the authority of God revealing. By faith, then, man has God present to his intellect, not as a form which he is able fully to understand, but he has Him present as the First Truth, representing the divine essence in a more perfect way than is possible by natural knowledge of God. There is, therefore, through faith, a much more perfect assimilation to God than is had in the natural order, inasmuch as the intellect becomes conformed to God, as He is in Himself, as to an object known but not perfectly seen, which is the beginning of the perfect conformity of the beatific vision, wherein God is attained as an object clearly seen.

There is a further type of assimilation which is higher (in this life) than the assimilation of the intentional order, namely, that assimilation which is achieved to the appetitive order by the act of the will, presupposing and following upon the assimilation attained in the intellectual order. When the intellect becomes intentionally identified with a good object, it perceives the goodness in that object and there immediately follows a motion of the will toward that good, not precisely as the good exists in the intellect, but as it exists in the object itself. Thus, whereas the intellect is assimilated to an object by drawing it, as it were, into itself, the will becomes assimilated to an object by going out to that object as it is in itself. The intellect is assimilated to its object only as it is represented within itself, while the will, though it depends upon and presupposes the representation of the object in the intellect, is not limited to that representation, but its act terminates directly at the object itself.[15] The inclination toward the object, however, effects a certain impression of the object loved in the affection of the lover.

Just as from the fact that someone understands something there proceeds in the one understanding a certain intellectual conception of the thing understood, which is called a word, so from the fact that one loves something there proceeds in the affection of the

[15] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 27, a. 4; I, q. 82, a. 3, etc.

lover a certain impression of the thing loved, according to which the thing loved is said to be in the lover as the thing understood is in the one understanding.[16]

We say that appetition effects a more perfect conformity with the object in this life, because the will, through love, is more intimately united with the object as it is in itself than is the intellect by knowing the object; in the life to come the essential union of the beatific vision is effected by the glorified intellect seeing the essence of God, upon which follows the union of the will to the Divine Goodness thus possessed.

By *hope* the will is moved *toward* assimilation to God and not actually assimilated to Him, for though the act of this virtue is directed toward God Himself, it is concerned with Him more as a Rewarder and a Helper than as an all-perfect Being, infinitely good in Himself and to be loved for His own sake. Consequently, hope begets a love of concupiscence rather than a love of benevolence, which latter is the love that principally effects assimilation. Hope is, however, a direct step toward the love of benevolence, for to love God on account of the benefits He bestows easily leads to a love of God on account of His own intrinsic goodness and perfections. It is, moreover, a direct tendency toward the soul's ultimate end, since it is an expectation of the attainment of the most perfect conformity to God, i. e., the conformity of glory.

Especially is the soul conformed and assimilated to God through *charity* because it thus becomes of one will and spirit with Him. Here we seemed to be involved in a vicious circle, for charity *is* friendship for God, and yet we are endeavoring to show that charity effects the similarity which is required as a basis for that friendship. It would appear that we are presupposing the very thing we are attempting to prove. The viciousness is only apparent, for while it is true that similitude causes love, it is equally true that love causes similitude, though in different lines of causality, since similitude is a dispositive cause of love and, in the order of grace, love is the efficient

[16] *Ibid.*, I, q. 35, a. 1.

cause of similarity. It is not until the soul is vivified by supernatural life through the infusion of charity that it becomes sufficiently assimilated to God to make a supernatural love of Him possible. Though, in point of time, this infusion and assimilation are simultaneous, in the order of dispositive causality charity presupposes the assimilation which charity itself effects. The same thing is true, in a sense, in human friendship, for though a certain objective similarity is presupposed to friendship, the friendship itself begets a subjective similarity which, in turn, intensifies the friendship.

The assimilation effected by charity is the result of the intimate union with God that charity sets up. The intellect having regarded God as the perfect good, infinitely lovable in Himself and on account of Himself, the will, through charity, which is founded on a communication of the divine good, rests in Him as conjoined to Him by its participation of the divine nature. " (Charity) rests in God, not in order that something might come to itself." [17] The will loves God, the divine good, because He is the Divine Good, as God loves Himself, thus becoming, in a sense, one with God; being one with Him, it loves whatever He loves as He Himself loves it. Through charity the soul thus dwells in God, and God in the soul, as the lover is in the one loved and the one loved is in the lover.[18]

The infused moral and intellectual virtues might be said to assimilate man to God only mediately, through the theological virtues, since they perfect man in the use of means necessary for the attainment of the object and end of the theological virtues themselves. As St. Thomas expresses it, the theological virtues " sufficiently order us to our supernatural end, inchoatively, that is, to God Himself immediately, but the soul needs to be further perfected by infused virtues in regard to other things, yet in relation to God." [19] These virtues are ordered to the theological virtues, especially to charity, in which they are radicated and by which they are informed. They are, therefore, perfections derived from the theological virtues and at the

[17] *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 23, a. 6.
[18] *Ibid.*
[19] *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 63, a. 3, ad 2um.

same time are dispositions for a more perfect practice of the theological virtues. Thus, for example, a man who lives chastely is rendered more apt to believe in, hope in, and love God and thus, by reason of his more perfect practice of the theological virtues, he becomes more and more conformed to God. The theological virtues in turn increase and strengthen the moral and intellectual virtues. In still another sense these virtues assimilate man to God since through the practice of them man participates in the perfection of God to Whom can be attributed the intellectual and moral virtues in their most perfect degree, not properly or according to their whole essence, but inasmuch as they do not include imperfection in their notion.

The *gifts of the Holy Ghost* add no essential perfection to the conformity wrought by the theological virtues, especially charity; they are ordered to the more perfect operation of these virtues, making their operation more in conformity with the divine manner of operation. The theological virtues are, to some extent, subject to the rule of human reason, not according to their own proper essence but on the part of the mind in which they are subjected, for man is able to elicit acts of faith, hope and charity at the instigation of reason moving him according to its own mode, presupposing, of course, the divine motion which is required both in the order of nature and in the order of grace. However, man is not able to arrive at his ultimate supernatural end, which exceeds the measure of human reason, unless he be led to it according to the proper essence of the theological virtues, for human reason is not able to move him sufficiently to that end, especially in view of the fact that it has been darkened by sin and the will has been so weakened as to be unable to compel reason to obey. The theological virtues are not in the faculties according to their proper essence, that is, as perfect forms, but only as participated forms. Hence, while man is able to act according to reason, he is not able to act according to the proper forms of the theological virtues unless he is specially helped by the motion of the Holy Ghost. In order that man operate according to his own motion—not

as a mere instrument but as a man, i. e., as the principle of his own actions, although in a manner exceeding nature—he must be perfected by some habitual disposition in order that he may be enabled to follow easily the movements and inspirations of the Holy Spirit. That disposition is the gift of the Holy Ghost. To operate according to the gifts of the Holy Ghost is to operate according to the proper form of the theological virtues or according to the divine measure. Hence the gifts are said to be measured according to the theological virtues in which they are radicated, in that they are ordered to the end of the theological virtues.[20]

Among the gifts themselves, the greatest assimilation to God is through *wisdom,* which corresponds to charity, for by wisdom man is rendered easily movable by the Holy Ghost to judge rightly about divine things and human things in relation to God. Wisdom corresponds to charity, for while judgment is essentially in the intellect, the rectitude of the judgment is in the will since the will, united to the Holy Spirit by charity, moves the intellect to judge according to the divine ideas and thus in a sublime manner man in his thoughts and affections is assimilated to God. It is also wisdom which leads man to infused contemplation, which is the greatest assimilation to God this side of the beatific vision.

Man, then, is assimilated to God by sanctifying grace which operates through the infused theological, intellectual, and moral virtues, and the gifts of the Holy Ghost, in such a way that from all these taken together, through their interconnection and interordination, there is constituted in man one representation of the divinity. According to that whole assimilation of grace, the intellect and will are proportioned to God so that they are conformed to Him. By the theological virtues, especially charity, man is immediately joined to God; through the intellectual and moral virtues, he is perfected in those things which are able to lead him to the ultimate end; by the gifts of the Holy Ghost, he is disposed to obey promptly the divine

[20] *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 68, aa. 2, 4, 5, 8, etc.

inspirations moving him in a divine manner according to the exigencies of his supernatural end, which exceed all human power, and thus man truly participates in the divine life itself and becomes truly God-like.

Thus the natural image of God impressed upon man's nature, which is in the order of substances, is elevated, and perfected, and completed by an accidental similitude to God effected by grace.

Hence, in divine friendship there is a counterpart of both the similarity in species, and the accidental similarity which are, respectively, the remote and the proximate bases of human friendship. To the similarity in species of human friendship corresponds, in divine friendship, the natural aptitude of man to be conformed to God by reason of his intellectual nature, while the accidental similitude to God, brought about by sanctifying grace, is a parallel of the accidental similarities which are necessary to friendship between men. This provides the answer to the question, " How could two beings so infinitely distant as God and man possibly have enough in common to be friends? "

II. COMMUNICATION

There is another fundamental prerequisite of human friendship, a requirement less basic than that of similitude, but one demanding fulfillment before a real friendship is possible. That requirement is a communication of some kind between the prospective friends. Two people might have all the equality in accidentals required for friendship; they might have a natural affinity for each other; they might be intimate friends potentially, but unless there is some sort of exchange of thought between them, some outward manifestation of their mutual love, that potentiality cannot be actualized. No doubt we pass people on the street every day with whom we might become intimate friends, if the opportunity of communication were ever given. As a matter of fact, practically the only friends we do make are those with whom we are thrown together in some common capacity; they are fellow-workers, fellow-members of some

civil, religious, or social society, and this by reason of the fact that mutual compatibility has had an opportunity of being manifested, usually through the medium of conversation. This is all reducible to an elementary principle always insisted upon by Aristotle and St. Thomas: "Nothing is loved unless it is first known."

Aristotle often states that friendship is founded in κοινωνία (Latin, *communicatione*). The English word "communication," used in the sense which we have described above, is not an adequate translation of κοινωνία, in the sense in which Aristotle uses it, nor indeed, of the Latin equivalent "communicatio." "Community" would be a better translation, community in the sense of common interests, common life, the participation of common goods, etc.; for the examples Aristotle gives of κοινωνία are "fellow-sailors who communicate in navigation and fellow-soldiers who communicate in military activity."[21] We have already considered in the preceding chapter how the requirement of "community" in this sense is fufilled with regard to man and God, since by sanctifying grace man participates in the supernatural life of God, becomes a sharer of God's knowledge and love, an adopted son of God and an heir to eternal beatitude. Using *communicatio* in this same sense, St. Thomas says: "Since there is some communication of man to God, according to which he communicates His beatitude to us, upon this communication it is fitting that friendship be founded."[22] St. Thomas does not mean to limit the communication of man in the divine beatitude to the beatitude which man will enjoy in heaven, for the communication begins in this life through grace, which is the beginning and seed of glory.

It is patent that in κοινωνία, Aristotle also includes communication in the ordinary sense of the English word, i. e., an exchange of knowledge, a mutual expression of thought, particularly through the medium of the spoken word, for though sailors do communicate in navigation and soldiers in military activity, that communication itself could hardly be considered

[21] Cf. *In IX Eth.*, l. 8.

[22] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 23, a. 1.

as a basis for friendship unless there be verbal communication between the fellow-sailors or fellow-soldiers. Aristotle brings out this necessity of verbal contact by saying: "These especially appear to be the works of friendship and that which creates it, namely concord and conversation (*colloquium*) among the friends." [23]

Even supposing then that a state of community does exist between man and God, by what actual communication is the reciprocity required for friendship to be mutually expressed? In other words, if man and God are going to be friends, they must in some way communicate with each other in order to know what kind of being each other is. There must be a "conversation" of some kind between them, not only to establish, but also to foster and perpetuate a friendship, for as Aristotle says:

> Because the friendship of virtuous people requires a long time and mutual accustoming (*mutua assuefactione*) to each other, in order that they might be able to know that they are virtuous and friends, it does not happen that they come to know each other before they have eaten a peck of salt (*mensura salis*) together.[24]

Again, he says:

> If the absence of friends from each other is long, it appears to bring about forgetfulness of the former friendship. . . . And therefore it is said in the proverb that many friendships are dissolved by reason of the fact that one does not seek the other and does not converse with him or live with him.[25]

How then, are God and man to know one another? With regard to God's knowledge of man, the answer is evident. God is the creator of man and is present in man "by essence, by presence, and by power" [26] and therefore God knows man far more intimately than man knows himself. He knows man's every thought, his every desire, his every motion, to all of

[23] Cf. *In VIII Eth.*, l. 3.
[24] Cf. *Ibid.*, l. 7.
[25] *Ibid.*
[26] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 8, a. 3.

which actions God physically premoves man. The question therefore, resolves itself to this—how can man know enough about God to consider Him a friend—how does God impart a knowledge of Himself to man?

There are many ways open to man in this life whereby he can arrive at a knowledge of God, not indeed a perfect knowledge of Him as He is in Himself, but a knowledge sufficiently full to serve as a basis for true friendship between himself and God. By the use of his natural reason, man can arrive at a true, though imperfect, knowledge of God as the author of nature, the infinitely powerful creator, infinitely good rewarder, and infinitely just punisher. He ascends to this knowledge of God through knowledge of himself and of other creatures. "For," as St. Paul says, "the invisible things of God, from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made." [27] Man may, moreover, by his natural powers acquire at least an indirect knowledge of the nature of God by reason of the natural law which was impressed upon him in creation. This natural law is a created participation of the eternal law of God, which eternal law, according to St. Thomas, "is nothing else but the reason (*ratio*) of the divine wisdom, according as it is directive of all actions and movement." [28] According to his perception of the natural law, therefore, man arrives at a knowledge of the eternal law, not, indeed, as it is in itself, but according to an irradiation of it as manifested in the natural law and, in fact, in all knowledge of the truth; for "every rational creature knows it (the eternal law) according to some irradiation of it, either greater or less. For all knowledge of truth is a certain irradiation and participation of the eternal law." [29] By this participated knowledge of the eternal law, then, man can arrive at some understanding of the essence of divine wisdom according as it is a Divine exemplar of creation, not really distinct from the essence of God Himself, and thus through his knowledge of the natural

[27] *Rom.*, i. 20. Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 2, a. 2, and q. 88, a. 3.
[28] *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 93, a. 1. [29] *Ibid.*, a. 2.

law, man can indirectly arrive at some notion of God's nature and attributes.

This type of knowledge, however, though it begets a certain natural love of God, is only a very remote and potential basis for friendship with God which belongs to the supernatural order. Moreover, the perfection of this knowledge of God through reason is attainable only " by a few, after a long time, and with an admixture of many errors," [30] due to the darkening of man's reason by sin and passion as well as to his necessary preoccupation with his physical needs. In order, therefore, to give a man a better opportunity to acquire the knowledge of Himself which is necessary for man's salvation and for the establishment of a friendship with Himself, God, in His infinite goodness, has condescended to *reveal* Himself to man, to give to man at least a veiled glimpse of the unspeakable beauty and attractiveness of the divine nature. This He has done by Revelation in general: in the Old Law, chiefly through the Prophets; in the New Law, in a most sublime manner through the Word of God made flesh. All the knowledge that it was necessary for man to have about God in order to make friendship with God possible in this life was communicated by Christ to His Apostles and through them to all mankind. Although through the centuries, under the guidance of the Church, there has been a gradual unfolding of the content of Revelation, all the essentials were radically present in the teachings of Christ and His Apostles.

Communication, however, must be at least two-sided. God has made Himself known objectively through Revelation. Faith is the subjective basis for all our knowledge of God in the supernatural order. The content of Revelation has been preserved for us by the Church which Christ founded and commissioned to guard and propagate His doctrines until the end of time. The Church proposes the truths we must know about God; by the supernatural infused virtue of faith, we believe those truths with complete certitude, not on intrinsic evidence nor even on

[30] *Ibid.*, I, q. 1, a. 1.

the authority of the Church, but we believe them on the authority of God Himself revealing. The knowledge of God which we have through faith is not a perfect knowledge of Him as He is in Himself—man is not able to attain such knowledge in this life. It is only a veiled and partial knowledge, but one amply sufficient to serve as a basis for true friendship with God in this life. After all, how much do we really know of the more intimate inner life of even our best friends? We can only judge from external manifestations, and experience teaches us how fallible that judgment can be. Even though our friends freely express to us their thoughts and emotions, are their words capable of fully representing the reality of their inner lives?

Faith is, then, a communication with God. By faith we learn, at least imperfectly, what sort of being God is, what perfections He has, what He is interested in, what pleases Him and what displeases Him, what we have in common with Him and what He thinks and wills in our regard. Certainly no communication between two prospective friends could reveal more than that. Faith is, in a sense, a conversation with God, for though we do not actually hear God speaking to us, we can know with the certitude of faith what He would say to us in some given circumstance if He were to speak to us personally. For instance, when we perform some genuinely good work, supposing that we are in the state of grace, we can by faith be as sure that God is pleased and that He will reward us as if He appeared to us personally and said, " This is very pleasing to Me and I will reward you." In fact we can be surer because the apparition might be a delusion.

There is another form of communication between man and God, one resting fundamentally upon faith, but more specifically a communication than is faith, and one superbly adapted to the establishment and fostering of friendship with God, namely the communication of *prayer*—using prayer in its wide theological sense to include any pious ascent of the mind to God. The conception of prayer as a mental communication or conversation with God is admirably brought out by various Fathers of the Church in their definitions of prayer: e. g., St.

Gregory Nazianzus, " Prayer is a conversation and a dialogue with God "; [31] St. John Chrysostom, " Prayer is a speaking to God "; [32] St. Augustine, " Prayer is a turning of the mind to God through pious and humble affection "; [33] St. John Damascene, " Prayer is the ascent of the mind to God." [34]

Under this broad aspect, prayer includes not only prayers of petition, adoration, thanksgiving, but indeed, any form of meditation or contemplation of divine truths. Speaking of the prayer of petition, to which he reduces the prayer of thanksgiving,[35] St. Thomas says: " Three things are required for prayer, the first of which is that the one praying approach God Whom he beseeches, which is signified by the name of prayer, because prayer is an ascent of the intellect to God." [36] And speaking of contemplation he says: " The contemplative life, as to the essence of its action, pertains to the intellect." [37] Prayer is, then, in a very special sense, a mental communication with God, the purpose of which is usually to manifest to Him something about ourselves, some need, some desire, some affection; we pray to express to Him our gratitude, our admiration, our profound veneration. Not that He needs to be told what is in our heart, for that He already knows, but He demands at least a mental expression of it for our own benefit rather than for His. With regard to the prayer of petition, again St. Thomas says: " It is not necessary for us to direct our prayers to God in order that we might manifest to Him our needs and desires, but in order that we ourselves might consider our need of recurring to the divine aid in these things." [38] With regard to prayers of adoration, admiration, love, etc., the expression of these affections whether it be mental or external, as by voice or bodily gesture, serves to intensify the affection itself.[39] Prayer, therefore, though it does not really inform God of something and is primarily for our own benefit, does fulfill a

[31] Migne, *PG.* XLIV, c. 1125.
[32] Migne, *PG.* LIII, c. 280.
[33] Migne, *PL.* XXXIX, c. 1887.
[34] Migne, *PG.* XCIV, c. 1019.
[35] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 83, a. 17.
[36] *Ibid.*
[37] *Ibid.*, q. 180, a. 1.
[38] *Ibid.*, q. 83, a. 2, ad 1um.
[39] *Ibid.*, a. 12.

requirement of friendship, i. e., some form of self-expression whereby we can project ourselves, as it were, into the intellect of another, not always simply to give information but also to benefit ourselves.

Communication must be at least two-sided. Though it is not difficult to see how in prayer we communicate with God, how does He in prayer communicate with us, over and above the fundamental communication of Revelation, of which we partake by the infused virtue of faith? Through the gifts of the Holy Ghost which are subjected in the intellect, i. e., the gifts of intellect, counsel, wisdom, and science, God may be said to project into our intellects, in a special way, the truth which is in His intellect. This projection is accomplished especially in prayer, since prayer is essentially an act of the intellect ascending and uniting itself to God, and it is precisely when the intellect is united to God that the four above-mentioned gifts are operating most effectively. Let us see how this projection takes place. The gifts in general are dispositions impressed upon our intellect and will whereby they are rendered easily movable by the inspirations of the Holy Ghost.

> It is fitting, therefore, that there be in man higher perfections according to which he may be disposed to be moved by God and these perfections are called gifts, not only because they are infused by God, but because according to them man is disposed to become promptly movable by the divine inspirations.[40]

The four gifts which perfect the intellect, render it easily movable by the divine inspirations; in other words, they render the intellect more capable of grasping the divine truth which is offered to it by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. With regard to the precise function of these gifts within the intellect St. Thomas says:

> On the part of the things proposed to faith for belief, two things are requisite on our part: first, that they be penetrated or grasped by the intellect, and this belongs to the gift of understanding. Secondly, it is necessary that man should judge these things aright,

[40] *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 68, a. 1.

that he should esteem that he ought to adhere to these things, and withdraw from their opposites: and this judgment, with regard to Divine things belongs to the gift of wisdom, but with regard to created things, belongs to the gift of knowledge, and as to its application to individual actions, belongs to the gift of counsel.[41]

It is evident then that through the operation of these four gifts the human intellect receives participations of the divine truth from the intellect of God and that, therefore, God can truly be said to communicate with man through the gifts, which operate especially during prayer.

We have seen how the mutual communication required as a basis of friendship between man and man is realized with regard to God and man; first, the communication established by natural knowledge of God and knowledge of the natural law impressed upon man in creation; secondly, the more perfect communication established by the supernatural knowledge of God through faith and lastly, by the most perfect communication possible in this life, which is that of prayer, especially the prayer of infused contemplation. Thus is answered the question: " How can there be between man and God a communication sufficient for the realization of a mutual friendship? "

III. THE ESSENCE OF FRIENDSHIP

Having considered the two principle prerequisites for friendship, namely, similitude and communication, and having seen how they are adequately fulfilled in the relationship of man to God, we shall now consider the essence of friendship itself, first as it is actualized between man and man and then as between man and God, attempting to point out how the essential notes of friendship between man and man are verified in the supernatural relationship established between man and God by grace and the infused virtue of charity.

The essence of friendship, according to Aristotle, consists in *mutual benevolence, mutually known* and *based on an honest*

[41] II-II, q. 8, a. 6.

good, a delectable good or a useful good. St. Thomas sums up Aristotle's definition of friendship thus:

> From these premises, (Aristotle) concludes the definition of friendship. He says that it is of the essence of friendship that by it persons *wish good to each other* and *that this be not unknown to them* and that it be *on account of an (honest) good, a delectable or a useful good.*[42]

The first point in this definition is, therefore, benevolence—the wishing of good to another. As it pertains to friendship, benevolence connotes the wishing of good to another primarily for the other's sake. "[Aristotle] says that by friendship men wish good things to their friends for the sake of the friends themselves. If they wished the good of a friend for their own sake, this would be rather to love themselves than others."[43] Simple benevolence is not love itself, for it does not necessarily presuppose the union required of love.[44] As it pertains to friendship, it is rather a *mode* of love, and thus the benevolence of friendship implies love because it is precisely benevolence which distinguishes the love of friendship from other kinds of love. Benevolence is not, however, completely disjoined from self, since it is based on the similarity which another bears to oneself. We wish good to another precisely because we regard him as another self and for this reason we wish for him the good which we would wish for ourselves. However, the good we desire for another by benevolence, we desire primarily for his own welfare, not for our own advantage. But the secondary consideration of some particular advantage which might accrue to us by reason of our friend's possession of some good, would not necessarily destroy benevolence as long as that consideration remained only secondary. Benevolence would still exist as long as the principal reason for desiring our friend's good would be the friend's own welfare. If the principal motive is the advantage of oneself, there is no longer benevolence but

[42] *In VIII Eth.*, l. 2, n. 1561.
[43] *Ibid.*, l. 5, n. 1604.
[44] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 27, a. 2.

concupiscence, which is the basis of only a very inferior kind of friendship.

One-sided benevolence is not sufficient for friendship, for while one may truly desire the welfare of another for the other's sake, if the other does not reciprocate the benevolence, there is no friendship. Moreover, merely occasional and inefficacious acts of good-will toward another, even though they be mutual, do not constitute the benevolence required of friendship. The good-will must be habitual and efficacious, i. e., one must be always prepared actually to *do* what is in his power to promote the welfare of the other. Only remotely and improperly can a mere inefficacious benevolence be considered friendship. As St. Thomas says in commenting on Aristotle:

> It is not possible for people to be friends unless they are first benevolent. This does not mean that all mutually benevolent people can be called friends. Benevolent people, as they are benevolent, only *wish* good to the objects of their benevolence; they are not moved to *do* good for them nor are they perturbed by their misfortunes. In a wide sense (*translative loquendo*) benevolence may be called a lazy friendship (*amicitia otiosa*,) because it does not have friendly operation joined to it. However, when a man perseveres in benevolence, and becomes accustomed to wishing another well, his soul is strengthened to wish good in such a way that his will is not lazy, but efficacious. In this way friendship is born.[45]

The second point in Aristotle's definition, namely, " that this (efficacious well-wishing) be not unknown to them," is self-evident. Though two people might have mutual, habitual and efficacious benevolence toward each other, in that they might be continually prepared to promote each other's welfare should occasion arise, if this regard for each other is not mutually known, they cannot be considered as friends, except, perhaps, in preparation of soul.

We now come to the third and most important point in Aristotle's definition, that is, the object of friendship, for friendship, being a habit, is specified by its act, which act is in turn

[45] *In IX Eth.*, l. 5, n. 1825.

specified by its object. Friendship is a particular kind of love—the love of benevolence. Hence, in common with all love, it must have as its object a good either true or apparent.

The particular aspect under which the good is attained is that which determines the various species of friendship. Good, as the object of love, has a three-fold aspect under which it is desirable, namely, as an honest good, a delectable good, or a useful good. Since good is that which terminates the motion of the appetite, these three aspects of good can best be understood by comparing them to the various terminations in the motion of natural bodies.[46] The motion of a natural body terminates absolutely only at its ultimate term. Each part of the motion, however, terminates relatively at various intermediate terms, through which the motion progresses successively until it reaches its ultimate term. The good which terminates the motion of the appetite can likewise be considered under this two-fold aspect of termination—it can be either the ultimate term of the motion or it can be an intermediate term, which is ordered to some further good as ultimate. The good which terminates the motion of the appetite relatively as an intermediate term is called the *useful good,* i. e., it is a good only insofar as it is useful as a means for the attainment of some further good. The good which ultimately terminates the motion can also be considered in two ways. Just as in the motion of a natural body the ultimate term can be considered either as the thing itself to which the motion tends or as rest in the thing. In the appetitive motion the good which is desired as it is in itself, and as that to which the appetite tends absolutely, is called the *honest good.* The good which terminates the motion of the appetite under the aspect of rest in the thing desired is called the *delectable good,* that is, it is not a good desired for what it is in itself, but only with a view to the delectation or pleasure which follows the attainment of it.

Applying all this to the object of friendship, the honest good is the good which is in the friend himself and which renders him

[46] Cf. *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 25, a. 6.

lovable for his own sake. The useful good is the good which is in the friend, not considered as lovable in itself but only as a means useful to promote the welfare of the one loving. The delectable good is the good which is in the friend, but considered only from the aspect of the pleasure which it affords to the one loving. In the case of the useful good and the delectable good, the motion of the appetite terminates ultimately with the lover himself and, consequently, love based on these goods is not a truly benevolent love of another, but only a form of self-love. It is, therefore, not true friendship but only a superficial friendship, inasmuch as the good which is in the one loved and the good which is desired for him are not loved or desired for his sake but for the sake of the one loving.

[Aristotle] says, therefore, that since there are three things which are lovable, namely, the good which is honest in every respect, the delectable good, and the useful good, these differ specifically from each other, not indeed, as three species equally dividing some genus, but according to a relation of primary and secondary. Because acts are diversified according to the difference of objects, it follows that the loves directed toward these three objects differ specifically; that is, the love by which something is loved on account of its goodness is one species of love, and that by which something is loved on account of its utility is another species. Because the act of friendship is to love, it follows that there are also three species of friendship, equaling in number the lovable thing. One of these species is friendship based on an honest good, i. e., good which is good in every respect; another that which is based on delectability; and the third, that based on utility. In each of these, the essential notion of friendship is saved because according to each one of these three, persons are able to wish each other the good according to which they love. For instance, if they love each other on account of virtue, they wish to each other the good of virtue, but if on account of utility, they wish to each other useful good (i. e., useful to the one loving); and if on account of pleasure, delectable goods. . . . He says, therefore, first that when persons love each other on account of utility, one does not love the other for the other's sake, but according as he receives from the other something for himself. So it is with those who love each other on account of delectation. Thus it is evident that both those who love on account of a useful good, love on account of the useful good

that comes to them and those who love on account of delectation, love on account of the delectable good which they receive. In this way, they do not love a friend for what he is in himself but according to that which is accidental to him, namely, according to that which is useful or delectable [to themselves]. Hence it is evident that friendships of this kind are not true friendships (*amicitiae per se*), but only quasi-friendships (*amicitiae per accidens*), for by them a man is not loved for what he is in himself but only for some utility or delectation which he offers.[47]

It is evident, then, that for Aristotle, the only true friendship is that which is based on an honest good, since on account of this good alone is a friend loved for his own sake and all the good that is desired for him is desired for his own sake, not primarily for the advantage of the one who loves him. For Aristotle, the honest good upon which true friendship is based is the *good of virtue*. Friendship based on virtue is the perfect friendship because it alone completely fulfills all the essential requirements of friendship.

[Aristotle] treats of the principal friendship, which is that based on the good of virtue. . . . He says that that friendship which is among good men and those similar to each other in virtue is the perfect friendship . . . showing that friendship of this kind is true friendship (*per se*) and not a quasi-friendship (*per accidens*), . . . for those who are similar to each other in virtue wish to each other goods which are in accord with each other's goodness. Both are good in themselves because virtue is a certain perfection which makes a man good and makes his works good, and they wish good to each other as each other is in himself. Hence their friendship is true friendship.[48]

The meaning of the latter part seems to be that one wishes the good of virtue to the other because the other is good in himself with the goodness of virtue; hence the good which each wishes to the other is wished for him on account of what he is in himself and for his own sake, which is true friendship.

Having considered, then, the three essential notes of friendship as they are realized in the relationship of man to man, we shall now considered those same essential notes as they are

[47] *In VIII Eth.*, l. 3, nn. 1563, 64, 66. [48] *In VIII Eth.*, l. 3, nn. 1574-75.

verified in that relationship of man to God which is established, in general by sanctifying grace, and in particular by the infused virtue of charity. In this consideration we shall treat the third point first, i. e., the object of charity as corresponding to the object of friendship, since that is the most radical of the essential notes and that upon which the other two notes more or less depend, because habits are specified ultimately by their objects.

Charity is commonly defined as a theological virtue, divinely infused, by which we love God on account of Himself, and ourselves and our neighbor as ourselves on account of God. We shall consider charity only with regard to its primary and formal object, i. e., God Himself, for though self and neighbor are also objects of charity, they are only the secondary material object of charity and in this paper we are concerned with charity only from the aspect of the friendship with God which it establishes. St. Thomas defines charity through a definition of friendship, for he says: " Charity signifies not only the love of God, but also a certain friendship for Him, which indeed, over and above love, adds a mutual return of affection with some mutual communication." [49]

The object of true and perfect friendship is the honest good of virtue in a friend, which renders him lovable in himself and for his own sake. The formal object of charity is also an honest good—not a mere participated good such as is virtue, whether natural or supernatural, but the very essence of goodness itself, the infinite and essential goodness of God, which renders Him infinitely lovable in Himself and for His Own sake. The good of virtue which we love in a human friend, we do not love as an abstract good having no reference to ourselves, for that would be contrary to the very nature of love, which of itself implies a reference, a convenience, an accommodation to the appetite of the one loving. Likewise by charity we do not love the goodness of God as something completely abstract and disjoined from ourselves; we love the goodness of God precisely as He communicates that goodness to us inasmuch as He is

[49] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 65, a. 5.

our ultimate end, capable of perfectly satisfying every tendency and desire of our appetites. We love that goodness precisely as it is the object of the divine beatitude, which God communicates to us completely and perfectly in the beatific vision and partially and inchoatively in this life through grace. Thus it is that St. Thomas says, time and time again, that the friendship of charity is founded upon a communication of the divine beatitude. This is the particular aspect of the divine goodness towards which charity tends as to its proper object.

This does not mean that we love the goodness of God only because it makes us happy, for that would be to love the goodness of God not in itself, but only with relation to ourselves; it would be to love God not for His Own sake, but primarily for our sakes. The meaning is that, while the principal and proximate motive of our charity is always the goodness of God as it is in itself, we do not love that goodness as something in no way participated by ourselves or in no way communicated to us by God, but we love it precisely because it is the ultimate end to which our whole being is ordered and because in itself it is the absolutely final term of the motion of our appetites; it is lovable in itself above all things, according to the very notion of lovable.

Certainly the goodness of God is a good for us, for otherwise it would not come within the sphere of the will, but to consider it primarily from the viewpoint of its being a good for *us* is to consider it only under the universal aspect of love, not under the special aspect of the love of charity, by which we love the goodness of God, not primarily because it is a good for us, but because it is the divine goodness, infinitely lovable in itself. This does not mean that we are to love God without any view to our own happiness—eternal or temporal; this would be quite impossible because man naturally seeks happiness in every one of his human acts. It simply means that our own happiness is not to be the principal motive for loving God, but in loving God we seek our own happiness in that we wish to refer ourselves to God and to refer our happiness to Him. Hence just as the principal and proximate object of true human friendship is

the participated honest good of virtue, so the principal and proximate object of the divine friendship of charity is the essential goodness of God as it is in itself, but viewed under the aspect of its being our ultimate end.

According to Aristotle friendship based on virtue is the only one in which the perfection of friendship is fully realized, precisely because it is based on the good of virtue. The first reason he gives for the perfection of the friendship of virtue is the fact that only in this type of friendship is the essence of true friendship achieved, since in this one alone the friend is loved as he is in himself and for his own sake. All other so-called friendships are only forms of self love. In the supernatural order, the divine friendship of charity is also the perfect friendship for the same reason, namely that by charity alone is God loved as He is in Himself according to His Own essential and proper Goodness and for His own sake. The friendship of charity has no inferior species because charity is one virtue with only one formal object, the infinite Goodness of God.

> Diverse species of friendship are regarded in one way according to the diversity of the end, and according to this there are said to be three species of friendship, namely, the useful friendship, the pleasurable friendship and the honest friendship: and in another way according to the diversity of the communications in which the friendships are founded. . . . In neither of these ways can charity be divided into many, for the end of charity is one, namely the divine goodness; and also there is [only] one communication of eternal beatitude upon which this friendship is founded.[50]

The friendship of charity can never be primarily a friendship of utility or of pleasure, for if one loves God primarily for the utility or pleasure he derives from loving, he is not loving God with the love of charity. Hence, properly speaking, charity does not admit of perfection and imperfection as to species, though it might be said to do so as to degree of intensity. Therefore, the friendship of charity is the perfect friendship in the supernatural order, precisely because its primary object is always the goodness of God, loved for God's own sake.

[50] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 23, a. 5.

Another reason Aristotle gives for the perfection of friendship being achieved only in a friendship based on virtue is the fact that in this type alone does friendship attain permanence of form, which is a property closely allied to its very nature. The friendship of virtue has this permanence of form because its object, virtue, is a habit, of its very nature difficult to remove. This type of friendship also has permanence from the viewpoint of the subjects themselves, since it includes everything that friendship requires in the line of pleasure, and for this reason is not apt to be set aside lightly. While pleasure is not the primary motive of such friendship, nevertheless some pleasure is required in all love and the purest pleasure is derived from a love based on virtue.

[Aristotle] further concludes that since (the virtuous) love each other for this reason, namely that they are good, it follows that their friendship will endure as long as they remain virtuous. Virtue is a permanent habit and one not easily lost. . . . Therefore such a friendship is of lasting duration and not easily terminable because in it are conjoined all things which are required for friends. Every friendship is on account of good or on account of pleasure and this either absolutely, for instance when that which is loved is good and delectable in itself (*simpliciter*) or because it is good or delectable to the one loving (*per accidens*); and this is to be good or delectable not truly and properly but according to a certain similitude to that which is truly and properly good and delectable. In the friendship of virtue all these things are present, not accidentally (*per accidens*) but in themselves (*per se*), for they who are similar according to this friendship of virtue, also have the other goods, because what is good in itself is also delectable. Thus, because friendship of this kind has all things which are required to friendship, it is not easily dissolved, since (only) that is wont to be set aside in which some defect is found.[51]

All this is doubly true of the friendship of charity. Charity, on the part of its object, has the greatest permanence since it is based on the immutable goodness of God. Nor is there anything in charity itself which would make it easily removable from its subject. The only way in which charity can be lost

[51] *In VIII Eth.*, l. 3, nn. 1577, 79.

is by the commission of mortal sin, and this is attributable not to charity but to the instability of the human will. Moreover, of itself, the least charity is sufficient to enable man to resist all temptations.

In another way, charity can be considered according to its proper nature and, so considered, it is not capable of anything that does not pertain to its proper nature. Hence charity is in no way able to sin, just as heat cannot grow cold.[52]

Charity which can fall short of the very nature of charity, is not true charity; for this would be the case if love should love for a time and afterwards cease loving, which is not the nature of true love. If charity is lost on account of the mutability of the subject, contrary to the determination (*propositum*) of charity, which is included in its very act, this would not be opposed to the truth of charity.[53]

Also, on the part of the subject, charity has a certain permanence inasmuch as in it is contained all that is required for the greatest and truest delight of the subject, and hence one is not reasonably inclined to destroy in himself by sin that which is capable of causing him his greatest joy. The joy connected with charity is the greatest joy of which man is capable because it is derived from the union with his ultimate end, the supreme and absolute good itself. This joy is, of course, only incomplete in this life due to the incompleteness of the union with the supreme good; nevertheless it is still the greatest joy attainable in life. Joy is not included in the essence of charity but is contained in charity as an effect in its cause.

Charity is the love of God, Whose goodness is immutable, because He Himself is His Own goodness, and when He is loved, He is in the one loving Him, through the most noble effect of Himself, according to *I John* iv, 16, 'who abideth in charity abideth in God and God in him.' Therefore spiritual joy, which is derived from God, is caused by charity.[54]

Hence it is that while joy is not the primary object of charity, man's greatest joy is necessarily connected with charity and this

[52] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 24, a. 11.
[53] *Ibid.*, ad 2um.
[54] *Ibid.*, q. 28, a. 1.

furnishes him with a strong, though only secondary, motive for remaining in charity. From this aspect, charity can be said to have permanence on the part of the subject.

So much for the object of the divine friendship of charity on the part of man considered as the one loving. Friendship includes a return of love by the one loved. What then, is the object of God's love of friendship for man? God's own infinite goodness is the only proper and adequate object of the Divine love and this goodness God loves by absolute necessity. All creatures are participations of the divine goodness in that their being is a participation of His being, and the divine being, as it is in God, is identical with the divine goodness. Since the existence of creatures depends on the free will of God, the actual goodness which they have by reason of their existence also depends on the divine will and hence divine love, unlike all other love, causes the goodness which it loves in creatures. " The love of God infuses and creates the goodness in things." [55] Among creatures, those natures which bear a greater similarity to God, more perfectly participate the goodness of God, and hence are loved more by God. In the supernatural order, grace, as we have seen, is a very special participation of the goodness of God since it is a participation of the divine nature itself and a sharing of the intimate life of God. Hence in the supernatural order, grace is that which God loves most in man. St. Thomas succinctly expresses all this as follows:

> Since the creature's good springs from the divine will, some good in the creature flows from God's love, whereby He wishes the good of the creature. On the other hand, the will of man is moved by the good pre-existing in things, and hence man's love does not wholly cause the good of the thing, but presupposes it either in whole or in part. Therefore, it is clear that every love of God is followed at some time by a good caused in the creature, but not co-eternal with the eternal love. According to this difference of good the love of God to the creature is looked at differently. One is common whereby He loves all things that are, and thereby gives things their natural being. The second is a special love whereby

[55] *Ibid.*, I, q. 20, a. 2.

He draws the rational creature above the condition of its nature to a participation of Divine Good, and through this love He is said to love anyone simply, since it is by this love that God simply wishes the eternal good, which is Himself, for the creature.[56]

Grace is, therefore, the principal object of God's love for man and that which constitutes the communication upon which God's friendship for man is based, since grace is the beginning of the communication of eternal happiness, the " seed of glory." The love which God has for man, by reason of the grace which is in him, adequately fulfills the essential requirement of true friendship as to its object, for in loving that grace, God is loving man as man is in himself and for his own sake. Though that grace comes from God and is a participation of God's own goodness, nevertheless it is an entitative habit intrinsically inhering in the soul of man, making him what he is in the supernatural order and, once received, truly belonging to man in the proper sense of the word, though it is a purely gratuitous gift and in no way strictly due to man. Once it is possessed by man, however, grace is man's goodness just as is any other goodness which he participates from God.

Everything is said to be good by the divine goodness as the first effective exemplar, principle, and end of all goodness. Nevertheless each thing is said to be good by a similitude of the divine goodness inhering in itself, which is formally its own goodness, denominating it (as good).[57]

This is equally true of the supernatural good of grace, though it inheres in the soul of man only as an accident. The man possessed of grace, therefore, God loves as He is in himself. It is also true that God loves that man for the man's own sake, for though in loving the grace in man He is only loving Himself, nevertheless that grace is a perfectly free gift given to man entirely for man's own advantage and in no way promoting God's own intrinsic welfare. God's love for man, though it is of necessity self-love, is nevertheless, the most unselfish love conceivable, for the good which it loves, He Himself has given. It

[56] *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 110, a. 1.

[57] *Ibid.*, I, q. 6, a. 4.

is in every sense, therefore, a love of man for man's own sake. Hence, as to its object, the love of God for man is the love of friendship in the highest possible form, completely free from any notion of utility or self-delectation arising from the creature as from a cause.

Having considered, therefore, the object of the supernatural friendship of charity and having seen how that object adequately fulfills the essential requirement of friendship as to its object, which was the third point in Aristotle's definition of friendship, we now pass to a consideration of how the benevolence required in friendship, which was the first point in Aristotle's definition, is verified in the relationship established between man and God by charity. The benevolence required of friendship is the mutual, habitual, efficacious wishing of good to each other for each other's sake. As has been said, benevolence, considered in itself, is not the love of friendship in its entirety, for benevolence in itself is a simple act of the will [58] and does not necessarily imply the union of affection required of love.

Moreover, benevolence, as the distinguishing mode of the love of friendship,[59] implies the wishing of good to another for the other's sake; hence it is opposed to concupiscence, which desires good for another not for his sake but for the sake of the one desiring it. Under this aspect, benevolence is closely connected with the object of friendship, which ultimately specifies the love of friendship and distinguishes it from other kinds of love. It is the nature of the object of friendship, i.e., the goodness of the person as he is in himself, which demands that the love of that object be a benevolent love, for to love a person as he is in himself is to love him for his own sake and to wish him well for his own sake, which is to love him benevolently. In treating of the object of the friendship of charity, therefore, we have already considered the benevolent aspect under which charity attains its object, inasmuch as by charity we love God for His own sake and not primarily for our sake, and He loves us

[58] Cf. *ibid.*, I-II, q. 27, a. 2.

[59] Cf. *ibid.*, II-II, q. 23, a. 1.

with a completely unselfish love. We will now consider how benevolence is verified in the friendship of charity with regard to the mutual wishing of good between man and God.

How, in the first place, can man possibly wish any good to God, since He already includes in Himself the first effective principle of all good, that is, His own substantial goodness? True, there is no good which can be intrinsically added to Him or desired for Him. Man can, however, in a broad sense, exercise efficacious benevolence toward God as He is in Himself by taking complacency in Him, that is, by rejoicing in the infinite goodness and perfections of God precisely because they are *His* goodness and perfections. Complacency in God as He is in Himself can be considered as efficacious benevolence in the sense that one would do anything he could to promote God's intrinsic welfare if such a thing were possible. This disposition of soul is thus beautifully expressed by St. Francis de Sales:

> I have said to God: Thou art my God, full of immense goodness, Who hast no need of my good or that of any others; if, however, it were possible for Thee to need some good, I would never cease to desire that good for Thee and to procure it for Thee, I would gladly surrender my life and everything most dear to me.[60]

There is, however, a way in which man can exercise efficacious benevolence toward God in a more strict sense, namely, by desiring and striving to promote the external glory of God, which, though it does not pertain to His Own intrinsic welfare, pertains, nevertheless, to the welfare of God considered exteriorily on the part of creatures inasmuch as it is a manifestation by creatures of their appreciation and love of the intrinsic goodness of God. By striving to promote the appreciation and love of God both in themselves and others, creatures are in a sense giving to God things which He Himself does not possess, for the appreciation and love of His goodness by creatures is something which only creatures can give. Once God has created man, His greatest desire in man's regard is that man appreciate and love His goodness and that man thus move toward the end

[60] *Treatise on the Love of God*, Book V, chapter 6.

for which he is destined, namely union with God Himself. To desire and to strive to promote the eternal glory of God is, therefore, to exercise efficacious benevolence toward God, since it is to wish for Him a good which He desires, even though that good be, strictly speaking, not God's good but man's.

How does God exercise benevolence toward man? The answer is too obvious to require discussion. If benevolence is the willing of good to another for the other's sake, every act of God's will that in any way pertains to man is an act of supreme and infinite benevolence, for it is impossible for God to will anything in man's regard except good and the good which He wills to man He wills solely for man's own welfare, without any view to His own advantage or felicity. God's benevolence toward man is, moreover, a supremely efficacious benevolence, for the good which He wills for man, He infallibly effects, unless man himself places an obstacle in the way. Every good which is in man or which comes to man is a direct effect of God's efficacious well-wishing. Man's very existence is the effect of divine benevolence; his elevation to the supernatural order completely exhausts all the possibilities of benevolence, for by it God not only willed for man the Supreme Good which is Himself, but He made it possible for man to attain that Good. Divine providence, predestination, all the gifts of nature and grace are the effects of divine benevolence, coming to man as perfect gratuities, the results of the self-diffusiveness of God's own goodness. Even the so-called evils which befall man are the results of God's benevolence, permitted by God for the ultimate welfare of the one who suffers them, or for the welfare of other men. Sin, the only real evil, is not the effect of God's will; it is the effect of man's will, though God's permissive will allows it because He has endowed man with free-will. Even out of sin, however, God often brings good to the sinner. The remedies which God gives for sin are outstanding examples of His benevolence. What need be said to prove the supreme benevolence of man's redemption by the Son of God, Christ's institution of the Church, the sacraments, all the means for the attainment of man's ultimate end? God's benevolence might be said to

extend even into hell, for terrible as it is, it is a far more lenient punishment than the sins of man deserve.

There remains but one of the essential notes of friendship to discuss, namely, the mutual knowledge of reciprocal benevolence, which was the second point in Aristotle's definition of friendship. How this applies to the friendship of charity on the part of God is also self-evident, because God knows exactly how much love and benevolence toward Him there is in the heart of every just man. Man knows by faith of God's love and benevolence toward him. The Sacred Scriptures abound with God's protestations of love and benevolence toward man, of His friendship and tender solicitude for the images of Himself He has fashioned, for the sons He has adopted by grace. Man can, moreover, have a sufficient knowledge of his own love for God, at least by the conjectural knowledge of signs. Though without a divine revelation he cannot know with certainty that he is in the state of grace and in the friendship of God, he can at least know the great probability of it—his own heart will tell him so.[61]

Thus we bring to a close our comparison of human and divine friendship. We have considered how all the dispositive and essential requirements of true and perfect friendship are adequately fulfilled in the relationship between man and God, which is established by grace and the infused virtue of charity. We have considered: first, how the radical requirement of similarity is realized between man and God inasmuch as the natural likeness which man bears to God by reason of his intellectual nature is perfected and supernaturalized by the special assimilation effected by grace operating through the theological virtues of faith, hope and charity, the moral virtues and the gifts of the Holy Ghost. We have considered, secondly, how the requirement of intercommunication between friends is realized between man and God by grace inasmuch as by faith man comes to an adequate though only imperfect knowledge of God as He has revealed Himself to man, and inasmuch as, by prayer, man communicates with God in a most intimate manner

[61] *Summa Theol.*, q. 112, a. 5.

and God with man through the operation of the gifts of the Holy Ghost. We have considered, thirdly, how the three essential notes of friendship, mutual benevolence, mutually known and based on an honest good, are fully realized in the relationship established between man and God by charity, inasmuch as by charity man loves God as He is in Himself and wishes Him well for His own sake, hence he loves God with a love of benevolence; and God loves man as he is in himself inasmuch as the good which is in man is a participation of God's Own goodness, hence God's love is benevolent in the most absolute sense. This love of benevolence is mutually known by God and man insofar as God can read man's heart, and man, by faith, knows of God's benevolent love for him. By the testimony of his own conscience and the dictates of his heart man knows at least conjecturally that he truly loves God and is in the state of friendship with God.

We conclude, therefore, that the friendship between man and God, though it is of necessity analogical, as is any relationship predicated of man and God, is, nevertheless, a true friendship in the literal sense of the word and, indeed, one vastly more sublime than the friendship which exists between man and man, both by reason of its object, which is God's own goodness and by reason of the superior manner in which it attains its object.

Our consciousness of the fact that between ourselves and God there exists a true friendsip, can be for us an inexhaustible source of consolation and encouragement, opening up to us as it does, vast realms of possibility as to the intimacy of union with God which we are capable of attaining. When applied to the Divine Friend, how profoundly significant become the words of the Holy Spirit, " A faithful friend is a strong defense; and he that hath found him hath found a treasure. . . . A faithful friend is the medicine of life and immortality." [62]

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[62] *Eccles.*, vi, 14-16.

THE INTELLECTUAL COGNITION OF PARTICULARS

EVERY philosophical system has problems which belong only to itself and which are either non-existent or quite peripheral in other systems. Absolute Idealism, for instance, does not have to explain the " affinity " that the categories have for transcendent reality, a question of central importance in the Kantian critique of knowledge. Similarly, the problem of individuation does not exist within a nomalistic philosophy as the latter considers individuals the only reality and universals pure products of the mind or even as " operational " indications. In like manner, Thomism has some problems which are meaningful only within the totality of Thomistic conceptions. One of these problems regards the manner in which the human intellect becomes cognizant of material particulars.

This problem is of pivotal importance. Though, at first sight, it may seem that the intellectual cognition of particulars represents but a minor detail—one meriting attention only for the sake of completing Thomistic psychology—it is in fact a problem that must be analyzed and solved if it is not to become a serious stumbling-block for Thomistic philosophy. This danger becomes apparent when one considers the principles involved: the principle of individuation by matter, the immateriality of the intellect, and the origin of knowledge in sense-cognition. Nobody can deny that these principles are indeed fundamental to Thomistic philosophy. If we are to retain them, it behooves us to explain more clearly how intellectual cognition of particulars takes place. To that elucidation the following pages aspire to contribute.

During the last thirty years experimental psychology has accumulated a number of facts apparently irreconcilable with the Thomistic principles of intellectual cognition. There are,

of course, facts of which St. Thomas was absolutely ignorant—they were discovered only many centuries after his time—and some of them present certain problems to Thomistic philosophy. One may try to apply the principles of his philosophy and to devise a theory of the facts based on his principles, but one cannot expect to find a ready-made solution in the writings of Aquinas. There are other problems, however, of which St. Thomas was perfectly aware, but which have taken on another aspect since his time by reason of more recent discoveries. In these cases one has to ask whether the ideas of St. Thomas can be preserved without modification, or whether they have to be adapted—without however abandoning basic principles—to the new facts. Finally there are problems which arise within the system of Thomism itself. Some of these problems result from certain obscurities in the texts, or their problematic character may be due to some incompleteness and indecision of the author. The problem of how the intellect comes to know the material particular seems to be one of these problems for which St. Thomas himself did not discover a thoroughly satisfactory solution. That this may be the case seems to be indicated by a noteworthy mode of expression: when speaking of the intellect gaining knowledge of singulars through what he calls "reflexion on or upon the phantasm" (*reflexio in vel super phantasma*), St. Thomas never omits to qualify his term by calling it a "kind of" (*quaedam*) reflexion, while he mentions other ideas closely related to this one without any such restriction; thus, he speaks of the "complete" return (*reditio completa*) of the intellect to itself. It seems as if Aquinas himself was not quite satisfied with the solution he proposed and by adding the qualification, "a kind of," he meant to indicate the necessity of a further elucidation.

The problem and the solution proposed by St. Thomas are well known. A brief recapitulation will be enough. The intellect evidently has a knowledge of material particulars. This is evident, since judging is an achievement of the intellect and since among judgments there are some whose subject is a particular and whose predicate is a universal: Socrates is a man.

Furthermore there are syllogisms in which the minor concerns a particular, as in the classical example for the mode *barbara*: All men are mortal, Caius is a man, Caius is mortal. To these frequently cited examples one may add another case. The mere recognition of a thing as *this one* implies an intellectual knowledge of the particular. True, the mere recognition, that is, the mere knowledge that I have already seen this thing before, does not necessarily entail the cooperation of the intellect; but the very moment I give the thing a name, calling it a man, a dog, a table, I connect a universal concept with the sensual evidence of the thing, and therefore bring together somehow the intellect and the particular.

Another group of facts which makes an intellectual knowledge of the particular necessary has to do with action. All action ultimately regards particular material things and situations. We behave toward these according to our principles and the decision of our will. The will, however, is an intellectual faculty.

Again, there is the fact that the intellect knows the sensory faculties which are themselves material. Furthermore, the intellect knows that its universal notion applies to material particulars—it is natural to the universal to be predicated of the many (*universale natum est de pluribus praedicari*).[1] The intellect knows, too, from what kind of particulars the notion has been abstracted by means of the phantasm.

Finally, we are told that the intellect needs to return to the phantasm in order to make clear to itself concepts it has formed. When we have in mind some general notion and want to give an illustration of it, we turn to the phantasm. This can be done only if the intellect knows somehow the phantasm it needs, else it could not well command imagination to produce the right phantasm. The phantasm itself, however, is material.

The answer given by St. Thomas is well known. The intellect, he tells us, is incapable of any direct knowledge of the material particular because the intellect is immaterial. Any

[1] Or it has *habitudinem ad multa; Summa Theol.*, I, q. 85, a. 3, ad 1um.

knowledge the intellect has of the particular is indirect or accidental. This knowledge is obtained by a certain turning back to the phantasm (*quaedam reflexio ad phantasma*), that is, by the intellect retracing the steps which led it from the phantasm to the intelligible species (*species intelligibilis*) and to the concept (*verbum mentis*) itself.

It cannot be denied that this explanation is far from being satisfactory or, at least, from being complete. Many questions arise and have to be answered before this theory can become truly acceptable. These questions are sometimes alluded to by Aquinas; they are not discussed in detail and they are not answered.

The problem of the intellectual cognition of material particulars [2] is closely related to the general idea Aquinas has formed of the role played by sense cognition in the formation of concepts. A discussion of the special problem can be carried through only if the general thesis is somewhat recapitulated. It is the more advisable to consider the relation between image or phantasm and concept, since there is an apparent contradiction between the Thomistic view and the statement of experimental psychology regarding " imageless thought."

Before reporting on the ideas of St. Thomas and summarizing the main passages which deal with the problem of the image-concept relation and the intellectual cognition of particulars, a methodological remark seems indicated. Many authors quote the various works of Aquinas as if these writings all belonged to the same time. But one does well to consider the possibility of a change of opinion or a development of ideas even in St. Thomas. It is true that there is, in his philosophy, no such division as that found between the pre-critical and the critical phase in Kant's ideas, nor is there any sign of such a development as that which Aristotle's ideas underwent from the *Protreptikos* to the *De Anima*. Nevertheless it is inadvisable to put, for example, the *Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum* or

[2] For brevity's sake, the term " particular " will be used in the special sense of " material particular," and when there is a reference to immaterial particulars, this will be expressly mentioned. The same applies to the term " singular."

the *Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate* on the same level with the *Summa Theologica* or the Commentaries on the *Corpus Aristotelicum*.

The first part of the present article will summarize briefly the views of St. Thomas on the relation between image and concept, or between the imagination and intellect. Having thus gained a comprehensive idea of the Thomistic viewpoint on the question still to be answered, we shall then proceed to survey in a summary manner the data of experimental psychology insofar as they have an immediate bearing on our problem. The next part will deal with the views proposed by some older and some recent Thomistic treatises. Finally, we shall attempt to answer the question and to develop a consistent theory of intellectual knowledge.

I

The classical Thomistic passage on image and thought is, of course, that found in the *Summa Theologica*, Part I, Question 84, Article 7. The main thesis is contained in the first sentence of the body of the article:

> I answer that, it is impossible for our intellect, in the present state of life in which the soul is united to a passible body to understand anything actually, except by turning to the phantasm.[3]

This is proved by two arguments, or *indicia*, taken from observation: whenever the sensitive powers, imagination and memory, are impaired, intellectual operation suffers. The intellect, therefore, needs the sensory powers for achieving its own operation.

> Wherefore it is clear that for the intellect to understand actually, not only when it acquires fresh knowledge, but also when it applies knowledge already acquired, there is need for the act of the imagination and of the other powers.[4]

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[3] "Respondeo dicendum, quod impossibile est intellectum nostrum, secundum praesentis vitae statum quo passibili corpori conjungitur, aliquid intelligere in actu, nisi convertendo se ad phantasma.

[4] "Unde manifestum est, quod ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat, non solum accipiendo scientiam de novo, sed etiam utendo scientia iam acquisita, requiritur actus imaginationis et ceterarum virtutum (*loc. cit.*).

Secondly, anyone can experience this of himself, that when he tries to understand something, he forms certain phantasms to serve him by way of examples, in which as it were, he examines what he is desirous of understanding. It is for this reason that when we wish to help someone to understand something, we lay examples before him, from which he forms phantasms, for the purpose of understanding.[5]

The universal nature *exists* only in the particular thing. But this nature is the object of the intellect. Particulars, however, are apprehended by sense cognition and represented by the phantasm. The intellect, therefore, in order actually to understand its proper object, must " convert itself " to the phantasm. Thus only can it envision the universal nature existing in the particular.

Not even incorporeal things—of which there can be no image —are conceived without phantasms:

Incorporeal things, of which there are no phantasms, are known to us by comparison with sensible bodies of which there are phantasms. . . . And, therefore, when we understand something about these things, we need to turn to phantasms of bodies, although there are no phantasms of the things themselves.[6]

Thus it seems that according to St. Thomas there is neither intellectual knowledge nor any intellectual operation without imagination taking part in the process. Even concepts already formed cannot be actually understood without reproduction of the phantasm and without the intellect turning anew to the phantasm. The question, however, arises whether this phantasm has necessarily to be the one from which the concept was originally abstracted or whether another phantasm may not take

[5] " Secundo, quia hoc quilibet in seipso experiri potest, quod quando aliquis conatur aliquid intelligere, format aliqua phantasmata per modum exemplorum, in quibus quasi inspiciat quod intelligere studet. Et inde est etiam quod quando aliquem volumus facere aliquid intelligere, proponimus ei exempla, ex quibus sibi phantasmata formare possit ad intelligendum (*loc. cit.*).

[6] " . . . quorum non sunt phantasmata, cognoscuntur a nobis per comparationem ad corpora sensibilia, quorum sunt phantasmata . . . Et ideo cum de huiusmodi aliquid intelligimus, necesse habemus converti ad phantasmata, licet ipsorum non sint phantasmata (*ibid.*, ad 3um.).

the place of the former. Furthermore, it seems doubtful whether the phantasm used by the intellect in considering incorporeal things is of such a kind as to allow for a sufficient understanding of the thing considered.

Conversion to the phantasm has, it becomes clear, a double meaning. It signifies the turning of the intellect towards a phantasm for the sake of abstracting the universal notion for the first time; and it signifies the " returning " to the phantasm for the sake of thinking anew or making clear—to oneself or to another—the notion already abstracted and preserved in the possible intellect (*intellectus possibilis*).[7] The acquisition of knowledge is achieved by such a conversion to the phantasm in the sensitive faculties, namely, the imagination, the particular reason (*vis cogitativa*), and the memory.[8]

There is a particular problem implied in this passage, which can be only mentioned incidentally. What is the precise meaning of the statement that the phantasm is in all three sensitive powers? It is of course in the imagination; it is also, though in a different mode, in memory from whose storehouse, so to speak, imagination draws its materials. But it is difficult to see how the phantasm can be in the *vis cogitativa*.

The same passage contains another interesting statement. The achievement of intellectual operation in returning to the phantasm involves not only the intellect, but also the inferior powers. These powers thus acquire a certain aptitude (*quaedam habilitas*) for assisting the intellect to envision the intelligible nature with greater ease in the phantasms. This remark is important. By it is indicated that the operation of the intellect is associated with an accompanying operation of the sensitive faculties.[9] We have therefore to suppose that there exists a certain coordination between the intellectual and the sensory part of the soul.

[7] For the conservation of the *species intelligibles* in the intellect itself, cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 89, a. 5, c. This passage refers to the *anima separata*. In this article however all questions regarding the separated soul are discarded; we deal exclusively with the psychology of cognition.

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 89, a. 5, c.

The twofold meaning of *conversion* implies a twofold "movement" between the two terms of the sensitive and the intellective powers. In the original formation of a concept by abstraction there is a "movement" from the senses to the intellect; in the "return" of the intellect to the phantasm there is a movement from the mind to the sense (*motus ab anima ad sensum*).[10]

It did not escape St. Thomas that the phantasm sometimes is not the one from which the notion had been abstracted. There is a passage in the *Q. D. de Veritate* which reads:

> Thus in intellectual vision, one may see the very essence of a thing without looking at the representation itself of the thing, although sometimes one sees that essence through another representation, as we know from experience.[11]

One and the same phantasm may, on the other hand, serve as material for abstracting several universals and, accordingly, be used in the "return" of the intellect as an example for several different concepts.[12]

St. Thomas seems even to admit that there are certain concepts to which no phantasm corresponds as a representation strictly speaking. The concept of *genus*, for instance, "is not a representation of anything existing outside the mind."[13] He also repeatedly points out that certain things cannot be represented directly by images. These things we know either by the relation of cause and effect, or by another relation. The latter is the case with the concept of prime matter: ". . . it (the intellect) does not know primary matter except as proportionate to form."[14]

One ought to distinguish the thinking of a mere and isolated concept from other contents of the intellect. When speaking

[10] *II Sent.*, d. XX, q. 2, ad 3um.

[11] *Q. D. de Ver.*, q. 10, a. 8, ad 2um contra.

[12] *Ibid.*, q. 8, a. 13, ad 4um.: *In eisdem phantasmatibus ratio nostra in diversa tendit cogitatione.*

[13] *I Sent.*, d. II, q. 1, a. 3, sol.; also *III Sent.*, d. XXIII, q. 1, a. 2, sol.

[14] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 87, a. 1, c.; *In VII Metaph.*, lect. 2; *In VIII Metaph.*, lect. 1.

of the conversion to the phantasm, St. Thomas seems to refer always to single notions which have to be "inspected" in the phantasm in order to be actually understood. But it is apparently otherwise with propositions. Propositions are units, because they have one single meaning. The intellectual operation which finds its expression in a proposition is not a series of isolated steps. Such a series could never result in one meaning unless there be another synthesizing power. The intellect conceives by its capacity of "combining and dividing" the "object" of a sentence as one. (This one object is what Bolzano called the proposition *per se—Satz an sich*—or what Meinong means by his term *Das Objectic.*) St. Thomas compares the understanding or the conceiving of a sentence with the awareness of a continuum.

. . . for we understand a continuous whole simultaneously, and not part by part: and in like manner we understand a proposition, and not the subject first and the predicate afterwards; because we know all the parts by one species of the whole.[15]

In this way our intellect understands together both the subject and the predicate, as forming parts of one proposition; and also two things compared together, according as they agree in one point of comparison. From this it is evident that many things insofar as they are distinct, cannot be understood as one; but insofar as they are comprised under one intelligible concept, they can be understood together. Now everything is actually intelligible according as its image is in the intellect. All things, then, which can be known by one intelligible species, are known as one intelligible object, and therefore are understood simultaneously.[16]

A proposition, therefore, is understood without a correspond-

[15] "Simul enim intelligit totum continuum, non partem post partem; et similiter simul intelligit propositionem, non prius subjectum et postea praedicatum; quia secundum unam totius speciem omnes partes cognoscit" (*I Cont. Gent.*, 55).

[16] "Et sic etiam intellectus noster simul intelligit subjectum et praedicatum, prout sunt partes unius propositionis; et duo comparata, secundum quod conveniunt in una comparatione. Ex quo patet quod multa, secundum quod sunt distincta, non possunt simul intelligi; sed secundum quod uniuntur in uno intelligibili, sic simul intelliguntur. Unumquodque autem est intelligibile in actu, secundum quod eius similitudo est in intellectu. Quaecumque igitur per unam speciem intelligibilem cognosci possunt, cognoscuntur ut unum intelligibile; et ideo simul cognoscuntur" (*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 58, a. 2, c.).

ing phantasm. Such a phantasm is indeed impossible. Phantasms are either images of particulars, or they are particulars illustrating or symbolizing a general notion. There are also phantasms which symbolize relations, sometimes even rather complicated ones. But there are doubtlessly many relations and many propositions expressing these relations which, by their nature, cannot be symbolized by any phantasm. The great importance of this remark of St. Thomas will become clear in connection with the question of "imageless thought."

There are, apparently, two meanings of the term to understand (*intelligere*). On the one hand, this term signifies the intellectual awareness of a universal nature; here the original sense of *intus legere* seems to be the appropriate one. On the other hand, *intelligere* signifies all kinds of intellectual operation outside of abstraction and the formation of the concept. *Intelligere* in the first sense demands the conversion to the phantasm. But St. Thomas evidently considered the possibility of there being degrees in this operation. He at least twice [17] points out that the phantasms are particularly necessary to people of a lesser intellectual capacity; these latter must be given particular examples to enable them to understand universal ideas.

In reporting the views of St. Thomas on the intellectual knowledge of particulars a more or less chronological procedure seems advisable since there is a certain modification to be observed in his teaching—if not in the essentials, at least in the mode of its formulation.

1. In his Commentary on the *Four Books of the Sentences*, St. Thomas, after summarizing the problem, gives this solution:

> In that cognition which is acquired through forms that are the causes of things, or through the representation of such forms, one arrives at singulars although the forms themselves are entirely immaterial; the reason for this is that the primary cause of a thing is that which pours being (*esse*) into things, but being (*esse*) regards both matter and form in common. Hence forms of this kind lead directly to a knowledge of both, that is to say, of matter

[17] *II Cont. Gent.*, 98; *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 98, a. 1, c.

and form; and for this reason things are known both in universal and in singular through such cognition.

The soul, therefore, when conjoined with the body, does not know except through forms received from things, and hence does not directly know singulars through that cognoscitive faculty in which forms are received from things in an entirely immaterial way, but only through powers affixed to the organs.

Indirectly, however, and through a certain reflexion it knows singulars even through the intellect—which does not employ an organ—as happens when from its proper object it returns to the knowing of its act, and from the act returns to the species, which is the principle of knowing, and thence proceeds to consider the phantasm from which the species was abstracted, and in this way knows the singular through the phantasm.[18]

The intellect is capable of making use of singulars in propositions and syllogisms insofar as it is bent toward the sensitive functions (*in quantum reflectitur ad potentias sensitivas*) and is somehow in touch with them (*quodammodo continuatur cum eis*). The intellect knows by means of an immaterial form which may be the origin of knowledge both of universals and of singulars (*forma . . . quae potest esse principium cognoscendi universale et singulare*).[19]

In regard to the interesting and important notion of a "continuity" between intellect and sensory faculties, St.

[18] "In illa cognitione quae est per formas, quae sunt rerum causae, vel earum impressiones, pervenitur ad singularia, quamvis huiusmodi formae sint omnino immateriales, eo quod causa rei prima est quae rebus esse influit: esse autem communiter materiam et formam respicit. Unde huiusmodi formae ducunt directe in cognitionem utriusque, sc., materiae et formae; et propter hoc per talem cognitionem cognoscuntur res et in universali et in singulari. Anima ergo cum corpori coniuncta est non cognoscit nisi per formas a rebus acceptas; et ideo per potentiam illam cognoscitivam in qua formae a rebus omnino immaterialiter recipiuntur, directe singularia non cognoscit, sed solummodo per potentias organis affixas; sed indirecte et per quandam reflexionem etiam per intellectum quo organo non utitur cognoscit singularia; prout, sc., ex objecto proprio redit ad cognoscendum suum actum ex quo actu redit in speciem quae est intelligendi principium; et ex ea procedit ad considerandum phantasmata, ex quo species huiusmodi est abstracta; et sic per phantasmata singulare cognoscit" (*IV Sent.*, d. L, q. 1, a. 3, sol. Cf. *Q. D. de Ver.*, q. 2, a. 6, c, where the intellectual knowledge of the particular is stated to be *secundum continuationem quandam intellectus ad imaginationem*).

[19] *Ibid.*, ad 2um et 3um contra.

Thomas appeals to the particular reason, or the *vis cogitativa*, as a medium between these two levels of mental operation:

> The practical intellect, as said in Book III *De Anima*, in order to make disposition concerning singulars needs the particular reason through the mediumship of which universal opinion may be applied to a particular work, as happens in a syllogism in which the major is a universal—an opinion of the practical intellect—while the minor is a singular—the estimate of the particular reason, which by another name is called the *vis cogitativa*—and where the conclusion consists of the choice of the work.[20]

The *vis cogitativa* is said to be within the confines of the sensitive and intellective parts where the sensitive part attains the intellect.[21]

Anyone considering these statements will become aware of a certain obscurity, or at least, incompleteness. The notion of continuation and the exact nature of the *vis cogitativa* need further determination. Moreover, it is not easy to understand how the intellect arrives at the knowledge of the intelligible species (*species intelligibilis impressa*), since what it knows is the *verbum mentis* or the *species expressa*, the *species impressa* being more of the nature of a process than of a content. Finally there is the problem of the precise signification of the " kind of " conversion or reflexion.

2. St. Thomas then has the following in the *Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate*: The intellect is capable of knowing truth. But true judgments may refer to universals or to singulars. The truth of a judgment of the latter kind, too, has to be corroborated by intellectual reflexion. This then is a further reason for crediting the intellect with a knowledge of singulars, since truth is known by a reflexion of the intellect on its own act and on the relation this act bears to the thing itself.

> (Truth) is known by the intellect due to the fact that the intellect reflects upon its act; not only that it knows its act, but that it knows its proportion to the thing.[22]

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[20] *Ibid.*, ad 3um contra.

[21] *III Sent.*, d. XXIII, q. 2, a. 2, ad 3um.

[22] *Q. D. de Ver.*, q. 1, a. 9, c.

But there is no direct intellectual knowledge of material particulars. The intellect gets in touch with the particulars only accidentally:

insofar as it is continued by the sensitive powers which deal with particulars. This continuation, however, is twofold. In one way it occurs by the termination of the movement of the sensitive part in the mind, as happens in movement that is from things to the soul; thus the mind knows the singular through a certain reflexion, just as the mind in knowing its proper object—which is some universal nature—goes back again to the knowledge of its act, and back further to the species, which is the principle of its act, and then even further back to the phantasm from which the species was abstracted, and in this way it receives some knowledge of the singular.

In another way, (the continuation occurs) by the movement from the soul to the thing, starting from the mind and proceeding to the sensitive part; thus the mind rules the lower powers, and involves itself with singulars through the mediation of the particular reason—a certain individual faculty that is also known as the cogitative power (*vis cogitativa*).

It is impossible to apply the universal proposition in the mind concerning operables to the particular act except through some intermediate power capable of apprehending the singular.[23]

The formation of a proposition about singulars is explained again through a kind of reflexion (*per quandam reflectionem*).[24] One gets the impression, however, that St. Thomas himself did not consider this solution as quite sufficient or as definitive.

[23] " . . . per accidens singularibus se immiscet inquantum continuatur viribus sensitivis quae circa particularia versantur. Quae quidem continuatio est dupliciter. Uno modo inquantum motus sensitivae partis terminatur ad mentem, sicut accidit in motu qui est a rebus ad animam, et sic mens singulare cognoscit per quandam reflexionem, prout mens cognoscendo objectum suum, quod est aliqua natura universalis, redit in cognitionem sui actus, et ulterius in speciem quae est actus sui principium, et ulterius in phantasmata a quo species est abstracta; et sic aliquam cognitionem de singulari accipit. Alio modo secundum quod motus, qui est ab anima ad res, incipit a mente et procedit in partem sensitivam, prout mens regit inferiores vires, et sic singularibus se immiscet, mediante ratione particulari quae est potentia quaedam individualis quae alio nomine dicitur cogitativa . . . Universalem sententiam quam habet mens de operabilibus non est possibile applicari ad particularem nisi per aliquam potentiam mediam apprehendentem singularem" (*ibid.*, q. 10, a. 5, c.).

[24] *Ibid.*, q. 10, a. 5, ad 3um.

He remarks that the intellect, being altogether free of matter, can be the origin of universal knowledge only, except perhaps by a sort of turning back to the phantasm from which the intelligible species were abstracted.[25]

It may be noteworthy that there is a slight change of expression in these passages. While the *Commentary on the Sentences* speaks of the intellect considering the phantasm and being reflected on itself, the term reflexion on or upon the phantasm (*reflexio ad*—or *supra*—*phantasma*), occurs first in *De Veritate* and is retained continuously afterwards.

3. In the fifty-ninth chapter of Book II of the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, there is a remark intended to make clear the nature of the continuation (*continuatio*):

> Therefore by the intelligble form the possible intellect is in touch with the phantasm which is in us, in the same way as the visual power is in touch with color, which is in the stone. But this contact does not make the stone to see but to be seen.

The meaning is that the relation between the cognitive power and the object this power becomes cognizant of is unilateral. The properties of the stone are not altered by its being seen or by the power of vision being continued to the stone. In a similar manner, the phantasm does not become intelligible as such by the intellect being continued to it. There is, however, a great difference between these two cases. The medium between the stone and the eye or the faculty of vision is of the same nature as both these terms; both stone and sense belong to the material order, even though the sense is " ennobled " as an organ of the human composite, " in touch " with the spiritual order. But the intellect is immaterial and the phantasm is material. It is true that the phantasm does not contain the individual matter of the singular thing it represents; but it is material by its very nature, depending on an organ for its existence. The reference to vision and the object seen is therefore not very helpful. One might refer, especially in regard to the role played by the *vis cogitativa*, to the principle that the

[25] *Ibid.*, q. 19, a. 2, c.

supreme of one order touches, or eventually is even the same as, the lowest of the next higher order.[26] But in applying this principle to the problem of the relation between intellect and phantasm the difficulty remains as before. This is more so the case, since anything is known only insofar as it is actual, never insofar as it is potential.[27] But the phantasm can never become actually intelligible; it is so only potentially insofar as it makes possible the disengaging of the universal and abstract form.[28]

It has been pointed out that the problem of the relation between the intellectual and sensitive powers arises not only in regard to knowledge but also in regard to will and action. The *imperium* exercised by the intellectual part of the soul over the sensitive powers is not less a problem: how can the immaterial dominate the material without being " mixed up " with it in a more than accidental manner? Aquinas repeatedly states this domination of the power by the higher faculties. Thus, for example, in the eighty-first chapter of Book III of the *Summa Contra Gentiles*: ". . . the sensitive power is subject to the intellective, and is controlled by its rule."

There is still another fact which shows that the intellect is concerned with the material order. Judgments are of the intellect; but in expressing our judgments we make use of the temporal determinations; present, past, and future are characteristic notes of all propositions. The intellect is beyond time. Time measures only motion in regard to space and can be applied only to what is somehow in space. The intellect in forming its propositions by composition or division applies the intelligibles it previously abstracted to the things.[29] But to apply notions to things, the intellect, it seems, must have got hold in some manner of the things. Again one is confronted by the difficulty of explaining how the intellect ever succeeds in getting hold of material contents.

4. In the *Summa Theologica,* Aquinas deals with the problem mainly in Part I, Question Eighty-six, Article One and in

[26] *III Sent.*, d. XXVI, q. 1, a. 2; *Q. D. de Ver.*, q. 15, a. 1, c.; *II Cont. Gent.*, 91.
[27] *II Cont. Gent.*, 98. [28] *Ibid.*, and *III Cont. Gent.*, 46.
[29] *II Cont. Gent.*, 96; *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 85, a. 5, ad 2um.

Question Eighty-nine, Article Four. But the argument of the *Summa* is taken up at greater length in *Quaestio Disputata De Anima,* and will be reported together with other passages taken from the latter.

The relation of the intellectual faculties to material things is discussed chiefly in connection with action and, especially, with the habit of prudence. Actions are about singulars and have to proceed from reasons regarding these singulars. Reason or intellect

> . . . first and chiefly is concerned with universals. . . .; the conclusions of syllogisms are not only universal, but also particular because the intellect by a kind of reflexion extends to matter." [30]

> Prudence does not reside in the external senses . . . but in the interior sense, which is perfected by memory and experience so as to judge promptly of particular experience . . . it (prudence) is chiefly in the reason, yet by a kind of application it extends to the sense.[31]

And:

> . . . the understanding which is a part of prudence is a right estimate of some particular end.[32]

One encounters here again the " sort of " reflexion (*quaedam reflexio*) by which the intellect " extends " [33] itself towards matter. But there is something more. We are told of a sort of application (*quaedam applicatio*) which enables the intellect to reach an interior sense. There can be no doubt, though the term is not mentioned, that it is the *vis cogitativa* to which allusion is made. This passage is noteworthy because it indi-

[30] " primo et principaliter universalium . . . ; syllogismorum conclusiones non sunt solum universales sed etiam particulares quia intellectus per quandam reflexionem ad materiam se extendit " (*Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 47, a. 3, ad 1um).

[31] " Prudentia consistit . . . in sensu interiori qui perficitur . . . ad prompte judicandum de particularibus expertis . . . principaliter quidem est (prudentia) in ratione; per quandam applicationem pertingit usque ad huiusmodi sensum " (*ibid.*, ad 3um).

[32] " . . . intellectus qui ponitur pars prudentiae est quaedam recta aestimatio de aliquo particulari fine " (*ibid.*, q. 49, a. 2, ad 1um).

[33] *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 60, a. 5, c.

cates a certain difficulty regarding the relation of the intellect and the interior senses; as the latter are material one may justly question what kind of an application this might be.

While we are told on the one hand that the intellect comes to know the singular only accidentally, we hear on the other hand that this knowledge is essential to the perfection of the intellect. A full knowledge of reality is possible only by means of a knowledge about particulars; only particular things are complete.[34] Knowledge of the universal alone is an indistinct knowledge.[35] The achievement of intellect is to know truth; but truth only about universals is incomplete and but half of truth. The intellectual knowledge of particulars, be it accidentally on what regards its mode of origin, is necessary for the perfection of the intellect.

> The knowledge of singulars pertains to the perfection of the intellective soul not in speculative knowledge, but in practical knowledge, which is imperfect without the knowledge of singulars, wherein operations exist. . . .[36]

In one remarkable passage, St. Thomas states that the intellective soul is potentially disposed for receiving species. By " species " is meant images of particular things, for St. Thomas says: " The intellectual soul is indeed actually immaterial, but it is in potentiality to determinate species." [37] Obviously, no other interpretation of " species " will stand; the opposition of immateriality and species can have no other meaning.

5. *Quaestio Disputata De Anima.* The idea that no knowledge of universals can lead to a knowledge of the singular is emphasized in this question. No combination of universals is absolutely individual so as to constitute any given particular thing, for it is always possible that the same combination of

[34] *Ibid.*, I, q. 13, a. 1.

[35] *Ibid.*, q. 85, a. 3, c., *II Cont. Gent.*, 98.

[36] " Cognitio singularium non pertinet ad perfectionem animae intellectivae secundum cognitionem speculativam; pertinet tamen ad perfectionem eius secundum cognitionem practicam, quae non perficitur absque cognitione singularium in quibus operatur " (*ibid.*, III, q. 11, a. 1, ad 3um).

[37] *Ibid.*, I, q. 79, a. 4, ad 4um.

universals be found in another singular.[38] The knowledge of reality, therefore, depends on the knowledge of singulars, but the immaterial cannot become the principle of a knowledge of material singulars.[39] This remark refers to the separated soul which is said to know singulars only *in universale*.[40] The same is asserted of the intellect of the soul united to the body, for " a soul while joined to the body cannot know singulars through the intellect " [41] but this means, evidently, *only* through the intellect and does not exclude intellectual cognition of particulars through the cooperation of intellectual and sensory faculties. This is expressly stated in the answer to the first objection:

> The soul while joined to the body knows singular things through the intellect, although this knowledge is obtained, not directly, but through a kind of reflexion. Thus, when the intellect has understood or grasped the universal, it returns to a consideration of its own act, the intelligible species, which is the principle of its act, and the origin of the species. In this way, it arrives at a consideration of the phantasm and the singular things with which the phantasm are concerned. This process of reflexion can be accomplished only through the assistance of the cogitative power, or the imagination.[42]

The cooperation of the imagination is taken for granted, since this power has to supply the phantasm to the intellect, and the cooperation of the *vis cogitativa* is also necessary. This however, does not solve the difficulty. Even if the intellect is capable of " extending " itself to the sensory faculties, the mode, or the nature, of this " extension " is not apparent. Moreover, the nature of the " action " of the senses on the intellect is not clear. St. Thomas refers to this action in a discussion on the

[38] Cf. *Q. D. de An.*, a. 20, c.
[39] Cf. *ibid.*, a. 7.
[40] Cf. *ibid.*, a. 12.
[41] *Ibid.*, a. 15.
[42] " Anima conjuncta corpori per intellectum cognoscit singularia, non quidem directe sed per quandam reflexionem; inquantum, sc., ex hoc quod apprehendit suum intelligibile, revertitur ad considerandum suum actum et speciem intelligibilem quae est principium suae operationis; et eius speciei originem; et sic venit in considerationem phantasmatum et singularium quorum sunt phantasmata. Sed haec reflexio compleri non potest nisi per adjunctionem virtutis cogitativae vel imaginativae " (*ibid.*, a. 20, ad 1um contra).

possible presence of sensory functions in a separated soul.[43] He compares the product of the sensory functions to a ship which carries people across a river, and which is not needed once it has brought them to the other side. Thus, the images which dispose for the reception of the intelligible species are not needed after these species have been formed. This applies only to the conservation of the species in the intellect; with regard to the intellectual operation St. Thomas considers the phantasm indispensable. In the *De Memoria et De Reminiscentia,* for example, he says: " The possible intellect of man has need of phantasms, not only for acquiring intelligible species, but also for any re-examination it might wish to make of the acquired species, in the phantasms." [44]

6. *In Boethii de Trinitate.* the necessity of the cooperation of the lower powers is stressed again:

> Knowledge is principally concerned with universal natures on which it is built. Secondarily, and by a kind of reflexion, it is concerned with other things. In this way, knowledge treats of those things to which the universal natures belong, in that it applies those natures to particular things that pertain to inferior powers.[45]

In this treatise, St. Thomas also speaks of " a connaturality of our intellect to the phantasm," which expression indicates that the intellect is, so to speak, helpless without the phantasm. Another question refers to the particular kind of phantasms to which the intellect turns when renewing its understanding of some concepts formed previously:

> In this life, our intellect cannot begin to know without a phantasm, but this does not mean that our knowledge is so bound up with the phantasm that we consider the things known to be, in all respects, exactly like the phantasm through which it is known.[46]

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[43] *Ibid.*, a. 15, c.

[44] *In de Mem. et Rem.*, lect. 2, n. 316, (Ed. Pirotta).

[45] " Scientia est de aliquo dupliciter . . . Alio modo est de aliquibus secundario et quasi per reflexionem quandam, et sic de rebus illis est quarum illae rationes sunt, inquantum rationes illas applicat ad res etiam particulares quarum sunt adminiculo inferiorum virium " (q. 5, a. 2, ad 4um).

[46] " Dicendum quod intellectus nostri operatio non est in praesenti statu sine

Though this remark deals primarily with our knowledge of immaterial substances (the body of the article notes that the likenesses of sensible things, when used to represent immaterial substances, are called by Dionysius "dissimilar similars"), the psychological fact it reports has a general significance. In acquiring knowledge, the phantasm is needed, however spiritual that knowledge may be; that is without question.[47] The phantasm, however, need not have a true likeness to the thing or things "meant" by the concept. Rather, the phantasm from which the intellect starts to get an idea of an immaterial object may be merely an effect of the immaterial object, and the idea is arrived at by way of causality, negation, or excellency.

7. *In Libros Arist. de Anima,* the various passages which refer to our problem reproduce what has been said before. It is not necessary to quote them *in extenso*; only one remark contains a special viewpoint which ought not to be overlooked, viz.,

> We would be unable to sense the difference between a sweet thing and a white thing, unless there were some sensitive power [namely, the common sense, St. Thomas, *In De An.*, III, 3, n. 601] which understood both. So, also, we would be unable to understand the comparison of the universal to the particular, unless there were some power which understood both of these. The intellect, therefore, knows both the universal and the particular, but it knows each in a different fashion.[48]

In sense cognition, the common sense is beyond the external senses, of which it is, at the same time, the root and the synthesis. Since, in the intellectual order, there is no higher faculty

phantasmate quantum ad principium cognitionis; non tamen oportet ut semper nostra cognitio ad phantasmata terminetur ut sc. illud quod apprehendimus judicemus esse tale quale est phantasmata per quod apprehendimus" (q. 6, a. 2, ad 2um).

[47] *Q. D. de Malo.*, q. 16, a. 8, ad 3um.

[48] "Non possemus sentire differentiam dulcis vel albi nisi esset una potentia sensitiva (sc. sensus communis, v. *In De An.*, III, 3, nn. 601) communis quae cognosceret utrumque; ita etiam non possemus cognoscere comparationem universalis ad particulare, nisi esset una potentia quae nosceret utrumque. Intellectus igitur utrumque cognoscit, sed alio et alio modo" (*In III de An.*, 8, n. 712).

than the intellect itself, the knowledge of the universal and the particular has to be achieved by the intellect. Here a difficulty arises. The " comparison of the universal to the particular " is expressed in a proposition. The proposition is a unity; it does not consist of separated steps, as if the intellect turned, first to the phantasm representing the subject, then to the universal to be applied as predicate. It seems, then, that the modes by which the intellect knows the two terms should be of a kind in order to allow their conjunction in the unity of the proposition, but the universal is known directly, and the particular by " reflexion." Of this difference nothing is experienced in the act of judgment so far as we know. (It is true, however, that these details of intellectual operation have not been studied sufficiently by means of experiments. This is one of the many problems which still await an experimental analysis.)

8. *Quodlibet,* I, a. 1, c., contains two remarks which should be considered. The first states that for a singular to be known, it is necessary that there be a likeness of the singular, insofar as it is a singular, in the cognitive power. Since the intellect arrives at a knowledge of the particular by reflection, there ought to be such a likeness in the intellect. It is difficult to imagine its nature.

The other remark repeats the theory of " reflexion," but there is a slight difference in expression. The reflexion is said to turn, not on the phantasm which is a product of the power of imagination, but on the sensory powers themselves—*reflexio ad potentias sensitivas.*

* * *

The passages recorded above do not contribute much to removing obscurities which we noted in regard to the Thomistic theory of the intellectual knowledge of particulars. It is not clear what kind of operation this " returning to the phantasm " is, nor are the reasons which make it possible evident. How the material intellect is capable of " extending " itself to the sensory powers, which are material, remains unexplained, and it is the same with the problem of how the intellect can return to the intelligible species, which is apparently not of

a nature to become an object of intellectual operation. Before attempting some kind of elucidation of the Thomistic theory it is well to consider the facts, since St. Thomas himself refers the reader, more than once, to experience as a proof of his conception of intellectual operation. It is by experience that we know universals have their origin in the phantasm; experience tells us that we have to return to the phantasm for clarification of a notion already acquired.

II

Notwithstanding the difficulties and obscurities alluded to above, Thomistic psychology is, in many senses, more modern than one would suspect at first sight. Although it does not cope with all the facts, it is more in accord with reality than the psychology which was accepted and taught throughout nearly the entire period from the beginning of experimental research to the twentieth century. Sensistic and associationistic psychology proved incapable of dealing with certain problems, especially with those regarding the higher operation of the mind. The change began when O. Kuelpe started his investigations on thought-processes. Kuelpe was not the only one, but his school, called the Wuerzburg School, did the greatest amount of work in this line. It would take too long to detail here the various factors determining this shifting of viewpoint in psychology, but one of these factors should be mentioned. Husserl's philosophy, though not psychological in its intentions, became very influential in psychology. Husserl was a pupil of Brentano and was very much impressed by the writings of B. Bolzano, who had taught philosophy at the University of Praha in the first half of the nineteenth century. Both Brentano and Bolzano were thoroughly acquainted with Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophy; Bolzano was a Catholic priest, and Brentano had been one until he left the Church because he would not accept the decisions of the Vatican Council. The philosophy of both contains a good deal of Scholasticism. Thus, under the influenec of Husserl's philosophy, on the one

hand, and the logical development of psychology and the strength of facts, on the other, a definite *rapprochement* may be seen between modern experimental and medieval speculative psychology. The latter, however, was not so purely speculative as many who are but little acquainted with the original works believe; the repeated references of St. Thomas to experience alone suffice to show this. With Aquinas " experimental " does not mean any experiment in the modern sense of the word, but it does mean taking account of observable facts. He, like many other Scholastics, was a keen and judicious observer.

The factual statements made by St. Thomas on intellectual processes are, in the main, the following:

1. The universal notion, or the concept, is derived by the activity of the intellect which uses a phantasm, or image, as the material from which to abstract the universal. Of this, St. Thomas says, we are made aware by experience.

2. We make use of the phantasm, not only for the sake of attaining the universal for the first time; we have to return to the phantasm every time we think the abstract notion anew. We need the phantasm also for making clear to another person the meaning of the abstract notion.

3. The phantasm to which the intellect returns when thinking anew a concept already existing within the mind need not be exactly the same image as the one which served as basis for the process of abstraction.

4. For the work of " realizing " a concept of immaterial things, a phantasm may be used which has but little, if any, likeness to the thing intended by the concept. All concepts, however, demand the intervention of a phantasm if they are to be thought of with meaning.

5. There are certain intellectual operations which, although ultimately based on phantasms, have no phantasm which would exactly correspond to them. All propositions belong to this class; the meaning of proposition cannot be " contained " in the phantasms which correspond to the terms of the proposition.

6. The intellect is incapable of getting direct hold on any

particular. It does, however, attain a knowledge of the particular indirectly, retracing the steps by which the universal was originally obtained, and finally arriving at a " reflexion on the phantasm." [49]

In considering the statements of modern psychology on " imageless thought," one has to distinguish between the consciousness of a single concept and the consciousness of a relation between concepts (or between universal and particular). The assertion that propositions may be thought without any images intervening is not at all opposed to the views of St. Thomas. The Angelic Doctor probably would have accepted observations showing the existence of " imageless thought," so long as these facts refer to the thinking of propositions. He knew, as every Scholastic since Augustine has known, that thought, i. e., the thinking of relations as expressed by a sentence, may exist without the images of words. The principle, " Every spoken sentence is preceded by a sentence of thoughts without words," was first enunciated by St. Augustine, in his *De Doctrina Christiana*, and is a commonplace in medieval authors who deal with language. It is quoted by William of Occam in his *Summa Totius Logicae*; Thomas uses it as an authority. There is, therefore, no reason for any Scholastic to doubt the validity of the experimental evidence regarding imageless thought, so long as this evidence refers exclusively to the thinking of propositions, or those mental states from which formulated propositions emanate.

It is different with the question of imageless thinking of single concepts. Here Aquinas asserts in a manner which leaves no room for doubt that no concept can be thought unless there is in the consciousness a corresponding phantasm. In the discussion of this point, there are two questions: 1) Is it actually true that we never think a concept unless this intellectual operation is accompanied by an image? 2) If this be the case, is the phantasm an indispensable element in the total mental

[49] On *reflexio* in general see: J. Webert, " Reflexio, Etude sur les opérations reflexes dans la psychologie de St. Thomas." *Mél. Mandonnet*, Vol. I, p. 285, Paris: 1930.

achievement, or is it only an accidental feature without which a concept *might* be thought, although it is generally required?

There can be no doubt that we are conscious of accompanying images in many instances of concept-thinking, and that we employ images frequently for our own use, especially in explaining abstract notions to others. Even concepts which, as such, have nothing to do with tangible reality may be illustrated by images, e.g., Euler's logical schemata, or the *Arbor Porphyreana*.

It may be questioned, however, whether there are not some concepts which, by their very nature, do not admit any imagining. In some cases, the images which arise from the thinking of such concepts are more of a hindrance than a help to true understanding. Modern mathematics has introduced many notions which escape all attempts at visualization; a mere glance at some of the more recent treatises on atomic physics, or wave mechanics, emphasizes this point. Is there, for example, any image which is really helpful to the understanding of notions like probability waves, six-dimensional space, the curvature of space? The mathematician or the physicist may have an image or some formula which expresses or implies one of these notions, but they can also be understood by someone incapable of handling any of these mathematical symbols.

Even if it is granted that some kind of image arises when we think of these notions, it still may be questioned whether these images are essential to our understanding. They might be mere accidents due to certain habits of the mind which are actualized even in those cases where the images themselves are not only superfluous, but even disturbing. Certain authors think they have found evidence for the constant presence of images, but their findings are opposed to those of the majority of experimental psychologists who have studied these questions. Authors who claim that they have shown the necessity of images have, in fact, but shown their ubiquity, provided, of course, that their findings be correct. They have neglected to inquire into the role played by the images in intellectual understanding.

The opposition of some authors to the existence of "imageless thought" is based more on prejudice than on experimental evidence. This is true, not only of certain Neo-Scholastics who believe this notion contradicts the statements of Aquinas, but also of certain psychologists who feel that their sensistic or associationistic position becomes untenable the moment the existence of thought without images is acknowledged. When, in 1906, R. S. Woodworth referred to "imageless thought,"[50] Angell rejected this statement in the name of "injured orthodoxy."[51]

The demonstration of imageless thought possibly depends on the mental type of the observers. There may be people who are incapable of abandoning images altogether, or of distinguishing the images essential to thought processes from those which arise only accidentally and have nothing in common with the notion considered. This danger of being deceived by the particular type of mental make-up is the greater, the smaller the number of observers. Thus, the critical remarks of T. D. Cutsforth[52] are based on experiments with one observer and, therefore, have no weight at all.

One has to beware, moreover, of confusing certain mental facts with images, because the former sometimes lend themselves to symbolization by tangible images. What G. E. Mueller or O. Selz would call "complexes," or what G. C. Myers refers to as "patterns"[53] may be symbolized by certain tangible schemata. (In describing the efficacy of the complexes, Selz speaks of "schematic anticipation." This term is not meant to signify any concrete image, but its choice indicates the aforesaid possibility.) This does not prove, however, that these patterns or schemata are, as such, of a palpable nature.

The objections raised against the assertion that there is

[50] "Imageless Thought," *Jour. of Phil.*, 1906, *3*, 70; also *Studies in Philosophy and Psychology. A Commemorative Volume by Former Students of Ch. E. Garman*, 1906, p. 351.

[51] *Journ. of Phil.*, 1906, *3*, 641.

[52] *Am. Journ. Psychol.*, 1924, *35*, 88; also R. H. Wheeler, *ibid.*, 1922, *33*, 361.

[53] "An Experimental Study of Patterns of Thought," *Ped. Sem.*, 1924, *31*, 352. Also C. C. Pratt, "Thought and Reasoning," *Psychol. Bull.* 1928, *25*, 558.

imageless thought may be considered invalid and based on insufficient evidence. We may, then, proceed to report on the observations demonstrating imageless thought.

Among the results of modern experimental investigation, one ought to list first the renewed recognition of an essential difference between image or perception, on one hand, and concept, on the other. Older psychologists, who were dominated by the sensistic philosophy stemming from Hume and the other empiricists, accepted the concept as nothing more than a generalized image from which the individual features have been deleted so that the image may fit every individual of a class; others, influenced by nominalistic prejudices, considered the concept a mere sign or symbol, useful in classification and reasoning as a class-name, but not distinct in its nature as a mental phenomenon, from the representation or image of the word. Long before the existence of imageless thought was experimentally demonstrated, however, it had become evident that words and their images are not indispensable for thinking; "preverbal" thought had been described by some psychologists and philosophers, e. g., B. Erdman, and also by psychopathologists, as for instance A. Pick. Thus, it became clear that thinking of a concept and thinking of it together with or by means of the word signifying this concept are two different mental acts.

The first to note the existence of imageless thought was A. Binet,[54] who records some very interesting remarks made by his two small daughters. He found that while images are absent the understanding of the concept may be as perfect as one could desire; even words signifying tangible experiences are sometimes understood without any accompanying image. Hearing the word "tempest," Armande remarks: "Oh, I haven't any picture of that. It really isn't a 'thing,' so I don't see it." Binet emphasizes the accidental role of images: "An image contains only a small part of the object it represents, and often a mental picture does not penetrate beyond the surface of things." The experimental study of these problems

[54] "La pensée sans images," *Rev. Philos.*, 1903, *28*, 138.

starts with the work of K. Buehler.[55] His extensive and careful experiments demonstrated definitely the existence of true thoughts with a complete understanding of their meaning, without any intervening image. The images which sometimes arise are often quite insufficient: they are variable, whereas the meaning of the thought remains unaltered. From this, he concludes:

> The variable rags of images are insufficient to explain the constancy and firmness of our thinking. Something which appears in consciousness as fragmentarily, as sporadically, as so utterly accidentally as images do in thought-experience can not be the bearer of firmly structured and continuous thought-experiences.[56]

The " thoughts " of which Buehler speaks are complexes, that is, awareness of relations which sometimes are of a quite complicated structure. One observer, for example, reports the thought, " that the idea of future is not to be confused with the future itself; such confusions are a common trick in philosophy. There was no trace of words or images." [57] That " thoughts " of this kind may exist or even do exist regularly without any accompanying image, or without any image forming an essential part of the total phenomenon is, as has been pointed out, not at all in contradiction to the Thomistic viewpoint; rather, the fact may be considered as in perfect accord with the ideas of Aquinas.

None of the modern psychologists denies that images of perception or of imagination are the necessary, the indispensable basis for abstraction. The Scholastic theory of abstraction has been confirmed by the experiments of J. Lindworsky,[58] and more recently by A. Willwoll.[59] Many of the later publications but confirm and complete the statements of Buehler, without adding anything of basic importance.

[55] " Ueber Gedanken," *Arch. f. d. ges. Psychol.*, 1907, *9*, 357.

[56] *Loc. cit.*, p. 317. [57] *Loc. cit.*, p. 318.

[58] " Das schlussfolgernde Denken," *Erg. Bd. Stimmen aus Maria Laach*, 1916. Also: Michotte et Ransy, *Contribution à l'étude de la mémoire logique*, Louvain: 1912.

[59] " *Ueber Begriffsbildung*," Leipzig: 1922.

Several experiences show that the images, if there are any, are posterior to the thought and its understanding. The images illustrate the meaning after it has been grasped by the intellect.[60] In thinking and reasoning, subject and predicate are never given as images. Contrary to the opinion of Sigwart, Wundt, or James Mill, the actual meaning of a sentence is not constituted by the images.[61] In syllogistic thinking the meaning of the premises is apprehended conceptually; this is a definitely intellectual, and not a sensory, experience.

Many important observations are to be found in O. Selz's studies on well ordered and productive thinking.[62] The general results of these experiments may be summarized by stating that the solving of problems, the developing of a consistent chain of ideas, the producing of new and creative combinations of ideas, depend on the actualization of certain intellectual dispositions; the actualization is anticipated in a general and schematic manner. Images play, if any, but a very subordinate role in this process.

The cognitional dispositions (*Wissendispositionen*) are not foundations for the reproduction of images which could be linked together by associations of contiguity; they are dispositions of a uniform consciousness of objective relations, (*Sachverhaltsbewusstsein,* a knowledge of how things are related to one another,) which consciousness cannot be resolved into a number of associated images put side by side.[63]

One fact is brought out very clearly by several of Selz' observations: images are, in many instances, not symbols of the intellectual contents of concepts, but of the intellectual operations. We may, for example, search for some solution of a problem and be dimly aware that this solution lies in a definite "direction"; then, a symbolic representation of "direction"

[60] A. Flach, "Ueber symbolische Schemata im produktiven Denkprozess," *Arch. f. d. ges. Psychol.*, 1925, 378.

[61] M. F. Dunn, "The Psychology of Reasoning," *Studies in Psychol. and Psychiat.*, 1926, *1*, no. 1.

[62] "*Ueber die Gesetze des geordneten Denkverlaufs I.* Stuttgart: 1913; *Zur Psychologie des produktiven Denkens und des Irrtums. Ueber die Gesetze des geordneten Denkverlaufes, II.* Bonn: 1922.

[63] *Loc. cit.*, I, p. 311.

may arise. This is not an image of the idea or complex of ideas from which our search starts, nor does it symbolize or anticipate the yet unknown result; it symbolizes the activity of the intellect.[64] Images sometimes serve as means of emphasis, or of underscoring some notional element of a conceptional whole.[65] In Selz' experiments, there are, of course, many instances in which the observers recorded the presence and the activity of images. To make clear to themselves, for example, the task and the particular solution in experiments demanding the name of the whole of a part presented as stimulus word, or vice versa, images were frequently used. " The image," remarks Selz,[66] " may serve as a *fundamentum* for the abstraction of new relations of things, just as a perception allows the gaining of new knowledge, because by means of the abstractive process, some objective sides are noticed in the perceptual object which had passed unrecognized before." It is well to remember, however, that the term " abstraction " is used by Selz, and by many other psychologists, in a rather wide sense. It signifies for these authors, not only the disengagement of the universal from the particular, but also any way by which we become aware of a feature common to several things. From this difference in terminology some avoidable misunderstandings have originated.

The disparity of image and concept had been noticed before Selz, and even before the Wuerzburg studies became generally known. Thus, W. M. Urban points out that " even . . . in the instrumental use of the concept, the particular images called up are not adequate equivalents for the consciousness of meaning. They are often irrelevant; . . . the intrinsic meaning of the term . . . has no image equivalent." [67] With this observation we pass on to the understanding of single concepts, whereas the previously reported studies deal mostly with the understanding of relations which may be expressed in sentences.[68]

[64] *Loc. cit.*, I, p. 219. [65] *Loc. cit.*, II, p. 120. [66] *Loc. cit.*, II, p. 146.

[67] *Valuation, its Nature and Laws*, New York: 1909, p. 106.

[68] The following experimental studies may be mentioned as containing valuable contributions to our problem: H. E. Hengstemberg, " Erwaegungen ueber den

There is also some indirect evidence for the fact that the role of images is not as essential in thought-processes as many believe. H. Bowers [69] found that problems more easily visualized are not, for this reason, more easily solved. Persons with vivid mental imagery are in no way better in solving problems than those lacking this capacity, even if the problems apparently make use of the images necessary. The fact of a transfer of insight [Alpert,[70] Paton,[71]] indicates that there is a principle at work which stays, so to speak, outside of the concrete, and, accordingly, imaginable situations within which problems have to be solved. W. Blumenfeld confirmed an observation reported by Buehler regarding the temporal relations of association of thought, on one hand, and of single words or their images, on the other; the former takes less time than the latter. If the thoughts and the establishment of relations between them depended on the images and their relation, just the opposite result would be expected.[72]

Several authors point out that the images appearing in the course of experiments on thought-processes, or those dealing with understanding of notions and words, often are either but slightly related to the meaning of the term presented, or are

Denkvorgang," *Arch. f. d. ges. Psychol.*, 1929, *67*, 131; M. Simoneit, "Beitraege zur Psychologie des Denkens," *ibid.*, 1926, *55*, 198; E. Jacob, "Ueber Entstehung und Verwendung von Begriffen," *ibid.*, 1925, *51*, 533; S. Fischer, "Ueber das Entstehen und Verstehen von Namen," ibid., 1922, *43*, 43; C. J. Taylor, "Ueber das Verstehen von Worten und Saetzen," *Zschr. f. Psychol.*, 1906, *40*, 225; Lindworsky, "Zur Psychologie der Begriffe," *Phil. Jahrb.*, 1919, *32*, 15; A. Wenzel, "Erinnerungsarbeit bei erschwerter Wortfindung," *Arch. f. d. ges. Psychol.*, 1936, *97*, 294; E. Peillaube, "L'étude expérimentale de la pensée," *Rev. de Philos.*, 1928, *28*, 397; Fr. Aveling, "The Relevance of Visual Imagery in the Process of Thinking," *Brit. Journ. of Psychol.*, 1927, *18*, 15; L. Rangette, "Untersuchungen ueber die Psychologie des wissenschaftlichen Denkens auf experimenteller Grundlage," *Arch. f. d. ges. Psychol.*, 1917, *36*, 169; A. Burloud, *La pensée conceptuelle*, Paris: 1927.

[69] "The Rôle of Visual Imagery in Reasoning," *Brit. Journ. of Psychol.*, 1935, *25*, 436.

[70] "The Solving of Problem Situations by Preschool Children," *Teach. Coll. Contr. to Educ.*, 1928, No. 323, p. 69.

[71] "The Problem of Insightful Behavior," *Psychol. Mon.*, 1933, *44*, No. 197. Also: Matheson, "A Study of Problem Solving," *Child Devel.*, 1931, *2*, 242.

[72] "Urteil und Beurteilung," *Arch. f. d. ges. Psychol.*, Erg. Bd. III, 1931.

limited to mere verbal symbols (eventually to symbols of a similar nature). The fact of substitution of one type of cognitive phenomenon by another, perhaps, has not been given the attention it deserves. Words, especially, are capable of acting as substitutes for images. One will have to distinguish two cases: the word may either replace directly the image, or it may symbolize the abstract notion. In a pathological case of optic agnosia analyzed by Hochheimer, the first case seems to have been realized.[73]

The second case is the one studied by T. V. Moore in his experiments on understanding of words.[74] He presented to his observers simple words and asked them to react either on the consciousness of meaning or of the image. The words chosen named things of common life, the images of which are supposed to be easily produced. These experiments showed that meaning is apprehended before any image appears. Thus it seems that the understanding of a word's meaning is independent of imagery. The results obtained by T. V. Moore were confirmed by E. C. Tolman.[75] One might object, however, that in such experiments the subject is supplied with an image from the very beginning, since the meaning is presented to him in a word he reads or hears. Since verbal symbols may substitute for images, and since according to the Thomistic theory the phantasm need not be the true representation of the thing from which meaning or the concept has been abstracted, the contradiction between the experimental data and the Thomistic interpretation is not as great as it seems at first sight.

There are, however, other facts. Patients suffering from aphasia were observed by H. Head [76] to be capable of expressing their ideas, even of reporting on their whole history by means of

[73] " Analyse eines Seelenblinden von der Sprache aus," *Psychol. Forsch.*, 1922, *16*, 1.

[74] " The Temporal Relations of Meaning and Imagery," *Psychol. Rev.*, 1915, *22*, 189; " Meaning and Imagery," *ibid.*, 1919, *24*, 114; " Image and Meaning in Memory and Perception," *Psychol. Mon.*, 1919, *27*, No. 119.

[75] " More Concerning the Temporal Relation of Meaning and Imagery," *Psychol. Rev.*, 1917, *24*, 114. For details see: T. V. Moore, *Cognitive Psychology*, Chicago: 1939, pp. 334 ff.

[76] *Aphasia and Kindred Disorders of Speech*, London: 1926.

expressive gestures, though they did not have at their disposal any remnant of verbal imagery. The conclusion drawn by Sir Henry Head is irrefutable: verbal images do not play as great a role in thinking as older psychologists believed, but words may be replaced by images, just as images may be replaced by words. Stories may be told in pictures, and a whole system of signs may be devised independently of words. The fact that verbal images can be dispensed with in thinking does not prove that there were no images involved; nor does it disprove the notion that verbal images usually play a great role in thought-processes. What is proved is that thought may proceed without relying on verbal images.

In understanding highly abstract ideas, linguistic schemata which need not develop into clear verbal images play a great role.[77] But, here, as everywhere else, no absolute necessity is demonstrable; images may be present, but they are not necessary. They are not an indispensable element of the operation of understanding. If they are present, they often contain or indicate but little of the whole meaning which is understood. It is not true that understanding does not go beyond what is expressly symbolized by the image,[78] but the images are surely a great help in many cases. Verbal images may be handled much as mathematical symbols are, that is, they may be combined according to certain rules (which need not be clearly given in consciousness) without more than a rather vague apprehension of their sense, just as the mathematician or the physicist does not care for the precise signification of the symbols he uses while he is developing the equation [Bourdon].

All these experiments deal more with the question of the presence and necessity of images than with their exact function within the totality of meaning-apprehension. St. Thomas holds, as has been reported above, that the intellect envisions, as it were, the abstract notion in the image. (J. P. Sartre, how-

[77] Selz, *loc. cit.*, II, p. 345.

[78] This seems to be the opinion of H. Schroeder, "Experimentelle Untersuchungen ueber die Bedeutungserfassung," *Arch. f. d. ges. Psychol.*, 1934, *90*, 103.

ever, is not of this opinion.) [79] The object or the meaning is not deciphered from the image, but is immediately apprehended by an act which presents to consciousness the object in its image.

By way of a preliminary summary we may say that the existence of imageless thought is definitely established, but that "thought" in the terminology of the psychologists means the result of an intellectual operation by which relations between terms are apprehended, relations which when formulated take on the form of a sentence. Also, the rise of images in the apprehension of meaning contained in single words or pictures is not a constant phenomenon. This however, refers to images other than those presented to the observer. There is indeed no way of conveying meaning but by sensible data. It is therefore impossible to exclude the cooperation of tangible factors. It must also be borne in mind that Aquinas himself acknowledged the fact that the image need not be the one from which the notion, the universal, or—to use the modern term—the meaning has been abstracted.

III

The alleged contradictions between Thomistic and experimental psychology are due largely to misinterpretations of the Thomistic texts and of the statements of experimental psychology. St. Thomas has never pretended that the consciousness of propositions—or the pre-verbal stages preceding the proposition—is necessarily dependent on phantasms; experimental psychology has not shown that the understanding of meaning is altogether free from the cooperation of tangible factors.

[79] "Structure intentionelle de l'image," *Rev. de Metaphys. et Mor.*, 1938, *45*, 543. The experimental evidence does not allow us to maintain any longer that "without sensations either actual or revived no thought ever occurs" (H. Gruender, *Experimental Psychology*, Milwaukee: 1932, p. 387). This opinion is called by C. Spearman (*The Nature of Intelligence and the Principle of Cognition*, London: 1927, p. 179) the "iconic doctrine." It rests, says the author, partly on the "action by contact principle," and partly on the idea that thought not based on a real experience such as imagery must be a nonentity, "a cat's grin without the cat."

But the difficulties of the Thomistic position remain. The grasp of the intellect on the particulars is as problematical as ever. We do not see how the intellect manages to get hold of the phantasm; nor how it becomes aware of the intelligible species; nor how it is capable of influencing the sensitive powers in so determined a manner as to evoke the right phantasm, that is, the one which corresponds to this particular concept. The same problem arises in regard to the particular determination of action. The reference to the particular reason (*vis cogitativa*) is no explanation. This power, notwithstanding its peculiar dignity, is material, and its relations to the immaterial faculties is not easy to understand.

There is, of course, the famous text in *De Veritate*, Question Ten, where St. Thomas says that, after all, the activities do not belong to this faculty or to that one, but are essentially of the one soul. But this is not of a great help. It is still not clear how these faculties cooperate; how, for example, the phantasm comes to be "in" the particular reason (*vis cogitativa*), and *a fortiori*, how the particularity (*ratio particularitatis*) is apprehended by the intellect.

Nor is the literature on this matter decisive. A complete survey of the older Thomists or the Neo-Thomists cannot be attempted. The opinions of non-Thomistic authors need not be considered because the problem exists in fact only within Thomistic philosophy. Any philosophy which either denies the individualization by matter, or the role of the active intellect and the genesis of universal ideas by abstraction, does not encounter this particular problem.

One of the difficulties was singled out by William de la Mare, the author of the *Correctorium Fratris Thomae*. His argument is called by Simonin hardly intelligible (*à vrai dire peu intélligible*); it is, however, neither unintelligible nor as negligible as the opponents would have it. The argument reads, in the edition of P. Glorieux: [80] If the particular were not known intellectually, the reflexion on the phantasm would be useless. The meaning is, I think, quite clear. If the particular and

[80] "Le Correctorium Corruptorii Quare," *Bibl. Thom.*, IX, 1927.

material phantasm remain outside the intellect and is only "illuminated" by the active intellect so that the immaterial universal is disengaged and passes, as an intelligible species (*species intelligibilis*), into the possible intellect (*intellectus possibilis*), there is no possiblity of the intellect ever getting hold of the particular. The answer of the Thomists, as contained in the *Correctorium Corruptorii Quare*, refers, in its *responsio ad cavillationes articuli secundi*, to St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 86, a. 1, in which the adversaries might have found all the answers they desired provided they had read and understood this passage. It then proceeds to state the reasons why the intellect has to be credited with a knowledge of particulars. The remark on the indirect cognition of particulars reads:

> Hence our intellect is not made cognizant of the phantasm directly from the species which it receives; rather it proceeds to a knowledge of the phantasm through a kind of reflexion. . . . Inasmuch, therefore, as our intellect, through the similitude which it accepts from the phantasm, reflects on the very phantasm from which the particular likeness was abstracted it has a certain knowledge of the particular singular thing according to the kind of continuity of the intellect through the image.

True to the text of Aquinas though this answer is, and though it may be considered as a somewhat satisfactory reply to the objections of William de la Mare or of Mathaeus de Aquasparta, it does not enlighten the reader on the true meaning of St. Thomas. Indeed the question becomes still more obscure by the introduction of two further qualifications: St. Thomas spoke of only some kind of reflexion (*quaedam reflexio*), but here we come across a "kind" of knowledge (*quaedam cognitio*) and a "kind" of continuation (*quaedam continuatio*).

The impression is inescapable that our problem has been a crux to most of the commentators of St. Thomas and that they felt a certain embarrassment when dealing with it. This is even true of Capreolus when he has to answer the arguments of Petrus Aureoli and of Durandus a S. Porciano.[81] The latter

[81] *Defensio Theologiae S. Thomae*, I, d. III, q. 2, a. 3.

dismisses the whole problem by denying the existence of an intelligible species (*species intelligibilis*) and the function of the active intellect (*intellectus agens*).

It must be noted . . . that the first thing known by the intellect is not the universal but the singular . . . its first object; and every per se condition of the object precedes the act of the faculty. For a potency does not make its object through its act, but supposes that object . . . but the universal, or a universal condition, does not precede the act of understanding, indeed it is constituted by the act of understanding, etc. . . . If our intellect did not understand the singular by the first act of understanding, this would be either because the singular was not presented to it, or because it could not or did not wish to understand the singular. The first cannot be said, because the representation which is made to the intellect is accomplished through the phantasm which is representative of the singular thing, and without it our intellect can know nothing new [" new ": because Durandus does not consider reflexion necessary and maintains that the intellect holds its notions once and forever]. Nor can the second be said because it is clear that the power of our intellect extends to a knowledge of singulars, otherwise we would not be disputing about them, nor could we do anything through our own free will since deeds are of and about singulars. The third cannot be said because willing follows knowledge . . . (the intellect) per se and primarily understands what first and primarily moves the intellect to understanding. . . . But it is the singular and not the universal which per se and primarily moves the intellect.[82]

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[82] " Advertendum . . . quod primum cognitum ab intellectu non est universale sed singulare . . . primum objectum; et omnis per se conditio objecti praecedit actum potentiae. Potentia enim per suum actum non facit suum objectum sed supponit . . . sed universale vel conditio universalis non praecedit actum intelligendi, immo fit per actum intelligendi, etc. And later: Si intellectus noster non intelligeret prima intellectione singulare, hoc esset aut quia non representaretur ei, aut quia non posset aut quia non vellet. Primum non potest dici quia representatio quae fit intellectui nostro, fit per phantasma quod est repraesentativum rei singularis et sine eo intellectus nihil potest de novo intelligere. Nec secundum quia constat quod potentia intellectus nostri se extendit ad cognitionem singularium, alioquin de eis non disputaremus nec aliqua faceremus per liberum arbitrium, cum factiones sint singularium et circa singularia. Nec tertium quia velle sequitur cognitionem . . . (Intellectus) illud per se et primo intelligit quod per se et primo movet intellectum ad intelligendum . . . Sed singulare primo et per se movet et non universale " (Durandus a S. Porciano, *In quattuor libros sententiarum*, Venet., 1586, f. 140r; I, d. III, a. 7; cf. *ibid.*, q. 5 and d. XXVII, q. 1).

Capreolus is not very happy in answering these difficulties; nor are his remarks against Aureolus really conclusive. Things do not become clearer by his stating:

> For a knowledge of the individual in his incommunicability it suffices to have a species representing the individual as to the principle of his individuation; and such a species need not be material, quantitative, or signate.[83]

It is quite true that such a representation as to the principle of individuation (*quoad principium individuationis*) would be sufficient; but how is such a representation possible in the immaterial intellect when the principle of individuation is matter?

Not even the lengthy explanations of Cajetan seem conclusive. His notion is that the phantasm is in both orders, in the material and sensible on one hand, and the intellectual on the other.

> With the advent of the light of the active intellect, the phantasm is illuminated . . . ; by this illumination there shines forth from the phantasm, not all that is contained in it, but the quiddity or nature alone, without the conjoined singularity; and so this illumination is abstractive, because it makes one thing appear, namely that which is, while the other, namely, the principle of individuation, does not appear. . . . The light of the active intellect makes the nature intelligible in act in the phantasm before it is made intelligible in the intellect. . . . The actually intelligible shines forth in the phantasm . . . and such an intelligible moves the possible intellect. . . . One thing, namely the phantasm, is in two orders . . . according to different modes of being: according to its real mode of being it is sensible, according to its relucent mode of being it is intelligible.[84]

There is some truth in the assertion of G. H. Mahowald [85] that Cajetan denies the existence of a distinct and clear concept of the singular objects. Cajetan is said to claim that we know only universals distinctly; we conclude in an abstract manner that there must be singular objects, since the universal cannot exist.

[83] *Loc. cit.*, ad 7um.
[84] *Comm. in Summam Theol.*, I, q. 79, a. 3, no. 9 and 10
[85] "Suarez, de Anima," *New Scholasticism*, 1932, *6*, 115.

The author probably alludes to the notion of an argumentative cognition (*cognitio arguitiva*).

> For when we conceive man and singularity, and realize that man does not subsist of himself, etc., the intellect argues and concludes that a singular thing exists in nature. . . . A singular is conceived by our intellect not by its proper, but by another concept, which, however, is in some way, that is, confusedly and argumentatively, but not representatively, a concept of the singular.[86]

There is not the least psychological evidence of such a process of reasoning, nor does this explanation appear satisfactory for it does not eliminate the real difficulties. It leaves unanswered the question of how the application of the universal to the particular is possible. Furthermore, if these singulars have to be " concluded " in the manner Cajetan suggests, how does the intellect arrive at the knowledge that universals do not exist and that there have to be singulars from which the universals are abstracted?

John of St. Thomas seeks another way out of the intricacies of this problem. He assumes the existence of a true concept of the singular, a proper and distinct concept (*conceptus proprius and distinctus*), which, however, is indirect and inadequate, not conceived directly, but due to a reflexion on the phantasm.[87] He appeals to a kind of intellectual intuition by which through the medium of coordination and a continuation to the senses (*mediante coordinatione et continuatione ad sensus*) the intellect achieves an intuitive knowledge . . . of a thing present to it (*notitiam intuitivam . . . rei praesentis*).[88]

Perhaps it is not without interest to report the opinion of a less known, though quite respectable later Scholastic. The Augustinian Thomas of Argentina (Strassbourg) discusses the problem in his *Commentary on the Sentences*.[89] His work deserves

[86] In I, q. 86, a. 1.

[87] *Curs. Phil. Nat.*, III, q. 10, a. 4. Ed. Vives, Vol. III, p. 474.

[88] Ed. Vives, Vol. I, p. 647.

[89] *IV Sent.*, d. L, q. 1, a. 3 (Venetiis, 1584, f. 206 ff.). He states his ideas on the primary and adequate object of the intellect in the introduction. (*Ibid.*, f. 13, v.) *Quod eius (sc. intellectus) adaequatum objectum est ens phantasiabile mediate vel*

consideration not only because it is a good example of the way later scholastics dealt with the problem, revealing some of their methods for evading more than solving difficulties, but also because it contains several new viewpoints.

One idea which distinguishes his conception from others is the division of the act of intellect into three stages, two of which are termed direct and one which is called reflex. Only the act whereby the intellect becomes aware of its own operation or knows itself as knowing is considered as a reflexion; the awareness of the particular in the phantasm is a direct operation.

immediate. Et appello ens phantasiabile immediate quod proprie cadit sub phantasmate. Sed mediate cuius cognitio arguitive vel illative vel quocumque modo deducibilis est ex phantasmate sive ex notitia eius quod proprie cadit sub phantasmate. This refers to the intellect considered *secundum suam capacitatem naturalem praecisum ab omni dispositione sive influentia supernaturali.* But if one considers the intellect *secundum suam potentiam sive capacitatem obedientialem,* then its *objectum adaequatum est ens inquantum ens, sive ens universaliter sumptum, comprehendens creaturam et creatorem, creatum vel creabile.*

The main theory is exposed as follows: *Intellectu conjuncto pro statu praesentis vitae res materialis particularis est per se intelligibilis.* Whatever is contained by an object adequate to the intellect is *per se intelligibile . . . Ens phantasiabile tam mediate quam immediate est adaequatum objectum nostri intellectus pro statu praesentis vitae . . . secundum suam naturalem capacitatem . . . ens materiale est per se phantasiabile; ergo.* Furthermore: to form a particular judgment the intellect has to know the particular. Moral acts refer to particulars.

Objections: (1) Aristotle's well known statement *intellectus est universalium.* Boethius: *singulare sentitur . . .* (2) Absence of proportion between material thing and immaterial intellect. (3) Intellect related to universals as senses to particulars. Senses do not know the universal, ergo. (4) Intellectual objects are abstracted from *hic et nunc,* the singular is *hic et nunc.* (5) *Quae sunt unita in superioribus sunt separata in inferioribus; Lib. de causis.* Angels know intellectually both universals and particulars; in man there are two different faculties. (6) The possible intellect is distinguished from imagination [*In III, De Anima*], the latter deals with singulars. (7) *Arguit specialiter quidam doctor sic* (Marginal note: Aureolus, *I Sent.,* d. XXXV, q. 4, a. 1): *Impossibile est singulare in sua singularitate cognosci nisi designando et demonstrando ipsum sub certo et determinato situ in ordine ad potentiam apprehendentem, sive in ordine ad ipsum qui cognoscit singulare. Sed talem cognitionem designantem impossibile est esse in intellectu; et notitia singularis signati, inquantum signatus est, impossibile est esse in intellectu.* Aureolus proves this: *Omne cognoscens aliquid propria cognitione virtute illius cognitionis distinguit ipsum ab omni alio. Sed si ponerentur duo homines similes in colore, figura et quantitate ac universaliter in omni accidente tam animae quam corporis, constat quod qui illos imaginaretur, non posset unum distinguere ab alio, nisi cognitione demonstrativa et situitativa, dicendo, iste non est ille.* The only distinguishing feature is the one's being *hic*

Something may be said for this view. The phantasm does not belong to the intellect—it is, as Thomas of Argentina says, not in the intellect but present to it—and stands therefore not on the same level as the concept, the intelligible species, and the act of abstraction. The intellectual movement by which the self-awareness of the intellect is achieved has an intrinsic or imminent term, whereas the phantasm is in some way outside of the intellect, though within reach of it. Though he does not state it expressly, this may have been also the opinion of Aquinas. The terms "extension," "continuation," seem to

and the other's *illic . . . non potest talis apprehensio esse in intellectu qui est potentia immaterialis et non extensa.*

Answers: *Illud quod ponit differentiam inter aliqua necesse est ut utrumque extremorum, illius differentiae cognoscat . . . Intellectus possibilis ponit et cognoscit differentiam inter formam communicabilem sive naturam universalem et naturam hanc particularem, individualem et singularem.* The intellect knows that the more abstract universal contains several degrees of abstraction, down to *species specialissima* and the individual. To deny this implies that the intellect in forming a judgment on particulars is incapable of understanding its own act.

The first object of the intellect is indeed the universal, presented by the *species intelligibilis.* The adequate object, however, is another; having become cognizant of the *quidditas rei materialis,* the intellect proceeds to the knowledge of many other things which too are known to the intellect though not *primo.* (Unhappily we are not told what characterizes an object as an adequate one.) The lack of proportionality neither can be alleged; the intellect is inextended but knows extension, immaterial and knows matter. The adequate object of the intellect includes not only the abstract universal as such, but all that is known by the sensitive faculties, these faculties themselves, their operations, *quia omne illud cujus notitia est deducibilis ex phantasmate clauditur infra ambitum objecti adaequati potentiae intellectivae.* The answers to the fourth and fifth objections need not be rendered. To (6) the author remarks that the intellect knows universals and particulars, and that the first capacity is enough to distinguish the intellect from imagination. The arguments of Aureolus are qualified as *apparentes sophisticationes.* There are other principles of singularity besides location which lead to a knowledge of the singularity. These principles are intrinsic and the knowledge of them is therefore prior to the one of the extrinsic *respectus ad aliquam creaturam,* e. g., location. Singularity does not depend on site; therefore neither does the knowledge of singularity.

Thomas concludes that the particular cannot be the primary object of the intellect. The *species intelligibilis recepta in intellectu possibili* is free from all material and individualizing conditions and represents *immedate* only the universal quiddity. Knowledge of the particular presupposes knowledge of the universal. As soon as the intellect knows the universal, it reflects on its own activity, knows itself as knowing, and also the cause of its knowledge, *quia naturale est intellectui quod cognito effectu immediate cognoscit causam, maxime si sit causa proportionata et sit praesens intel-*

infer that the intellect just " touches "—these metaphorical expressions are unsatisfactory, though unavoidable—the phantasm which, however, remains necessarily and forever outside of the intellect itself.

Thomas of Argentina describes this position of the phantasm by the term of " presence "; the phantasm is present to, but not in the intellect. But this is only a description, not an explanation.

Another notion to be recorded is the one of the *phantasiabile*. Everything contained in or to be inferred from the phantasm is a *phantasiabile*, and as such an object of the intellect. By defining the object of the intellect in this manner, the author probably thought to escape the various difficulties of which he was evidently very much aware. But this, too, is a formula, and even a gratuitous assertion, not an explanation of the facts nor a theory of intellectual cognition.

The very same notion of " presence " appears in some Neo-Scholastics. L. Noël, for example, attempts the development of a theory of intellectual knowledge by combining the two notions of " continuation " and " presence."

. . . but while the organism undergoes this invasion (namely of the primitive presence of things) the intelligence is not a stranger to that invasion; it undergoes it tacitly at first, in continuation

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lectui. The phantasm is not *in intellectu, sed praesens intellectui: ideo intellectus cognoscit huiusmodi phantasmata et per consequens cognoscit tale particulare cuius perfecta similitudo relucet in tali phantasmate. Unde hic est rectus ordo cognitionis intellectivae . . . quod intellectus actu recto primo cognoscat ipsum universale . . . secundo actu reflexo cognoscit suum intelligere* (including evidently all the steps of intellectual operation and the *species intelligibilis* among these), *et tertio actu directo cognoscit ipsum particulare ut relucet in phantasmate.* (Contrary to Cajetan, Thomas uses the term *relucentia* for designating the appearance of the particular in and through the image.)

Thomas then reports the arguments in favor of a direct intellectual knowledge of the particular. These arguments he holds to be invalid. Of this discussion one point only deserves mention. The speculation of the phantasm, says our author, occurs not *antecedenter sed concomitanter vel consequenter. Est tamen hic notandum quod quamvis intellectus intelligat universale et intelligat se intelligere priusquam intelligat particulare ut relucet in phantasmate, tamen quia in omni intellectione rei materialis isti tres actus ita velociter se consequuntur quod tempus interpositum non est percetibile.*

with the sensible conscience; when it extricates itself from this passivity, it will come to some notion which it will place in the abstract above the intuitive real of the sensation; between these two moments there is a continuity which, taken in conjunction with the primitive indistinction of the two aspects of conscience, allows us to know well that the notion expressed in the mental word has proceeded from the complexus of the primitively present.

From the time that the intellectual conscience awakens, the sensible is present, not only to the sensible conscience, which is its term, but to the human conscience . . . as the support which carries the intelligible object, which gives body to, or supports it.[90]

These statements do not differ essentially from those of Thomas of Argentina; here are the same notions of presence and of continuity with the same lack of satisfactory explanations. Noël refers to the *Commentary* of Cajetan [91] which, he says, does not give a full explanation though it supplies some precision. The words of Cajetan are interpreted as implying an activity of the active intellect not only in regard to the production of the intelligible species, but also in regard to the phantasm itself: "By a priority of nature, the phantasm is illuminated, before it (the active intellect) and the phantasm actuate the possible intellect." It seems, however, doubtful whether the passage referred to allows for such an interpretation.

The statements of many modern Scholastics are not much clearer. In recent times J. Gredt has dealt with the problem.[92] His views are not in accordance with the facts. Though he refers to experience, he does not take into account the data supplied by experimental psychology. That "thought" (*Denken*) is continually accompanied by images is, as we have seen, not true. Gredt fails to distinguish between thinking as

[90] "La présence des choses à l'intélligence," *Rev. Neo-Schol.*, 1930, *32*, 145. Cf. also "La Présence de l'intélligibile à la conscience selon S. Thomas et Cajetan," *Philos. Perenn.*, Regensburg: 1930, Vol. I, p. 161; "La présence immédiate des choses," *Rev. Neo-Schol.*, 1927, *29*, 179; M. D. Roland-Gosselin, "Sur la notion de 'présence' en épistémologie," *Rev. Scienc. Phil. Theol.*, 1928, *17*, 77.

[91] Cajetanus, *In Summam Theol.*, I, q. 79, a. 3, n. 6-12.

[92] "Das Bindeglied zwischen der geistigen und sinnlichen Erkenntnis," *Div. Thomas* (Fribourg): 1937, *15*, 243.

consciousness of propositions and as understanding of single concepts. In regard to reflexion, Gredt's ideas are not more enlightening than those of the older Scholastics. The universal, we are told, carries within itself the necessary relation to a definite image; the universal depends intrinsically (*innerlich*) on a definite image and this dependence on the image and the image itself are represented together with the universal in the intellect. But how such a representation of the material image is possible—though it be, as Gredt says, " spiritualized " —is not explained by these formulations. Nor do we learn how it is possible for the image to be represented in the intellect by way of " inclusion and accidentally " (*nebenbei*).

The intellect becomes cognizant of the particular in an unessential manner. . . . By means of " thinking back " the intellect comes to know the particular thing represented by the image. By more precise thinking it also comes to know the image, the activity of imagination and of the other senses, insofar as they are represented by the image. But in first line the intellect knows the particular thing.

The notions acquired by the intellect are dispositionally (*der Anlage nach*) stored in the intellect; they themselves have a dispositional relation to a definite image. Human thought is always a sensible-intellectual activity.

These statements seem to have appeared unsatisfactory to the author himself since he takes up this matter in a second article.[93] But he does not achieve greater clarity.

An essential knowledge of corporeal singulars is precluded from the human intellect. The intellect knows of the singular only by a detour and by some regression to sensible knowledge.

The dependence on the image and the image itself are represented together (*mitdargestellt*) in the concept. There is but an imperfect intellectual knowledge of particulars.

The intellect does not know (the singular) according to its essence as singular (*Einzelwesen*); it knows the singular only as presented

[93] " Die Koerperwesen im Einzelding und im menschlichen Verstand." *Div. Thomas* (Fribourg): 1938, *16*, 257.

by the image, by its singular properties (*Einzelmerkmale*). These are accidental, exterior, palpable features, like shape, location in space and time, by which the intellect distinguishes one singular from another; these features, however, do not form the essential difference of singularity; they may change while the singular thing remains the same . . . thus there is no real knowledge of the particular as such. . . . *De singularibus non est scientia.*

The views of Gredt do not further the solution very much. One point deserves attention: the statement, namely, that the first object reflexion attains is not the image but the particular thing itself, because the latter is supposed to be " unessentially " and implicitly contained in the concept. This idea, however, only creates a new difficulty. Concepts are usually, though not necessarily, abstracted from several particulars; these particulars may be given in imagination by a multitude of images or by one " generalized " or generic image.

Regarding these generic images and some other points which are of interest, M. J. Adler remarks:

> An experience . . . is a sort of universal; the quasi-universality of the products of imagination has been recognized, in the modern tradition, under the head of generic or abstract images. Strictly, of course, these images are not abstract. The word " abstract " can be said of them only with the signification that they have the potentiality for abstraction; they are the proximate matter upon which the intellect operates in the first act of abstraction. The difference between the perceptual image and the so-called generic image is that the former has an individual intention whereas the latter has a particular intention. The mark of determinate individuation can be lost with the loss of the marks of singularity. The generic images, therefore, provide the transition to the universal intention of the idea which can be abstracted from it. It has a mean between the extremes of sensitive and intellectual apprehension.[94]

Dr. Adler seems to imply that abstraction always proceeds from a generic image and that to attain a concept the mind has

[94] *What Man Has Made of Man*, New York: 1937, p. 162, note 18. Some pertinent remarks on the role of images in intellectual processes may be found in R. Lacroze, *La fonction de l'imagination*, Paris: 1938, pp. 145 ff.

to have experience of several singulars of one kind. This interpretation of the abstractive process is, however, not in accordance with facts. Even if there were no experimental evidence to show that we are capable of abstracting a universal notion from one individual, it would be sufficient to refer to the fact that the abstract concept " sun " was long known before astronomy spoke of the fixed stars as so many suns.

It is true that in many cases the image serving as a basis for abstraction is of a more or less generic nature. It therefore refers to a multitude of singular images and of singular things represented by these images. All these singular things have to be contained " unessentially " in the concept. In " thinking back," then, the intellect arrives not at one singular thing but at a multitude of them. It is difficult to understand how the intellect may arrive, by this process, at a knowledge of an individual particular. This knowledge is indispensable for the intellect forming any particular judgment.

J. Maritain seems to be led by similar considerations to " admit with John of St. Thomas, the existence of a rightful (indirect) concept of the singular." [95] A non-Thomistic philosophy, one which introduces the notion of a *forma haecceitatis*, has indeed no difficulty in admitting such a concept of the singular, direct or indirect, but it is still questionable whether such a concept can be justified on the basis of Thomistic principles.[96]

Maréchal's views do not differ very much from those proposed by Gredt:

> The intelligence remains the intelligence, and the imagination the imagination: but the intelligence subordinating itself to the imagination undergoes an extrinsic constraint thereby. . . . The intelligence, reflecting, encounters then in the species something other than the pure expression of immaterial spontaneity: it encounters there a relation of the intelligible to the extrinsic material, impene-

[95] *The Degrees of Knowledge*, New York: 1938, p. 85, footnote 2.

[96] Cf. e. g., C. Nink, " Die intellectuelle Erkenntnis," *Phil. Jahrb.*, 1928, *41*, 273. " So hat jedes individuelle Ding seine eigene Wesenheit," which is apprehended by the intellect as " allgemeine Gestalt."

trable and tyrannical; a relation to something which would be demanded as a necessary complement of the species, but which would not be intellectually definable except negatively, as a lacuna of intelligibility . . . our reflection . . . hurtles itself against the material and perceives it as a restrictive condition of the autonomous play of the immaterial.[97]

P. Maréchal's conception deserves the greatest attention. His is, in fact, a new viewpoint: the particular is reached by the intellect not as a fully grasped object—such as it is even when the grasp is termed an unessential or accidental one—but as a limit, a barrier, against which the intellect collides without being able to overcome it. We shall not inquire here into the ancestry of this notion of limit; without deeper analysis one is reminded of Kant's notion of the thing in itself (*Ding an sich*) which is not given but somehow attained as a limit.

There are, too, certain notions of recent philosophers. Among these is the idea of limit (*Grenze*) in N. Hartman's epistemology: the intellect is aware of its own boundaries; the " transintelligible " has to possess " a minimum of intelligibility " to become noticeable even in the mere form of limitation to the intellect. This applies, of course, to the infra-intelligible, the material particular, as well as to the supra-intelligible; Hartmann himself, being far from viewing things in the Thomistic manner, does not refer to the particular, the intellectual knowledge of which he evidently takes for granted.[98] Another is M. Heidegger's " mode of deficiency "; certain things with which we deal in ordinary situations pass unnoticed, but become very noticeable the moment there is something amiss with them or they themselves are missing.[99]

The idea that the particular is known by way of negation appears as early as some of the writings of the older commentators of Aquinas and of other Scholastics. This idea has been developed to a greater extent and has been given a deeper signification by the modern philosophers to whom reference was

[97] *Le Thomisme devant la philosophie critique*, p. 168.
[98] *Metaphysik der Erkenntnis*, 2d ed., Leipzig: 1927.
[99] *Sein und Zeit*, Halle a. S.: 1929.

made above. The problem of limit, limit of knowledge, and similar formulae, has aroused a greater interest in recent years than ever before. The " philosophy of existence," or " existential philosophy," has emphasized this problem. It arises in Neo-Scholasticism, too, as is shown by the quotation from Maréchal.

Another notion which plays a certain role in the writings of Neo-Scholastics is the notion of " intellectual intuition." This notion recalls the expression repeatedly used by Aquinas, that the intellect regards (*inspicit*) the phantasm and in it the particular. The modern idea seems, however, to go farther than Aquinas. G. Rabeau has a characteristic passage [100] wherein he summarizes his ideas:

> The knowledge of the singular object is not, properly speaking, intellectual. By that I mean that it does not consist in the intellect being reduced to act by a universal form and expressing that form in a word. There is indeed a universal form there, but its role is only occasional; it sends the reflection back to the phantasm from which it was born. Having arrived there, we find a positive element, the " continuation " between the intellect and the phantasm. Now, since this contact is not a simple bump, but a knowledge, it is very difficult not to conclude with M. Régis Jolivet,[101] that the knowledge of the singular is an intuition.

Here, the intuition credited to the intellect refers to the particular which is intuited through and in the phantasm. There is another conception of the intellectual intuition. Bl. Romeyer, after having stated that the senses are incapable of perceiving the laws of being through (*à travers*) the sensible phenomena, continues:

> Such a perception of the absolute is an intellectual intuition, of a very low degree (*infime*) but true. By this intuition man attains not only being as such, its transcendental properties truth and

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[100] " Species, Verbum, L'activité intelléctuelle selon S. Thomas." *Bibl. Thom.*, XXII, p. 85.

[101] " L'intuition intelléctuelle et le problème de la métaphysique." *Arch. de Phil.*, 1934, *11*, n. 2.

goodness; he attains still other determinations affecting being: its substantial and accidental characteristics, its causality, efficient, exemplary, and final, its essential degrees, matter, life, sensibility, mind.[102]

By being credited with the capacity of attaining matter, this intuition of the intellect evidently becomes capable also of attaining the particular. On the other hand, Romeyer states that the concrete reality of material objects is known to the intellect by means of the extrinsic concurrence of the senses and in the way of a reflex-grasp (*saisie réflexe*).

Roland-Gosselin is apparently a little sceptical in regard to intellectual intuition as a legitimate concept of Thomistic philosophy. He says, however, that it is the intellect which ultimately centralizes all data of consciousness, including of course those of sensibility.[103] And elsewhere he asserts that the intellect, being ordered by its nature to an essential knowledge of being, is capable of discerning the act of existence which is presented to its view.[104] But the act of existence is individual existence.

In the discussion of intellectual knowledge and its relations to the senses the point which is chiefly stressed is the dependence of the intellect on the senses. But the senses depend, on the other hand, on the intellect. There is no perception, in the true sense of the term, in which the intellect does not take part. As has been remarked above, the simple fact of naming a thing recognized presupposes the cooperation of the intellect. Though the common sense (*sensus communis*) is said to synthesize the percept of the crude data supplied by the external senses, the percept in truth is more than the product of a merely sensory activity. Roland-Gosselin is, therefore, right in asserting the role of "judgment" in perception; though it would be prudent to speak only of intellectual activity, because

[102] "St. Thomas et nôtre connaissance de l'ésprit humain." *Arch. de Phil.*, 1928, 6, n. 2.

[103] "Peut-on parler d'intuition intelléctuelle dans la philosophie Thomiste?" *Philos. perennis*, Regensburg: 1930, Vol. II, p. 742.

[104] "Essai d'une critique de la connaissance," *Bibl. Thom.*, XVII.

there is no empirical evidence of a judgment being active in sense perception.

There is another question more directly related to our problem. It has been remarked repeatedly that the phantasm to which the intellect " converts " itself after having formed a concept need not be, and very often is not, the very phantasm from which the concept had been originally abstracted. There are certain concepts to which no phantasm can correspond exactly, like e. g., the phantasm of a dog corresponding to the universal notion of " the dog." Concepts like " potency," or " $\sqrt{-1}$," or " concept " itself, are not related in the same way to phantasms as universals abstracted from some sense data are related to their phantasms. The existence of such concepts is acknowledged by Aquinas himself. Rabeau [105] calls these concepts constructed concepts (*concepts construits*)—whether in conscious recognition of the modern notion of " constructs " or not, is not clear. In any case, the term is a happy one and characterizes perfectly the nature of certain concepts which are not abstracted directly, but which result from a peculiar intellectual operation. The human mind, however, naturally attempts concrete illustrations of the most abstract concepts, even though these illustrations do not really contribute to our understanding; they are sometimes more of a hindrance than a help. These illustrations are, moreover, not related in a determined manner to the concepts. A concept of higher mathematics or of theoretical physics, may be illustrated in various ways; just as one and the same thought may be expressed in various manners. A proposition of mathematics may be stated by a symbolic formula, in words, in any language; the " phantasm " of these expressions is another in each instance, but it serves equally as a support for the abstract idea.

If there are minds that can dispense with diagrams in geometry and mechanics, why not minds that can dispense with mechanical models of physical phenomena? Mechanical models certainly have not as much relevance to physical inquiry as diagrams in geometry

[105] *Loc. cit.*

since it can be shown, as Poincaré has done (*Electricité et Optique*, Paris, 1890, *préface*), that whenever a mechanical model is invented to explain physical phenomena, an infinity of these models is possible.[106]

What is said here of the models for physical phenomena applies also to every phantasm imagined or invented or constructed for the sake of illustrating any concept whatsoever. It applies equally to all phantasms of symbolic character. Words are but one case of these symbols. There are many others. Logical relations as well as all kinds of mental contents may be symbolized by images. Some people have images representing such things as the week, or the seasons of the year. The use of metaphoric expressions, of similes, allegories, etc., goes back to this capacity of the mind, viz., to " see " something in a concrete thing of an altogether different nature. But, to state this once more, these images are not a *conditio sine qua non* for the understanding of certain concepts. Nor are they necessary for the understanding of propositions. Here too one and the same idea may be illustrated by different images. As one may express the same thought in various manners, using different words, so it may be illustrated by different images.[107]

What may be called the " choice of images " is a problem in itself. The mere fact that there are good and bad similarities, appropriate and insufficient illustrations, proves that the choice of images is a particular function of the mind. This function has to be under the direction of the intellect, since the concepts or ideas to be illustrated are primarily in the intellect. But it is not the image which is of importance; the main thing is the intellectual concept. The concept is not understood by means of the image, but the image receives its significance from the concept it is intended to illustrate. As W. Staehlin rightly says, no metaphor would be understandable, if the images were the relevant facts.[108]

[106] M. R. Cohen, *Reason and Nature*, 6th ed., New York: 1932, p. 215.

[107] R. Allers, " Bild und Gedanke," *Zschr. f. d. ges. Neurol. u. Psychiatr.*, 1922, 1.

[108] " Zur Psychologie und Statistik der Metapher," *Arch. f. d. ges. Psychol.*, 1914, *31*, 279.

The intellect has, therefore, to exercise a selective influence on the images. It has, so to speak, to reach down in the storage house of memory or to dictate to imagination which images are to be fetched forth. Evident though this is, it seems that this side of the problem has not aroused much interest on the part either of the experimental psychologist or on the part of the Scholastic philosophers. There is a remarkable passage in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, where he speaks of what he terms the *Schema zu einem Begriff*. There is, according to this philosopher, a "general procedure by which to procure its image for a concept. What underlies our pure sensible concepts are not images but schemata." [109]

Not only concepts are "constructs"; images also may be said to possess this property. It has always been known that the imagination is not only reproductive but also creative. The capacity of combining elements of experience into new images is important in invention and in art. New concepts, however, do not originate exclusively from new images. The contrary is even the more frequent occurrence, at least in sciences of a higher degree of abstraction. The application of new principles of physics to practical tasks of engineering makes necessary a translation, as it were, of the newly conceived abstract notions to particular things and situations. Then the mind has to "construe" new phantasms, whose origin is in the intellect and the construction of which has to be directed by the intellect. This fact did not althogether escape the mind of St. Thomas.[110] It is pointed out expressly by Rabeau.[111]

The mind knows evidently, by the nature of the concept itself, that and how this concept may be illustrated by and incorporated in a definite phantasm. There is always the possibility of several phantasms among which the intellect chooses. We reject some phantasms as not serving the purpose of the intellect, we look around, as it were, for an adequate image, we know in what direction we have to search for such an appro-

[109] Another relevant passage may be found in Kant's *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, § 59, "Von der Schoenheit als Symbol der Sittlichkeit."

[110] *Q. D. de Veritate*, q. 10, a. 3, c. [111] *Op. cit.*, p. 131.

priate illustration. This activity presupposes not only a directing influence of the intellect on the imagination, but also an intellectual capacity of comparison; if such a capacity did not exist, we could never distinguish between an adequate and an inadequate image. Furthermore, a concept, even if formed anew and not derived directly by abstraction from a phantasm, has to carry in itself an element indicating its possible relation to images. This is, as it seems, the view of A. Dondeyne, who writes: " The content of a concept presents itself spontaneously to consciousness as a ' possible,' that is, as a content of infinitely realisable being."[112]

There are still many authors whose opinion might be quoted. But all these studies do not advance our understanding of the problem in a noticeable manner. The same terms return constantly. We read of reflexion, continuation, glow (*reflexio, continuatio, relucentia*), etc., but we do not penetrate deeper into the nature of the problem itself.[113] It is, therefore, permissible to end this report and to attempt a summary of the results of recent philosophic endeavor.

The only real progress which has been achieved seems to be the reference made by P. Maréchal to the consciousness of limit or the awareness of a *lacuna*. Rabeau may be mentioned for stressing the fact that propositions are units, that to them corresponds one *species expressa* and that they are not a mere combination or succession of imaginable terms. We have shown above that this is indeed the very idea of Aquinas himself.

Philosophy has first of all to take account of facts: " *Salvare apparentia*," as St. Thomas repeats after Plato and Simplicius. It is therefore not permissible simply to discard all empirical evidence and to declare it misleading, because sensible experience is never given in its purity. There can be no doubt that this is the case. But the same may be asserted of every other mental operation. If this contention were right, there could be

[112] " L'abstraction," *Rev. Néo-Schol.*, 1938, *41*, 1.

[113] For a good historical study see: J. Webert, " L'image dans l'œuvre de St. Thomas." *Rev. Thomiste*, 1926, *31*, 427.

neither an empirical nor a speculative psychology. Even if one would concede to F. Rahner,[114] who holds this view, that philosophy may proceed independently of experience and experiment, it is nevertheless the task of philosophy to legitimate its views ultimately by referring them to the data of experience. The statements of this author would have gained in validity if he had taken more account of facts.

Not all Neo-Scholastics have dealt so contemptuously with experience and with the data of psychology. If they did not, it is partly because they chose to disregard them altogether. Not caring to study carefully the evidence supplied by psychology, many of these authors believed in a contradiction between psychology and the statements of Aquinas. They felt justly that the Thomistic theory of knowledge or rather cognitive processes, could not be abandoned without seriously endangering the system in its totality. Being convinced of the truth of the philosophical system, they preferred to distrust the statements of the psychologists. We have endeavored to show that in fact there is no contradiction, that the findings of experimental psychology are rather just what one would expect to follow from the Thomistic principles. Thus, the evidence supplied by psychology may be used without any restriction in attempting an explanation of the still mysterious process of intellectual knowledge of particulars. We cannot hope to attain a theory which would be wholly satisfactory and which would eliminate all the difficulties alluded to before. But we may hope to contribute something to a more penetrating classification.

IV

In devising a theory one must be clear on two points: first a precise knowledge of what the theory is supposed to achieve, and, secondly, the assembly of all the facts pertaining to the problem. Now, a theory which supposes a definite philosophy to be true, has to cope with two difficulties: it has to supply a

[114] *Geist in Welt. Zur Metaphysik der endlichen Erkenntnis bei Thomas von Aquin.* Innsbruck: 1939.

satisfactory explanation, and this explanation has to be couched in the terms of the philosophy adopted by the writer. Moreover, these terms have to be taken in their original and undistorted meaning. It happens frequently that a theoretical explanation of certain facts or a solution of definite problems is given apparently in the terms of a definite philosophy, although, a closer analysis shows that these terms have undergone in the mind of the scholar some subtle modifications, which may pass unnoticed, the more so, since they are introduced unwillingly and unconsciously. The ambiguity of many terms becomes a dangerous pitfall. The same words, used in philosophy and in psychology, in the sciences and in common life, seem to have the same signification, but this is too often an illusion. Thus, the term "abstraction" is used in psychology and in philosophy; it is not certain that the meaning in both instances is exactly the same. We have had occasion already to point out that abstraction is used by psychologists in a rather loose sense. Identifying the abstraction of the psychologist with that of the philosopher is the origin of disturbing misunderstandings.

The problems posited by the Thomistic theory are evident. The phantasm is outside of the intellect; yet the intellect has to get hold of the phantasm, first to "illuminate" it by the force of the active intellect in order to disengage the universal nature which is transmitted by means of the intelligible species to the possible intellect; secondly, to clarify or illustrate a concept when the intellect returns by way of "reflexion"; thirdly, to form a particular judgment.

There has to be, furthermore, a definite and determining influence exercised by the intellect on the faculty of imagination. This becomes evident from the fact that the intellect is endowed with the capacity of "choosing" the appropriate phantasm in the case of "constructs" and highly abstracted notions, which do not stem directly from some phantasm.

Besides these empirical necessities, there is a further reason which forces us to credit the intellect with the power of knowing particulars. Actual being is found only in particulars, the

individually existing things; and being is the object of the intellect. As the highest faculty of the human mind, reason is the light by which this mind not only becomes cognizant of things as they are, but also finds its way in active behavior through the world of reality.

The facts collected by experimental psychology do not contradict the ideas of philosophy. " Imageless thought " refers to what modern psychology calls thought, that is, to propositions or " propositionable " contents of the intellect. To these mental phenomena no phantasm corresponds, as we have pointed out more than once. The experimental evidence, then, referring to " imageless thought " cannot be alleged as proof against Thomistic psychology, nor has the latter any reason for doubting the validity of the statement made by the experimental psychologists. Experiments demonstrating that " meaning " may be grasped before an image appears, have to be interpreted in the light of the thesis that the image need not be the one from which the meaning originally had been abstracted. If the meaning is given in words, and, is understood before the word is fully grasped, one has to recall that words are sensible data, that they evoke images or are given as such through the external senses, and that these data are accordingly sufficient as a material basis for intellectual understanding. The same applies, in a similar manner to meaning presented by way of pictures. These experiments do not constitute any objection against the classic conception of intellectual operation.

A serious objection would arise only if it could be shown that meaning may become conscious spontaneously and be fully understood without any image appearing at the same time. Whether such a case exists or not, is not easy to decide. In reviewing personal experience the greatest care is necessary. Everyone is but too easily deluded into believing his personal mode of experience to be general. In the history of psychology there are striking proofs of such instances. Some psychologists who belonged to the so-called motor type, his imagery being mainly or even exclusively, of kinesthesia, thought that " inner

speech " consisted in the reproduction of articulatory movements. But there are many persons who do not have such kinesthetic imagery. People whose vital imagination is well developed are inclined to believe that everyone " thinks " in visual images. In inquiring into the presence or absence of images one has to take account of the particular type of imagination. Images may be very poorly developed and consist in mere fragments or symbols of the thing imagined. These symbols often have no resemblance to the thing for which they stand.

The psychologist will have to inquire whether the important factor is the image as such, or the activity of imagination of any kind whatsoever. It may be that the particular kind of image is quite irrelevant and that the important fact is the imagination being aroused to some activity. On these things as well as on the question of meaning without any imagery no decision as yet seems possible, since the necessary experimental evidence is lacking.

The experiments on the understanding of meaning and its relation to imagery deal with a mental process which is in truth rather uncommon. The usual task, outside of the laboratory, is not understanding isolated words or pictures, but grasping contexts. Isolated words, when used in common speech, are usually fragmentary sentences. A question is often answered by one word. But this word stands for a sentence which repeats the question in the form of an assertion. An exclamation may consist of one word; if it is meaningful, that is, more than a mere expression of emotional disturbance, this word too replaces a sentence. I may call something to another person's attention by simply saying: " there "; the accompanying demonstrative gesture stands in fact for the prēdicate of a sentence reading, more or less " look, there at this thing." And so on.

The average case is the understanding of contexts which may be nearer or farther from a proposition and from the possibility of being cast into a sentence; meaning as it is encountered in common intercourse with reality, is practically always meaning

of relations. Hardly ever does an isolated concept rise into consciousness and have to be understood. It is probable that cases—if such cases exist—of understanding, without accompanying images, will always be of sentences or sentence-like contents. But this question is much in need of experimental investigation, before a definite statement can be made. In any case, one may feel safe in asserting that no fact is known that would prove the existence of concept-understanding without some image being involved. Thomistic philosophy has, therefore, nothing to fear from experimental psychology, and the latter cannot pretend that its findings disprove the statements of pre-experimental, philosophical psychology.

Experiments may, however, contribute much to a better understanding and a clearer demonstration of the principles asserted by Thomistic psychology. It would be especially interesting to have detailed introspective evidence, under controlled conditions, on the mental processes involved in the thinking or forming of particular judgments. So far as we can see, this problem has not yet been studied.

Thus, if we desire to attain a somewhat clearer idea on the way in which the intellect gets in touch with the particular, we are thrown back on philosophical analysis. Particularity and singularity as such are not unknown to the intellect. We distinguish perfectly one intellectual operation from another, or one concept from another. Also, the intellect knows itself as one and as distinguished from any other. It is not singularity, but materiality which seems impenetrable to the intellectual power.

Materiality is a property not only of the particular things apprehended by the mind, but also of the mind's own faculties by which this apprehension is primarily achieved. There is one particular material thing of which reason is fully conscious, namely, the human body. The soul knows itself united to matter and residing, as it were, in this particular body. (Though one has to remember that this body is not strictly matter, but matter informed by the soul.) The intellectual powers have to be cognizant of the body and of the sensory

faculties depending on this body, otherwise we would never know that a given sense impression is ours, neither would we know how to put into execution an act of will arising in the volitional faculty. The problem of the intellectual knowledge of particulars starts therefore not only with the awareness of things outside of ourselves; it starts with our knowing ourselves.

Little is gained by pointing out the fact that, after all, sensory and intellectual faculties belong to the one selfsame soul. The faculties are proper accidents, really distinct from each other and from the substance of the soul. It is only a metaphorical way of expression and not much more than a description or a factual statement, if one asserts that the various faculties communicate with each other because of, or through, the soul to which they belong. This has apparently been felt by the authors who dealt with this problem. Because of this, they sought to discover some mean between the intellect and the senses or imagination. Aquinas himself refers us, especially in regard to the operation of the will, to the *vis cogitativa*. However close this internal sense may be to the intellect, it can never become a real mean because there is no mean imaginable between materiality and immateriality. A thing is either the one or the other; there are no transitions from one level to the other. Nor can this gap be bridged by referring to some " spiritualization " of the image. This too is only another way of stating the facts, but not an explanation of them.

Another way out of this difficulty seems to present itself if one considers the fact that mere pure perception, as an achievement of the senses alone, does in truth not exist, at least, not under normal and average conditions. What we call a perception is much more than a mere affection of the senses; it is this plus a noticeable intellectual factor. In calling the object apprehended a something we employ the intellect; " something " is not less a concept than dog or man or size. In recognizing a simple color as, e. g., red, we draw, not only on the store of sensory memory, but on the store of intellectual memory as well. In this sense one may surely speak of a " spiritualization " not only of the image but also of the percept. It is also

true that the process of apprehension involves a gradual dematerialization of the object. The *species sensibilis,* material though it is, does not carry, as it were, the matter from the particular thing apprehended into the senses. Moreover, the image, especially if it is somewhat generalized and not a mere " portrait " of an individual thing, is still less material. But all this leaves the central problem unsolved. The cooperation of the intellect with the senses in perception presupposes that the intellect is somehow capable of transcending the barrier between materiality and immateriality.

It is true furthermore that the intellect knows directly, by the nature of the concept, of the latter's reference to a multitude of singulars. It is indeed the nature of the concept to imply such a reference; its nature is to be predicated of many things. But by this, the intellect does not attain the least knowledge of any individual particular; nor is the particular " given " by the knowledge of all the universals, if such a knowledge is possible at all, which may be abstracted from the thing and its properties. The individual is not what older Scholastics termed a " collection of properties "; [115] each of these properties being expressible by name. Not even a perfect knowledge of the general laws which condition the appearance of an eclipse at a certain moment enables the astronomer to know actually this one phenomenon unless he observes it. But does this knowledge of the universal nature necessitate an intellectual grasp of the particular? Must the intellect in order to know that its concept refers to an undetermined, and, eventually, infinite number of particulars have a knowledge of any individual particular? Or is its knowledge of the universal's nature based on an intellectual apprehension of some relation between this universal and the notion of the particular in general? Or again: Is the notion of a concept, for example, the concept of elliptic functions in mathematics, secondary by nature to the universal derived by abstraction from a phantasm? That such a highly abstract notion is secondary in time is clear; the first notions the

[115] Cf. the remarks of L. Raeymaker, *Rev. Néo-Schol.*, 1937, *40*, 604, in his critical report on Fuetscher's work on *Akt und Potenz.*

mind forms are abstracted from sensible images. It is also clear that the highest degrees of abstraction rest ultimately on the first. This does not, however, necessitate a constant referring of the highest concept to those gained by the first steps of abstraction; not even an implicit reference is necessarily implied. These problems have, however, but an indirect bearing on the questions under discussion. To mention them seems advisable because thus the wide range of problems related to the one of intellectual knowledge of the particular becomes manifest. But we cannot attempt to analyze all these issues.

The various suggestions of how to find an answer to the question of bridging the gap between the intellect and the particular leave this gap as wide as before. They are rather indications that the gap has to be bridged by some theory, since it is evidently bridged in reality. The problem is more of a metaphysical than of a psychological nature. It will be solved, probably better, from a standpoint on the terrain of ontology than on the ground of psychology. The attempts to discover any mean between intellect and senses or the immaterial and the material seem bound to fail. Psychological analysis and description may supply some valuable indications on the direction into which metaphysical inquiry must turn.

By this we do not refer to the Thomistic notion of extension (*continuatio*). This term only expresses the fact that there is an undoubted cooperation of the sensory faculties and the intellectual powers, and a penetration, as it were, of the latter into the former in such a way that, even a simple sensory operation has a certain amount of intellectuality admixed. Extension is not an explanatory but a descriptive term.

One notion which has been reported above seems of a particular usefulness, the one, namely, contributed by P. Maréchal when he pointed out the limit, the boundary, or the barrier of which the intellect becomes aware when approaching the particular. We shall see presently that this notion deserves particular consideration.

Thomism is convinced of the basic intelligibility of reality. In spite of the limitations of the human mind, the whole of

reality may be somehow grasped by it. Things we cannot understand in their essence may be at least understood by way of analogy. The analogical way of understanding is the counterpart of the analogical structure of being. The terms we use are ambiguous or equivocal; but the fact that we know this equivocation is a proof of our capacity of understanding, somehow, even things which are beyond our power of understanding. Mention has been made of N. Hartmann's notion that even the transintelligible is endowed with a "minimum of intelligibility," else we could not know it at all and would not be able to call it the transintelligible. The transintelligible is, so to speak, on both sides of the intelligible; it is below, as matter, and above, as pure spiritual being. The latter is, as such, not transintelligible; being spiritual and immaterial it is rather an appropriate object of the intellect, were it not for the intellect's limitations and its dependence on the sense functions. Matter is essentially transintelligible, but it is not so far "below" the intellect that its concept is inaccessible to reason. Even the concept of prime matter is a purely intellectual achievement. Prime matter can never become an object of experience; it is itself a limitative notion—*Grenzbegriff*, to use the Kantian term which expresses exactly what we have in mind. Matter can be thought of only in correlation with form. Form may be thought of independently of matter, because we can think, if inadequately, of the pure and subsistent forms. The theory of ideas as conceived by Plato is a historical demonstration of the mind's capacity to think pure forms. The abstract notion is a likeness of the form which in Aristotelian-Thomistic ontology cannot be conceived as existing independently of, and separated from, matter and the individual thing. It is of the very nature of form to be concretized—"contracted"—by union with matter. The relation to matter is an essential feature of the form, and thinking of form the mind cannot think but of form as related to matter. That the concept is capable of being predicated of many things is but the psychological counterpart of its ontological nature. Thinking the universal, the mind necessarily thinks the universal's relation to matter and to indi-

viduals. Thus far the knowledge of particulars is entailed in the knowledge of concepts or universals.

The philosopher discovers, by his painstaking inquiries, only what is really involved in human knowledge. He states explicitly what is implicitly given in the mental facts which mirror reality. That only the particular is really existent and that the concept follows the existing thing is not a fact because it may be deduced from experience, by means of turning to the phantasm; it can be deduced because it is a fact which is contained in the very notion of a concept, a fact which is implicitly given together with the concept, and which has only to be drawn into light and couched in words to acquire a certain compulsory force. Thinking a concept is at the same time thinking it as only existing in particulars. Existence is not derived, or need not be derived, from experience about things outside of the mind. Existence is the immediate experience of the mind itself. From the time when St. Augustine first pointed out : " I know that I know," as the one irrefutable fact which even the sceptic cannot but recognize, there has never been any doubt about this fact: that the mind knows itself as existing. The Cartesian *cogito* has a long and noble ancestry.[116] The experience of existence as my existence makes me aware also of this existence being an individual one.

Reason, therefore, knows of existence and knows too that existence is always, at least so far as it is accessible to direct experience, individual existence. Reason knows furthermore that the concept implies existence, therefore existence as actual in individuals. The search for the individual is accordingly a natural tendency of the intellect. In proceeding on this search, the intellect encounters the barrier of materiality. An obstacle which opposes itself to the progress of intellectual movement may be of two kinds. It may be in the nature of an impenetrable, dark, unwieldy resistence, or, it may present itself in some dim light, translucent as it were, unsurmountable indeed, but recognizable in its nature. The latter case seems to be

[116] Cf. the various studies on Descartes' philosophy by Dr. E. Gilson.

the one realized in the attempt of the intellect to attain the individual, of whose existence the intellect is certain beforehand, since the very nature of its proper contents, the universal, testifies to the fact that that to which it refers, exists, if at all, in particulars. These particulars may be thought of, in a general manner, as being material, because the universal notion of a material particular is, of course, attainable by the intellect. Reason, therefore, knows what it has to look for; but on its way to this preconceived aim reason encounters an insurmountable obstacle behind which the things desired are hidden.

Certain facts pertaining equally to grammar, logic, the philosophy and the psychology of language may be mentioned in this respect. We refer to the so-called distributive judgments. The two propositions: " The dog has four legs," and " every dog has four legs," are equivalent; they state the same fact, they refer to the same " Objective," to use the terminology of A. v. Meinong. They are convertible. The psychological background, however, is not quite the same in both these cases. The first proposition is, so to speak, more purely intellectual than the second, which implies, in an indirect manner or by implication, a reference to particulars. These particulars are not grasped as individuals; they are nevertheless intended as individuals in a general and indefinite manner. The fact that the intellect may form these two propositions shows that the concept as such implies some intellectual knowledge of the particular.

Another point where the intellect gets in relatively close touch with the particular is the proper name. A name, generally speaking, is a name of a class or a universal. A proper name is a general name narrowed down until it fits one individual only. As a name, the proper name belongs to the group of vocal symbols used for universals; as a proper name, it is related to one individual. There are certain transitions between the proper and the general name. A general name can be used as a name for an individual, for example, a father calling his boy " son "; and a proper name may be used in a general

fashion, for instance, a child calling all dogs by the name of his own dog.

Another phenomenon which is related to the one of the proper name is the possessive pronoun. By adding " my " or " his " to a general name, this name becomes the name of an individual; my house, my friend, his book, are individuals. Possessive pronouns refer to the person who possesses a thing. A thing belonging to a person partakes, in a sense, of this person's individuality. (This is manifest in the attitude children have in regard to their possessions. Though it is a mistaken idea to believe that the child does not distinguish between himself and surrounding objects—in fact he has a quite clear, though not explicit and not formulated, knowledge of the uniqueness of his ego, as St. Augustine has already pointed out —it is true that the relations of a child to things belonging to him or to which he is accustomed are closer than is generally the case with adults.) That something belongs to me is not a datum of the senses; it hardly could be given by the senses alone, not even by the *vis cogitativa,* though this power is capable of grasping certain relations. To realize fully the meaning of the relation expressed by " mine " man needs some intellectual insight.

There are probably still other ways by which the particular gets near to the intellect. Nonetheless, it can never really enter the sphere of immateriality. But the intellect knows, by the indication alluded to above, what it would find behind the barrier, could it but pass it. But must the intellect pass the barrier to be able to deal with the particular? The common idea seems to be that in understanding the meaning of a particular, or in forming a judgment about it, the intellect has to " contain " this particular. It might be, however, a mistaken notion due to the illusion created by the grammatical form expressing the intellectual operation. This illusion arises because the name of the particular has to be employed in the sentence. The sentence is the expression of an intellectual operation; thus the common opinion that the particular is in the intellect in the same manner as it is in the senses.

The intellect knows that there are particulars. It knows too that it has ultimately derived all its contents from without. It suffers, as Rabeau expresses it, a shock from the phantasm. It undergoes another shock when encountering any image. This does not mean that the process of abstraction has to be repeated every time an image presents itself. The image may be one of imagination, or one of perception. This does not make any difference, since the memory image, eventually to be revived in imagination, has to arise simultaneously with the percept, as H. Bergson rightly points out.[117] Even impressions, of which the mind does not become conscious at the time of their actual presence, cause memory images to be developed. Impressions of which we are not cognizant, are remembered, and, under certain conditions, recalled.[118] Sometimes a kind of renewal of the abstractive process takes place, when we encounter an object which we recognize as known without being able to place it. Recognition, however, usually does not consist in a comparison of a new impression with an image; it rather consists in the awareness, that the new object—the same applies to objects of the intellect—fits into some already existing frame or constellation.[119]

That the intellect suffers such a shock from the activity of the sensory faculty postulates a " continuity " between the two. Is this continuity sufficiently explained by referring to the unity of the soul to which all the faculties belong? This seems doubtful, for there is still the difficulty resulting from the materiality of the sensory faculties. These faculties, however, are not purely material. They are faculties of the composite, and accordingly, spiritual as well as material. One can hardly conclude from this fact that the sensible species, the phantasm, and the mental states, in which the impressions are conserved in memory, are " spiritualized " in a strict sense; this " spiritu-

[117] " Le souvenir du présent et la fausse reconnaissance," *Rev. Philos.*, 1908, *66*, 561.

[118] R. Allers and J. Teler, " Ueber das Auftauchen unbemerkter Eindrücke in Assoziationen," *Zschr. f. d. ges. Neurol. u. Psychiat.*, 1923.

[119] Cf. O. Selz, l. c. *passim*.

alization " is relative, and the expression is not much more than a descriptive metaphor. Another consideration, however, seems permitted. Analogically, one may assert that the spiritual factor in the sensory faculties is related to the material factor in a similar manner as the soul is related to the composite human being. The psychical " part " of the sensory faculties is, in a way, the formal factor, and, as such, accessible to the intellect. Thus, any modification of a formal character will be within reach of intellectual cognition. Sense impressions condition an accidental information of the sensory faculty, therefore, some modification within the formal element of these faculties. The activity, or, envisioned from another angle, the passivity of the sensory faculty thus becomes a proper object of the intellect.

It is possible that a satisfactory theory of intellectual cognition of particulars might be developed along these lines. There remain, however, two problems which should be mentioned, even though a thorough discussion of them must be postponed. One of these problems refers to the dominion the intellect exercises over the imagination in the " choice of phantasms." The other problem concerns the manner in which meaning is " contained " in symbolic phantasms. The latter problem necessitates so lengthy an analysis that it cannot even be touched upon in this context. Some words may be said however, on the first problem.

No faculty of the human soul ever operates in isolation; every mental operation is always the cooperation of many, practically, of all faculties. Perception implies an intellectual factor; the intellect depends on sensory faculties; will relies on the intellect for supplying the ends; the sensory appetite cannot operate without sensory cognition; nor can the will flow over into action without the sensory appetites cooperating. The fact, then, that an intellectual operation actuates imagination is neither an exception nor in any way more wonderful than the other activities of the mind. The problem is posited by the fact that a definite intellectual operation actuates a definite imaginative activity. We observe, at times, that the imagination works in

a manner not in accordance with the needs of the intellect. Frequently we cannot find the right word to express what is in our minds, the really illustrative analogy or image is not at hand, we search for an appropriate symbol. The precise cooperation of the imagination is, therefore, not a pre-established way of functioning but an achievement which has to be trained by experience, developed by exercise, controlled by the intellect. Notions which are well known, easily find the corresponding images and symbols ready made in the imagination and memory. For other, more unusual, and newly formed concepts of a higher degree of abstraction, images have to be created or painstakingly sought. The particular image is forever outside of the intellect. The particular activity of imagination is not. It is probable that the particular activity of imagination is strictly correlated to the particular image. In Husserl's philosophy there is a notion which seems to apply here. He speaks of a strict correlation between Noësis and Noëma, the act-aspect of knowing and its content-aspect. What Husserl states of theoretical knowledge or of the cognition of "essence" (*Wesensschau*) applies to every mental operation of any kind whatsoever. This relation is, if we understand things correctly, not one due to psychological laws, but depends on ontological facts. It depends on the same basic parallelism between notions and reality which enables the human mind to understand reality and to apply to real things the ideas thought out by the mind.

The problem of cognition, whether intellectual or sensual, is in the last analysis not to be solved solely by psychology. It is a psychological problem, since its solution demands a thorough knowledge of empirical facts which is the task of psychology. Psychology alone, however, cannot discover any ultimate answer to its own questions. To comply with its own task, psychology has to be more than just empirical psychology; psychology transcends, whenever it arrives at its last and deepest problems, its own boundaries. To be complete, psychology must embrace philosophy.

* * *

We have tried, in the foregoing pages, to report on the Thomistic theory of intellectual knowledge, particularly, in regard to material singulars. We have also endeavored to show that there is no contradiction between the statements of Thomistic psychology and the findings of modern experimental research, especially in reference to " imageless thought." Finally we have attempted to indicate the ways in which the solutions to certain basic problems may be found; problems which are at home, so to speak, within the confines of psychology and philosophy. We cannot boast of having proposed definite and wholly satisfactory solutions of these problems, we hope the way has been prepared for further inquiries. The study of these important problems will have to proceed by means of experimental investigations as well as by means of philosophical, ontological, analysis.

Psychology has been called by Kant a " stranger in the country of philosophy " who in time will return to his own country, namely, a truly philosophical anthropology. This philosophical anthropology may be rightly called a metaphysics of the human person. We are still far from laying even the foundations of this edifice. What we have tried to state here is not even a contribution to the foundations; it aspires to be nothing more than a preliminary sketch, useful, perhaps, for drafting the first blueprint.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Language and Reality. By Wilbur Marshall Urban. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1939. Pp. 755, with indices. $5.50.

The sub-title of this volume further indicates its nature: it treats of "the philosophy of language and the principles of symbolism." It is the author's contribution to the solution of what he holds to be the basic problem of both science and philosophy: "Language is the last and deepest problem of the philosophic mind" (p. 22). In its effort to advance a solution of this problem Prof. Urban's book gives many and varied rewards to its reader. These come from the author's own thinking upon the general question and its countless aspects, and from his wide range of reading, as exhibited in countless quotations.

Language and Reality consists of two parts. In Part I—on the philosophy of language—eight chapters discuss the following general subjects: the theme of a philosophy of language; the origin, development and science of language; language as the bearer of meaning; the primary functions of language; linguistic validity; the nature and conditions of intelligible communication; language and logic; language and cognition. In Part II—the principles of symbolism—six chapters discuss the general theory of symbolism; the language of poetry and its symbolic form; symbolism as a scientific principle; religious symbols and the problem of religious knowledge; symbolism as a metaphysical principle; *philosophia perennis*: the "natural metaphysic of the human mind." Four appendices discuss in turn the development of language; the problem of translation in general logistics; neo-nominalistic philosophies of language; and symbolism as a theological principle in St. Thomas.

Prof. Urban cannot emphasize too much his conviction that the last and deepest problem of the philosophic mind is found in language. He holds that this is true whether reality be approached through life or through science. "Life as it is merely lived is senseless. It is perhaps conceivable that we may have a direct apprehension or intuition of life, but the meaning of life can neither be apprehended nor expressed except in language of some kind. . . . In a very real sense the limits of my language are the limits of my world. Science, in the last analysis, is language well made" (p. 21). Again: "All life comes back to the question of speech, the medium through which we communicate" (p. 50). This being held, ". . . the deepest problem of the philosophy of language is to be found. It is the critical problem of the relation of linguistic forms, and of symbolic forms in general, to the immediately given reality. . . . The only real problem is whether our creations have taken us to reality or away from it, whether

they have become a veil to be torn away, or are, after all, when properly understood, the only road we have to reality" (p. 50).

In his long consideration of this problem the author comes to an expected conclusion: "There are in general only two ways of solving the problem of language and cognition. The first of these . . . assumes a 'reality' known independently of language and its categories, a hypothetical 'pure experience' to be discovered by stripping off language. This way is closed to us, for the assumptions on which it is based are pure myth. The second way proposes an exactly opposite method and proceeds upon opposite assumptions. Instead, as in the first way, attempting to get back of the forms of thought and language to a hypothetical 'pure experience,' it assumes that experience is never 'pure' in this sense, and that intuition and expression are inseparable. It therefore proposes not to deny, but to complete and perfect the principles of expression and symbolism. It proceeds upon the assumption that the more richly and energetically the human spirit builds its languages and symbolisms, the nearer it comes, if not to the original source of its being, certainly to its ultimate meaning and reality. If the entire process of human culture consists in the creation of certain spiritual constructions, symbolic forms of various types, the way to truth and reality lies, not in negating these forms, but rather in seeking to understand them and in becoming more and more conscious of the formative principles embodied in these constructions. . . . Language which, as we have seen, is inseparable from thought and knowledge, is not moulded on reality. It is rather the mould in which reality as significant is first given. This is the *idealistic minimum* which must be present in any adequate philosophy of language" (pp. 374-5).

In a sense it is with words as well as with wonder that philosophy begins. Coleridge's development of Aristotle's thought may be paraphrased: It is with words that philosophy begins; it is with words that it grows; it is with words that it ends. Not with "mere words," it is true, but with words that have some degree of precision and consistency of meaning. To engage in the common affairs of our daily life, much more to engage in the scientific and philosophic tasks of describing things and assigning causes to them, it is necessary that we, as social beings, be able to fashion means to an end. We must be able to fashion a means adequate to express to ourselves and to our fellows the meaning that we discover in things and the uses that we find we can put things to. It is also seen that development of knowledge and of expression are inseparable. Allowing for all defects of expression in individuals, among groups and races, and at various ages in history, it is yet true that what is known can find expression, while lack of power to manifest meaning argues the absence of genuine understanding. Yet despite all this, and despite many further considerations, the problem of language remains the problem of a means rather than of an end. Unless

a most extended meaning be given to the term "language," it is difficult to agree that language is the last and deepest problem of the philosophic mind.

Can assent be given with Prof. Urban to Hegel's dictum that language is the actuality of culture? Only, it seems to the present writer, if the widest possible interpretation is given to language. In that case language will include music, painting, sculpture, and architecture along with literature. It will include science together with philosophy; moral practice along with moral theory; social, political and economic institutions along with theoretical bases. All are forms of expression. Indeed, what a people or an age fails to do may be more expressive than the most formal proclamations of language in the literal sense of the term. Thus the sterility that has largely prevailed in the field of the arts and architecture throughout American history, the lack of creative impulse and the defect of integrating principles—all this is only too revealing of a corresponding emptiness within the dominant American character. Yet it would seem as if consideration of such presences or absences in a culture falls outside the province of a philosophy of language. Language is to be thought of as the instrument—or even as the material cause—of a certain part of a culture, rather than as the actuality of culture itself.

Among the many related subjects that Prof. Urban brings into his general discussion is the problem of the nature and meaning of truth. Holding that no adequate philosophy has ever been exclusively realistic or idealistic, he anticipates that despite this thesis his truth-theory will be charged with being the idealistic doctrine in new disguise, for he has written: "Truth, then, in the last analysis, is immanent in discourse—the sum-total of intelligible discourse *is* the truth. *Veritas in dicto, non in re consistit.* If there is no knowing that does not involve expression (and ultimately linguistic expression), whether such knowledge be knowledge by acquaintance or knowledge by description, then it is only in language that the meaning of that knowledge can be elucidated and interpreted" (p. 394).

If this anticipated charge of idealism in Prof. Urban's truth-theory is to be rejected with complete success, it will undoubtedly require concession of truth to things as well as to language. For the present writer it is impossible to see how a satisfactory theory of truth can be raised upon a deemphasis of ontological truth. Much less can it be raised upon an evacuation of such truth. So also with regard to meaning. An acceptable theory of meaning will give full allowance to both realistic and idealistic values. Such allowance will necessitate the assertion of meaning and value to things in themselves, prior to and independently of our discovery and expression of such meaning and value. A forthright realism has its place in metaphysics as well as in the realm of conduct, and can lead to great results in theories of truth and meaning.

There is in *Language and Reality* an embarrassment of riches for the

reviewer. The completeness and clarity of the discussion, the variety of subjects brought under the general thesis, the wealth of illustration and documentation, the independence and originality of view—all these contribute to the importance and value of the volume. Where the reader does not agree with positions stated, the author's candor and conviction still exert their instructive and persuasive power.

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Greek Popular Religion. By MARTIN P. NILSSON. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940. Pp. 166, with 39 illustrations and index. $2.50.

This is the first book in a new series of lectures sponsored by the American Council of Learned Societies. The author, one time rector of the University of Lund, Sweden, has in his long career made many notable contributions to the study of religions, particularly that of Greece. He is, consequently, treading on what is for him familiar ground in the present volume, whose seven papers deal with every aspect of the religious life in ancient Greece.

Briefly, Mr. Nilsson's thesis is this: Greek popular religion (which he takes to mean the religion of the ordinary man) suffered a gradual evolution which culminated in a complicated set of beliefs. The zenith of this development occurred in the Golden Age, and it was something artificially imposed upon the simple belief of a simple people. It does not, therefore, adequately represent or reflect the actual state of their religious feeling, but was quite simply a base attempt of the great artisans of Greek literature to impose a higher level (artificial, of course) of religious ideas upon the man of the street and of the field. The attempt was foredoomed to failure, for the lofty, intricate speculations of the great thinkers were too far removed from the life-giving sap of the popular religion. They flourished briefly, then languished and died. But the sound, sturdy, popular religion still exists.

I

Since the present discussion must inevitably use unfamiliar technical expressions, one must admire the sagacity of the author in devoting his first chapter to a definition of terms. There we learn what is meant by herms, water-spirits, demons, nymphs, heroes,[1] etc. Man travelled, and the herms (tall stones or heaps of stones haunted by the god Hermes) provided him with guidance. Water was scarce and so beneficial to land and herds that

[1] The author here displays a simple naiveté in regard to Catholic belief that is nothing short of amazing. Coming from a scholar like Mr. Nilsson, the remark that "The power of the saints, like that of the heroes, is bound to their relics. . . and the pope canonizes a saint for similar reasons" (p. 20) is astonishing, to say the least.

the Greek considered rivers and brooks and springs to be inhabited by a god or gods; watered-places, groves, and forests were invested with helpful beings.

In a sense the first chapter of this book is the most important of all. The Greek was essentially religious. Living as he did so close to nature, upon whose generosity it depended whether or not he would starve or live in abundance, it was only to be expected that his religion be expressed in a manner which reflected his life. The Greeks were an agrarian folk, and peopled nature with vague, misty spirits who wielded a considerable influence upon crops. The bad spirits among this number were periodically rendered impotent by various rites of purification and first-fruits. It is a point to be noted that the religious calendar followed that of nature, and the feasts with their accompanying magical rites, marked the coming of the different seasons. There were many festivals: those of fruit-offering, wine, flowers, swinging, new wine, etc. At some of them (those of Dionysius, for example) the great tragedies and comedies were first produced. However, Mr. Nilsson, inexorably clinging to his point, declares that scarcely a single festival was associated with a particular god until *later* times. The gods have vanished, but many of the festivals remain even in modern Greece.

II

Of all the religious rites of ancient times, there is hardly one to compare with the Eleusinian Mysteries for haunting, persistent, provocative charm and fascination. Distance may perhaps lend a certain enchantment to the view, and their very mysteriousness arouses a desire to lift the veil and peer behind, but the fact remains that the Eleusinian Mysteries were the highest form of religious expression attained by the Greeks.

The author is inclined to believe, and with reason, that the kernel of the mysteries lay in the reuniting of Demeter, the goddess of cereals, with her daughter Kore (Persephone). The story of the rape of Kore is well known. While she was playing in a meadow, the earth suddenly burst open and the god of the nether world appeared. He seized the girl and brought her to his subterranean realm. The disconsolate mother strikes the earth with barrenness until Kore is permitted to return temporarily to earth.

In what did the mysteries consist for the initiates? The *mystae* have kept their jealous secret all too well. However, we know that after preliminary rites of a bath in the sea and sacrifices, there was a procession to Eleusis. On the eighth and ninth days there took place in the dead of night, illumined only by flickering torches, the ceremony which made of the candidate a "seer" (one who *saw*). After performing certain acts of which we know absolutely nothing, he pronounced the formula: "I have fasted, I have drunk of the kykeon (a mixed drink which once restored the fasting Demeter), I have taken from the chest, and having worked, I have laid

down into the basket and from the basket into the chest." The formula has been disclosed to us by Clement of Alexandria. Mr. Nilsson is frankly sceptical of its value, adjudging it to be a prejudiced invention (p. 43). In this he goes too far, for the early Christian writers were honorable men, and the ridicule they may have heaped upon pagan practices was founded on what they knew them to be. But taken even at its best, the quotation is not very enlightening. It does not tell us in what the rites consisted. Apparently they consisted in the seeing of some object, but what the object was we do not know. Various are the conjectures: [2] a phallus? a serpent? an ear of corn symbolizing the reunion of the Mother and the Corn Maiden? At any rate, the Mysteries were anything but a gloomy festival; they conferred joy and happiness on man. The torches were extinguished, the initiates joyfully ran a race symbolical of their coming to a land of light,—an image of their future destinies. The last act of the drama was the reenactment of a sacred marriage by the high priest and a priestess, symbolical of or representing the union of Demeter with a mortal, which was, for the initiates, a promise of rich, full harvest.[3]

The Mysteries, then, were intimately connected with the lives and hopes of an agrarian people. But what spiritual value did they have? Mr. Nilsson insists (p. 63) that they persisted from a hoary antiquity because they contained no dogma (indeed, to this cherished fact they owed their hardy existence!) but only some simple fundamental ideas about life and death as symbolized in the springing up of a new crop from the old. Upon this basis was developed a hope of immortality and a belief in the eternity of life, not for the individual but for generations which were to spring one from another; and likewise a sort of vague humanitarianism. Once civilization had lost touch with the soil, with agriculture, man became uninterested in the immortality of future generations, and desired it for himself.

Here however we are no longer concerned with historical evidence, but with theory, and the theorizing is that of the author, not of the texts. All that we know of the ancient religions of Egypt and the Near East shouts at us that man had a persistent belief in his own personal immortality. True, the next life was usually nothing more than a continuation of the present one, but at least it was personal. In this discussion, what is certain is that the initiation at Eleusis corroborated the hope in a life after death, but the promised happiness should begin to be realized in the present existence. The miming of the sacred marriage led the initiates to believe that they could share in some way a life with the divinity. But of itself the rite does not suggest a divine force communicated to them in order to practice virtue. The guarantee offered by the mysteries sufficed, and even supplied the absence of all virtue. The "seers" were assured of their

[2] For the following remarks, confer M. J. Lagrange in *Revue Biblique* (*RB*) 1919; 1929.

[3] *RB*, 1919, 200 ff.

salvation with a religious assurance, but it was not demanded of them that they mend their lives.[4]

III

How did the early Greek bring his religion into his daily life? There was no professional religion, but every man's hearth and home was the altar upon which he expressed his piety by acts of libations, and food-offerings to the house gods. All this was soon to change. Men began moving into cities, and around the 8th century B. C., life became more and more industrialized. When Athens had successfully driven off the Persians, it became the leader of Greek commerce and culture. The triumphant gods who had given victory to Greece were popular indeed, and religion went hand in hand with patriotism. Religious festivals became national carnivals where every man had his fill at the expense of the State. The reaction set in in the 5th century, which saw the decline of Athens. The great gods, explains the author, had become too exalted to give help to the ordinary man in the necessities of his ordinary life, and for this reason we see many new and lesser gods imported from Asia Minor and Thrace: Cybele, Bendis, Aesclepius and many others. Aristophanes and the comic poets mocked the gods with an almost unbelievable impunity.

IV

Along with the mystical elements common to all forms of religion, there is another which the author designates as legalism or ritualism, whereby a man endeavors to make peace with God and win his favor by faithfully and meticulously fulfilling his commandments (p. 103). Hesiod lays down many rules for the religious life and conduct of man some of which are "not far from Protestant ideas" as, for example, the hallowing of labor! Many of these rules are but a step removed from superstition; and ritualism, as promoted by Apollo and advocated by Hesiod, fastened its "fetters" on the whole of man's life. This was, however, only a "tendency" (p. 107), despite the fact that it had "sprung from the depths of the popular mind" (p. 108).

Mr. Nilsson is happy to refute the common opinion that the Greeks of the classical period were quite free from superstition. He explains its absence from great literature of the period "because great writers found such base things not worth mentioning" (p. 111); it would be more to the point to explain its absence by the fact that the great writers simply took it for granted.

One important contribution which we owe in great part to the Greeks is the development of the idea of Tartarus or hell. For Homer the soul was a pale valueless shade; it was the body that counted as the man. With the coming of the Orphics the soul began to be looked upon as immortal,

[4] Cf. Lagrange, *RB*, 1919, 208-215; 1929, 63 ff., 200 ff.

imprisoned in the body. This led naturally to new ideas relative to the other world. The old idea that it was to be a repetition of the present existence was retained, but to it was coupled the growing conviction of divine justice; individuals guilty of grave misdeeds unpunished during life were to suffer their punishment in the life after death.

" Greek Popular Religion " closes with a chapter on " Seers and Oracles." These were an acknowledged part of the Greek religion, and exerted great influence in political circles; the author gives abundant details.

V

In the final summation, Mr. Nilsson again affirms that religion is dependent on the conditions of life. There is a basic assumption here to which we cannot ascribe. To speak loosely, as moderns do, religion is an elastic term which comprises all a man's intellectual, volitional, and emotional acts of homage, with emphasis upon the last element. In this sense it includes faith also. But, speaking accurately, religion is in the will, a virtue connected with justice, and its whole purpose is to give external evidence of man's conviction (based upon his reason) of his *subjection* to a superior being. This fundamental note of subjection is a constant, even though the external recognition of man's subjection is subject to change. As for evolution of religion itself, it must be conceded to the author that the externals did change with a change in environment, but certainly not in the sense that the objective content of man's belief in his subjection changed. At any rate, the author is concerned mainly with the externals.

A criticism suggested by a careful reading of this book is one that may easily be misunderstood. It is this: the author's thesis, dealing with such remote times, appears to be something like a Hollywood set seen through the camera. Everything falls so neatly into place that one wonders if he did not unconsciously build up a case for himself. As a matter of fact, his conclusions are couched in such terms that they are practically dogmas (which elsewhere he judges severely), and one hesitates to accept the fact that in the nebulous regions of ancient beliefs, all can be explained. It would be better, then, to describe his conclusions as hypotheses which are worth no more than the historical evidence with which he bolsters them up. The probability of the opinions opposed to his remains.

Lastly, the long period of Greek religion (about two thousand years, from 1500-500 B. C.), entails problems that can hardly be treated fully in many books. The author has availed himself of the extant Greek literature and of archeological findings of importance, and has done remarkably well in this particularly difficult domain of study in his reconstruction of the ordinary daily life of Greek society, with its bearings upon religion.

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BRIEF NOTICES

Science and Wisdom. By JACQUES MARITAIN. Trans. by BERNARD WALL. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1940. Pp. 241. $3.00.

This is really two books, or a book with a rather long and quite unnecessary appendix. The title refers to the first part of the book, which contains three chapters: Science and Wisdom; The Philosophy of Nature; Philosophy in Faith. We find in these chapters a brief and clear summation of several previous works by M. Maritain. The reader will find here an excellent introduction to Maritain's thought on many modern problems.

The second part of the work, entitled: "Reflections on Moral Philosophy," might be considered an extension of the third chapter mentioned above: Philosophy in Faith. It contains a defense of the idea that there can be no true moral philosophy (as a practico-practical science) unless it be subalternated to revealed theology. Here the author is defending an opinion, expressed more fully elsewhere, against the objections of two theologians. The ordinary reader will feel somewhat lost in this section, but it contains many valuable passages. We should like to call attention to three: the special work of the moral philosopher as distinct from the moral theologian (p. 117); the relation of the empirical sciences of culture, such as history, sociology, etc., to moral philosophy (p. 168); and, finally, the passages concerned with the ethical conditions of human thinking (p. 205).

A Preface to Metaphysics. By JACQUES MARITAIN. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1939. Pp. 152. $1.75.

"It is not enough to employ the word being, to say 'Being.' We must have the intuition, the intellectual perception of the inexhaustible and incomprehensible reality thus manifested as the object of this perception. It is this intuition that makes the metaphysician" (p. 44). This small work may well be called a vademecum of metaphysical contemplation. In seven chapters M. Maritain gives us the fruit of his profond knowledge of the object of metaphysics. Every paragraph, every sentence, holds the attention of the mind, and provides an insight into the mystery of being.

The plan of the work is extremely simple. The first chapter, an introduction, repeats the author's well-known defense of Thomistic metaphysics, and here especially valuable is the distinction between "mystery" and "problem." The next three chapters contain a masterly meditation on the meaning of Being. First, he considers what being is not—not "the *particularized* being of the sciences inferior to metaphysics, the *vague* being of common sense, the being *divested of reality* which is the subject

of logic and the *pseudo-being* of a misconceived and decadent logic" (p. 42). Then follow two chapters on "Being as such" and on some of the characteristics of being. The last three chapters consider the first principles of being—identity, sufficient reason, finality and causation. Maritain has written no better work than this *Preface to Metaphysics.*

Nature and Functions of Authority. (The Aquinas Lecture, 1940). By Yves Simon. Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1940. Pp. 78. $1.50.

Yves Simon approaches here one of the most fundamental practical problems of our day—where are we to place the limits of authority and freedom? Most men see the problem in the form of a dilemma; either we deny freedom to individuals and extend the authority of the state, or we drastically restrict the authority of the state and leave the individual with complete freedom. We must choose between individualism, or the *laissez-faire* attitude, and authoritarianism, or collectivism. There are historical reasons for this difficulty. Revolt against authority, of the Church, the state, and the family, has brought about impressive material and social progress, through individual efforts. However, there is another side to the picture; the ruthlessness of these individual efforts has created social and economic conditions that weigh heavily on the majority of men and cause the totalitarian reaction against individualism.

In this short work the author asks himself "whether it is possible to find out principles to which we can make appeal in our endeavor to proportion exactly authority and liberty in any given situation" (p. 41). By an analysis of the field in which authority works (the practical order) and by a distinction between the various functions of authority, Simon arrives at a clear and precise statement of the relations between authority and liberty. Authority loses all of its stigma when we realize that its essential function is to provide for the unity of action of every multitude which cannot attain its common good except through common action.

Catholicism and the Progress of Science. By W. M. Agar. New York: Macmillan, 1940. Pp. 109. $1.00.

The Medieval Papacy in Action. By M. W. Baldwin. New York, Macmillan, 1940. Pp. 113. $1.00.

Under the auspices of the Confraternity of Christian Doctrine, the Macmillan Company is publishing a series of popular books on important topics in the history of Christianity, under the general title of The Christendom Series. The two books under review are the first of the series.

In *Catholicism and the Progress of Science,* W. M. Agar simply and clearly discusses various scientific questions that bear on the relation of

science and religion. His treatment of organic evolution is especially recommended for its sanity. An adequate bibliography is included.

The Medieval Papacy in Action describes how the Holy See, after reestablishing its supremacy in the thirteenth century, ruled the Church and extended the influence of Christian principles in the world. Well written, the book concisely outlines the development and organization of ecclesiastical government in the middle ages, offering at the end a bibliography for those who may wish to investigate farther.

Life's Final Goal. By Rev. Henry C. Schuyler. Philadelphia: The Peter Reilly Co., 1939. Pp. 365. $3.00.

In *Life's Final Goal* Fr. Schuyler restricts himself to argumentation derived solely from the light of reason in an endeavor to indicate how order and harmony may be introduced into the lives of men.

This work, which presupposes a knowledge of philosophy, is divided into three parts, the first of which is psychological in character; the second is a combination of cosmological and metaphysical considerations; the third presents a unification of the matter which has been treated separately in the preceding portions of the book.

There is a constant stress upon the necessity of an intelligent regimentation of man's faculties of intellect and will to the end that each individual may achieve his highest development and accomplish the purpose of his existence. The route of the philosopher in the quest of the "Ultimate" and "Absolute" is painstakenly indicated and illuminated with homely examples.

A fault, but not one beyond repair, might be found in the lack of bibliography and indication of more profound treatises anent the many and serious problems met in the perusal of this work.

Man of Spain: A Biography of Francis Suarez. By J. H. Fichter. New York: Macmillan Co., 1940. Pp. 349, with index. $2.50.

The era is one of Spanish prestige and thought, the period of the Armada. Separation within the fold of Christ has just begun; to repress it the Council of Trent has convened and intense study of unadulterated Scholastic doctrine is being advocated by Rome.

Joseph H. Fichter has caught the atmosphere in which the man lived, and the personality of the man, Francis Suarez. Thanks to an excellent evaluation of material and a facile presentation he has given us a thoroughly interesting life. The reader becomes acquainted with Suarez the man, and incidentally with Suarez the son of Ignatius, the scholar, and the teacher. The teachings original with the Jesuit are presented with unusual clarity.

The partiality of the sources upon which the author relies, thwarts, in not a few instances, his manifest efforts toward objectivity.

National Socialism and the Roman Catholic Church. By NATHANIEL MICKLEM, Principal of Mansfield College, Oxford. London: Oxford University Press, 1939. Pp. xvi + 243, with index.

Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, this work, as indicated in the subtitle is ". . . an Account of the Conflict between the National Socialist Government of Germany and the Roman Catholic Church, 1933-1938."

The author first sets forth from official sources the Nazi *Weltanschauung*, and then shows the theory put into practice by presenting an historical and chronological survey. Being neither a Catholic nor a follower of Nazi philosophy, Doctor Micklem has sought throughout to be objective and impartial. He makes no defense of, no attack on, the position of either side, but he furnishes ample material for a discussion of the philosophical and theological principles involved in the *impasse*.

Since the appearance of this book, international events have only too vividly and cruelly verified a conclusion the reader could not avoid, *viz.*, the conflict is not a battle of religious in the field of academics; it is a battle waged by an academic religion on the march.

Modern War and Basic Ethics. By JOHN K. RYAN. Milwaukee: Bruce. 1940. Pp. 142, with index. $1.75.

This work falls into two parts. The first, comprising Chapters I to IV, treats of the scholastic doctrine of war as contained in the writings of St. Thomas, Vitoria and Suarez. The basic and unchangeable principles of ethics are clearly set forth. The second part, Chapters V to X, apply these principles to modern war, especially, modern aggressive war. The author questions whether there can be a just and adequate cause for modern war. His discussion of the attack on civilian population is especially good.

Construction de la Paix. By TH. DEMAN, O. P. (Collection: Chrétienté, 3) Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1939. Pp. vi + 77.

This small book from the pen of a great French theologian has a tragic air about it. Peace is really not the work of statesmen, diplomats, and jurists; it is something much too spiritual to be accomplished by their efforts. Fr. Deman studies its requirements, which are justice and charity. Without interior peace there is no possibility of exterior peace.

The New Testament: A New Translation from the Original Greek. By F. A. SPENSER, O. P. New York: Macmillan, 1940. Pp. 719, with index. $2.50.

We are happy to note that Macmillan has issued a cheaper edition of this fine translation of the New Testament.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Albright, W. F. *From the Stone Age to Christianity: Monotheism and the Historical Process.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1940. Pp. 363, with index. $2.50.

Bernard, Abbot of Clairvaux. *The Steps of Humility.* (Trans., with Introduction and Notes, by G. B. Burch) Cambridge, Mass. Harvard Univ. Press, 1940. Pp. xi + 287, with index. $3.00.

Blakely, P. L., S. J. *What Jesus Said: Reflections on the Sunday and Feast-day Gospels.* New York: America Press, 1940. Pp. 140. $1.50.

Brightman, E. S. *A Philosophy of Religion.* New York: Prentice-Hall, 1940. Pp. xvii + 539, with bibliography and index. $4.00.

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Hocking, W. E. *Living Religions and a World Faith.* New York: Macmillan, 1940. Pp. 291, with index. $2.50.

Klein, Felix. *The Doctrine of the Trinity.* (Trans. by D. J. Sullivan.) New York: Kenedy, 1940. Pp. 293. $2.50.

Maritain, J. *Scholasticism and Politics.* (Trans. by M. J. Adler.) New York: Macmillan, 1940. Pp. 248. $2.50.

St. Austin, Mother Mary. *The Divine Crucible of Purgatory.* (Revised and Edited by Nicholas Ryan, S. J.) New York: Kenedy, 1940. Pp. 185, with index. $2.25.

Woodbridge, F. J. E. *An Essay on Nature.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1940. Pp. x + 351, with index. $3.00.